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Financial globalization has many economic implications for countries. On one
hand, it provides protection against national shocks and more efficient global
allocation of resources. On the other hand, the financial interlinkage driven
by globalization increases the exposure of countries to the financial and real
shocks and to the risk of sudden capital reversals. This, in turn, has an impact
on countries in various aspects. This dissertation explains the three different
roles of financial globalization in individual countries and group of countries.
The first essay examines the degree of regional consumption risk sharing of
countries in ASEAN+3 and investigates the extent to which financial integration
determines the degree of regional consumption risk sharing. There are three
main questions that this paper attempts to answer. First, the paper examines
whether or not consumption risk sharing exists in ASEAN+3. Second, the paper
explores to what directions should they contribute to the degree of regional con-
sumption risk sharing. Finally, this paper examines to what extent ASEAN+3
shares the risk within the region vis-a`-vis the rest of the world. According to the
empirical analysis, there is a limited degree of regional and bilateral risk sharing
among ASEAN+3 and the degree of such has not changed much during 2000–
2007. However, despite the limited degree of regional risk sharing, countries
that invest in ASEAN+3 in moderate proportion, that is, Singapore, Korea, and
Thailand, tend to have a higher degree of regional consumption risk sharing
than global risk sharing.
The second essay addresses the major issues of inflation targeting in Thai-
land. An empirical study shows there is no evidence that inflation targeting
has contributed to economic improvement since Thailand does not perform any
better, and even worse in terms of output stability, than non inflation targeting
countries. Moreover, the results show that exchange rate channel under the
transmission mechanism plays a major role which contradicts the traditional
inflation targeting, and thus does not fit Thailand’s economy. In addition, SVAR
indicates that the disinflation is accompanied by declined and volatility in out-
put, suggesting that the adoption of inflation is not free from expenses. Re-
garding oil price surge, results obtained from SVAR estimation suggest that any
active interest policy is able to help relieve the oil price shock and leaving other
variables unaffected while having an impact of shorter duration than does in-
flation targeting.
The third essay presents an analysis of the interrelation between financial
institutions and the housing sector in the United States. The evidence presented
in the first and the second section of the essay suggests that all economic sectors
have increasingly participated in financial investment and have been exposed to
a higher degree of volatility in financial investment, combining with changes of
regulations, and new available instruments, creating the unsustainable boom in
U.S. housing markets during the late 1990s to early 2000s, and later resulted in
the subprime crisis. The third section sheds light on the dynamics of house price
by the panel error correction formulation. The econometric estimation shows
the slow adjustment of housing prices towards long-run equilibrium. The last
section examines the spill over effects of housing markets to other economic
sectors. The estimated results from VECM indicates the strong and statistically
significant of all channels of wealth effect, credit effect, and balance sheet effect.
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CHAPTER 1
CONSUMPTION RISK SHARINGAND REGIONAL FINANCIAL
COOPERATION IN ASEAN+3
1.1 Introduction
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 caused extensive damage to East Asia.
This experience made the East Asian countries acutely aware of the need to
promote regional financial cooperation to prevent resurgence of a crisis and to
attain stable economic growth. Since then, ASEAN+31 have been vigorously
promoting regional financial cooperation. With the rapid increase in economic
interdependency in East Asia, regional financial cooperation is becoming all the
more important.
The ASEAN+3 framework consists of five initiatives. First is the Chiang Mai
Initiatives (CMI) which aims to create a network of bilateral swap arrangements
(BSAs) amongASEAN+3 countries to address short-term liquidity difficulties in
the region and to supplement the existing international financial arrangements.
CMI comprises (i) bilateral swap arrangements among China, Japan, Korea, and
between any of these plus-3 countries and a core ASEAN member and (ii) the
ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA). The total bilateral swap size reached 83 bil-
lion USD and the total ASA was at 2 billion USD. Recently in February 2009,
member countries agreed to create a multilateral currency swap, or the so called
“crisis fund,” worth 120 billion USD under CMI framework, to ease the eco-
nomic difficulties resulting from economic situation in the USA.
1ASEAN+3 consists of 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations which are
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
and Vietnam,and plus three countries are China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
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Thailand
Indonesia
Philippines
Total: US$ 83.0 bil
6/
Vietnam
Brunei
Cambodia
Myanmar
Lao PDR
Singapore
Malaysia
Republic
of Korea
Japan
China
ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA)
US$ 2 bil
US$ 4 bil
Korea I¸ndonesia $2 bil
Indonesia K¸orea $2 bil
US$ 3 bil
Korea M¸alaysia $1.5 bil
Malaysia K¸orea $1.5 bil
US$ 2 bil
Korea T¸hailand $1 bil
Thailand K¸orea $1 bil
US$ 6 bil
(Japan I¸ndonesia $6 bil)
US$ 4 bil
Japan S¸ingapore $3 bil
Singapore J¸apan $1 bil
US$ 3 bil
Korea P¸hilippines $1.5 bil
Philippines K¸orea $1.5 bil
US$ 4 bil
(China I¸ndonesia $4 bil )
eq. US$ 2 bil 3/
(China P¸hlippines $2 bil)
US$ 1.5 bil
(China M¸alaysia $1.5 bil )
US$ 2 bil
(China T¸hailand $2 bil)
eq. US$ 6 bil2/
Japan C¸hina eq. $3 bil
China J¸apan eq. $3 bil
eq. US$ 8 bil4/
China K¸orea eq. $4 bil
Korea C¸hina eq. $4 bil
eq. US$ 21 bil①Japan K¸orea $10 bil
   Korea J¸apan $ 5 bil②Japan K¸orea eq. $3 bil
@ Korea J¸apan eq. $3 bil
US$ 1 bil1/
(Japan Malaysia $1 bil)
US$ 9 bil
Japan T¸hailand $6 bil
Thailand J¸apan $3 bil
Total: US $ 36.5 bil
As of end of April, 2004
1/  In addition to the BSAs under the CMI, there exists other BSA under the New Miyazawa Initiative
 between Japan and Malaysia (US$ 2.5 bil).
2/  Local currency swap between Japanese YEN and Chinese YUAN
3/  Local currency swap between Chinese YUAN and Philippine PESO
4/  Local currency swap between Chinese YUAN and Korean WON
5/  Local currency swap between Japanese YEN and Korean WON
6/  The sum of US$ 83.0 bil does not include the BSA under the New Miyazawa Initiative and the ASEAN
 Swap Arrangement (ASA).
5/
US$ 6.5 bil
Japan P¸hilippines $6 bil
Phillipines J¸apan $0.5 bil
Network of Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSAs) under the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) (after inurement of the 3rd BSA between
Japan and Thailand)
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan
Figure 1.1: Network of Bilateral Swap Arrangement(as of July 2007)
Second is the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD). ERPD con-
tributes to the prevention of financial crises through the early detection of ir-
regularities and the swift implementation of remedial policy actions. ERPD acts
as a foundation in providing an emergent assistance, especially in the event of
financial crisis.
Third is the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI). The objective of ABMI is
to develop efficient and liquid bond markets in Asia, enabling better utilization
of Asian savings for Asian investments. Bonds market development received
much attention among ASEAN+3 as new channel of fund allocating and pre-
vent currency and maturity mismatch which were the main causes of financial
crisis in 1997. It is estimated that there is a potential need for infrastructure
2
investment of 300 to 400 billion USD per year in Asia over the next ten years.
Forth is “Research Group” whose main task is to explore ways to further
strengthen financial cooperation by providing academic input from researchers
and research institutes in ASEAN+3 countries. Last but not least, “Monitoring
Short-Term Capital Flows.” ASEAN+3 countries agreed to exchange the data
on bilateral capital flows on a voluntary basis to assist the regional monitoring
system.
Financial cooperation in this region is addressed in various frameworks.
ASEAN countries have planned to move the relation forward. ASEAN finance
ministers agreed to accelerate the process to establish an ASEAN Economic
Community by 2015,2 In this context, the finance ministers agreed in 2002 on
the Roadmap for Financial and Monetary Integration of ASEAN by focusing
on capital market development, capital account liberalization, financial services
liberalization, and ASEAN currency cooperation.The Vientiane Action Program
signed at the 2004 ASEAN Summit identified three financial cooperation ini-
tiatives: (i) strengthen surveillance mechanisms including the setting up of an
early warning system, (ii) enhance domestic financial systems through capacity
building, and (iii) develop and integrate financial markets.
Financial cooperation in the ASEAN+3 or within the ASEAN itself is not
only initiated as a means of crisis prevention, it is also believed to enhance the
higher degree of financial regionalization among country members. The open-
ing of financial markets in Asia and ASEAN+3 countries have many implica-
tions on investments region-wide. One implication is the opportunities that
countries in the region benefit from smooth consumption growth and diversify
2Parties to the agreement set the goal to be achieved 5 years earlier than the last decision
made in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in Indonesia in 2003.
3
the country-specific income fluctuation. For the case of ASEAN+3, benefits from
consumption smoothing could be reaped regionally and internationally.
The objective of this paper is to study the extent to which countries in
ASEAN+3 share the risk regionally. The analysis is extended to study whether
the more open of regional financial markets and net position of the current ac-
count balance would determine the degree of regional risk sharing. The paper
is organized as follows. The next section presents the current situations of fi-
nancial regional cooperation among ASEAN+3 countries. Section 3 reviews the
existing literature with regards to relevant issues. Section 4 provides the data
snapshot of the co-movement of ASEAN+3’s consumption and regional and
global aggregates. Section 5 investigates the degree of consumption risk shar-
ing of ASEAN+3 countries. Section 6 studies the role of potential determinants
and their contributions to regional risk sharing and bilateral risk sharing. Sec-
tion 7 examines to what extent ASEAN+3 countries share the risk within their
own region vis-a`-vis the rest of the world, by allowing an individual country to
pool their consumption stream either within a region, with the rest of the world,
or with their national output. The final section explains policy implication and
the conclusions.
1.2 Literature Review
Risk sharing analysis has been widely used to measure the degree of financial
and economic integration: if the economy of a region is fully integrated, all
countries in the region will equally share the risk, and consumers are able to take
advantage of the wider range of investment opportunities, thereby smoothing
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out their lifetime consumption patterns.
The studies on risk sharing are done theoretically and empirically. Consid-
ering the previous theoretical studies, many, such as Obstfeld (1994a), Crucini
(1999), Athanasoulis & van Wincoop (2001), and Crucini & Hess (2000) fo-
cused on studies of the precise measurement of incomplete risk sharing, while
some did not pay much attention to the degree of intertemporal consumption
smoothing of the region. For instance Athanasoulis & van Wincoop (2001) as-
sumed away intertemporal consumption smoothing while Crucini (1999) and
Crucini & Hess (2000) assumed the extreme degree of intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing by using the permanent income hypothesis. Obstfeld (1994a)
did not take the intertemporal consumption into account.
On the empirical style, the studies touch upon measuring the contribution
to risk sharing (Asdrubali et al. (1996); Sørensen & Yosha (1998); Me´litz &
Zumer (1999); Asdrubali & Kim (2003)).These papers provided the distinction
between risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing. By using the purely em-
pirical technique on the studies, these papers provided no theoretical supports
that would make them soundly reliable. Furthermore, there are some of studies
that combined the two extreme approaches, which made the results more rig-
orous.Asdrubali & Kim (2003) and Kim et al. (2004) developed a method that
jointly measured the degree of risk sharing and the degree of intertemporal con-
sumption smoothing, which are derived from the theory of intertemporal con-
sumption smoothing and risk sharing theory. Asdrubali & Kim (2003) obtained
the approach mentioned above to test both of the intranational and interna-
tional degree of risk sharing using the data from the United States, OECD, and
EU countries to show how the degree of risk sharing and consumption smooth-
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ing differ within countries and across the regions. The results showed that both
of degree of consumption smoothing and the degree of risk sharing are higher
within the countries than across the regions.
The degree of risk sharing and consumption smoothing across the regions,
in addition, is used to measure the effectiveness of financial and economic inte-
gration. Kim et al. (2004) found that the degree of risk sharing in ten East Asian
countries was quite low and did not increase over time. The result indicated the
premature level of financial and economic integration in East Asia that corre-
sponds to the results from Fujiki & Tareda-Hagiwara (2007) who suggested the
high degree of integration between East Asia and the world financial markets.
They also found welfare gain is archived if East Asia financially integrated with
global markets.
There are also studies that test the channels through which risk sharing takes
place. Sorensen et al. (2007) documented that the extent of risk sharing among
industrial countries rose during the late 1990s while the home bias in debt and
equity holding declined. Giannone & Reichlin (2005) found an increase in the
extent of risk sharing among European countries during the early 1990s, when
financial integration in Europe had started gaining momentum. Results corre-
spond to a study from Fratzscher & Imbs (2007) who found that, by using sam-
ple countries from both matured and emerging countries, the international con-
sumption risk sharing was significantly improved by capital flows, especially
portfolio investment. They also found that the quality of financial institutions
determine the degree of risk sharing. Kose et al. (2007) used various empirical
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techniques and came upwith the conclusion that there is at best amodest degree
of international risk sharing which is far from what is predicted by theory. They
argued that industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes dur-
ing the recent period of globalization, whereas developing countries have been
shut out of this benefit.
Some studies focus on the regression framework used by Obstfeld (1994b) to
evaluate changes over time in the extent of risk sharing. Bai & Zhang (2006)
used a data set which comprises 21 industrial and 19 developing countries.
They found that there are no significant changes in the regression coefficients
from 1973–1985 to 1986–1998. Moser et al. (2004) ran the same regression for
15 EU countries and formally tested the stability of the regression coefficients
over time. They did not find any break points in the regression coefficients over
the period 1960–2002. They interpreted these results as indicating the absence
of any improvement in the extent of risk sharing.
Another branch of literature analyzes how the international correlations of
output and consumption have been affected by financial globalization. For in-
stance, Kose et al. (2003) examined the factors that influence output and con-
sumption correlations of individual country macroeconomic aggregate with the
corresponding world aggregates. Their results indicated that actual gross cap-
ital flows have no significant impact on output correlations, and they found
even weakerlink in case of consumption correlation. And so they concluded
that there is little evidence that financial globalization has influenced consump-
tion co-movement across countries.
There have been discussions about interactions between trade openness and
financial integration. There are papers studied about the effect of trade integra-
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tion and financial integration on economic growth, many of them support that
these two parts of economic integration help promoting growth. Guerin (2006)
found that regional trade agreement (RTAs) help to reduce transaction cost, and
geographical patterns of trade and portfolio investment are similar to those of
FDI. In addition, by using gravity model to find the relationship between trade
and financial credits, Rose & Spiegel (2002) found that there is a positive effect
of bilateral trade on bilateral lending patterns. And so the pattern of lending
is determined by pattern of trade. Debtors tend to borrow more from creditors
with whom they share more international trade ties. Regarding the study of
trade relations and risk sharing, Kose et al. (2007) found the striking evidence
of risk sharing improvement for 21 emerging economies when financial integra-
tion is accompanied with trade integration. That is, financial integration works
in terms of delivering risk sharing benefits only when the economy is also open
to trade flows.
1.3 Correlations of Consumption and Output
The preliminary study of risk sharing can be undertaken by looking at correla-
tions of growth rate of output and consumption nationally and internationally.
According to Kose et al. (2007), perfect risk sharing suggests (i) weakly correla-
tions (or no correlations) between consumptions and national output, (ii) high
cross-country correlations between consumption and output, (iii) cross-country
correlations of consumption are much higher than those of output, and (iv) do-
mestic consumption is more highly correlated with world consumption than
with national output. All mentioned four theoretical predictions were used
as guidelines to look at data with regard to consumption risk sharing among
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ASEAN+3 countries. In this part, I examine the correlations of household con-
sumption and output during the years 1991 to 2007 and divide the period of
study into two sub periods which are 1991 to 1999 and 2000 to 2007, to see the
pattern of changes in correlations overtime.3 Correlations are computed in three
sets (i) within a country (ii) between a country and world aggregates, and (iii)
between a country and ASEAN+3 aggregates,4 in order to compare the degree
of regional and global risk sharing of countries in ASEAN+3.
The relationship between country’s household consumption growth rate
and GDP growth rate at the national level is positive (as illustrated in Figure 1.2)
in every country except Brunei where the pattern of median spline is not quite
clear. Pairwise correlations between country’s consumption and country’s out-
put are calculated over the period 1991 to 2007 and then are split into two sub
periods that is, 1991 to 1999 and 2001 to 2007, in order to see structural change
of correlations before and after CMI had taken place. The bottom left panel in
Figure 1.3 shows the correlations between country’s consumption and country’s
output for the entire period. More than half of ASEAN+3 countries have high
national correlations of consumption and are above 0.5 except for Brunei. Ac-
cording to Figure 1.2, Brunei’s correlation was -0.1. Sub period correlations pro-
vide the useful information that ASEAN+3 have high correlations of domestic
consumption and domestic output in the early period, and right after that cor-
relations tend to scatter across countries. From the top right panel of Figure 1.3,
Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have correlations
below 0.4, whereas the rest of the ASEAN+3 countries have correlations above
0.4. China’s and Malaysia’s consumption correlations with domestic output are
3The other two motivations are to see the development of correlations after financial crisis
and the year 2000, when the Chiang Mai Intiatives (CMI) was officially announced.
4Myanmar and Laos PDR were excluded from the study dues to data unavailability.
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Figure 1.2: Country’s Consumption and Country’s Output (fitted line is median
data with 5-year rolling window)
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Figure 1.3: Pairwise Correlation of Country’s Consumption and Country’s Out-
put
Regional consumption co-movement is measured by pairwise correlation
between individual country and ASEAN+3 aggregates. The first graph is be-
tween country’s consumption and ASEAN+3’s output. The second is between
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country’s consumption and ASEAN+3’s consumption. Correlations of con-
sumption and ASEAN+3 output aggregates (see Figure 1.4) from 2000 to 2007
are scattered and relatively are within a relatively lower range than those for
1999–2007. Correlations range from -0.4 to 0.9. Brunei outperforms the entire
group and shows improvement of consumption correlations over time. Cam-
bodia, China, Philippines, Singapore,Thailand, and Vietnam saw decreasing
correlations. A similar pattern of correlations is found in between individual
country’s consumption and ASEAN+3’s consumption, except that correlations
of individual country’s consumption and ASEAN+3 are relatively higher and
less scattered than correlations of consumption and regional output in 2000–
2007. For the entire period (the bottom left panel of figures 1.4 and 1.5), corre-
lations of consumption and regional output overall are higher than correlations
of consumption and regional consumption in most of countries.
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Figure 1.4: Pairwise Correlation of Country’s Consumption and ASEAN+3’s
Output
On the global basis, countries in ASEAN+3 have slight correlations with
world output. Correlations of most countries stay in a narrow range of 0–0.2.
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Figure 1.5: Pairwise Correlation of Country’s Consumption and ASEAN+3’s
Consumption
Sub period figures (left and right top panel of Figure 1.6) suggests that the cor-
relations are scattered over time. Some countries have higher correlations in
the latter sub period whereas others have lower ones. For instance, Cambo-
dia’s correlation is -0.7 during 1991–1999 and jumps to 0.6 during 2001 to 2007.
China’s correlation also improved while the rest of ASEAN+3’s correlations ei-
ther stayed at the same level or declined overtime.According to Figure 1.7, cor-
relations of individual country’s and world’s consumption are mostly at -0.4
in all countries during 1991–1999. The pattern of correlations is more disperse
from 2000 to 2007 and rises to between 0.2 and 0.4. However, overall, correla-
tions between country’s and world’s consumption are negative between 1991
and 2007.
Contrary to the first suggestion from risk sharing theory, the consumptions
in ASEAN+3 are highly correlated with national output aggregates despite the
significant increase in financial openness since the 1990s. Correlations of con-
sumption with regional and world consumption is less than unity, which con-
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Figure 1.6: Pairwise Correlation of Country’s Consumption andWorld’s Output
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Figure 1.7: Pairwise Correlation of Country’s Consumption and World’s Con-
sumption
tradicts the second prediction from theory. Moreover, the evidence shows that
both regional and global cross-correlations of consumptions are slightly lower
than those of output. The above findings contradicts the forth proposition sug-
gested by Kose et al. (2007). ASEAN+3’s domestic consumption still heavily
depends on the countries’ own national output rather than either regional or
13
global consumption. From preliminary study, countries in ASEAN+3 have low
levels of both regional and global risk sharing, even during globalization peri-
ods when countries are more open to international financial markets.
1.4 Regional Risk Sharing
1.4.1 Research Methodology
To measure the degree of regional risk sharing among countries in ASEAN+3, I
follow the risk sharing framework suggested by Kose et al. (2007) that involves
running a regional risk sharing regression equation in a panel data frame-
work.The regional risk sharing regression equation is expressed as:
∆ log cit − ∆ log Crt = αt + β(∆ log yit − ∆ log Yrt) + εit, (1.1)
where cit is per capita consumption of country i, Crt is regional per capita
consumption, yit is per capita GDP of country i and Yrt is regional per capita
GDP. The difference between national and regional components represent the
country-specificity of the variables. Kose et al. (2007) suggests that coefficient β,
obtained from equation 1.1, represents the degree of idiosyncratic co-movement
between consumption and GDP. Risk sharing is extracted by taking the value of
β and subtracting it by one ,that is, degree of regional risk sharing is (1 − β).The
panel regression equation 1.1 covers the period 1990 to 2007.
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1.4.2 Determinants of Regional Consumption Risk Sharing
In this section, I extend the standard model as exhibited in equation 1.1 to in-
vestigate how the cross-border investment and net position of current account
should achieve in terms of risk sharing. According to Kose et al. (2007), finan-
cial openness allows countries to access international capital markets and that
should foster the higher degree of consumption smoothing and risk sharing.5
In particular, I estimate
∆ log cit − ∆ log Crt = αt + β1(∆ log yit − ∆ log Yrt) + β2φi j(∆ log yit − ∆ log Yrt)
+β3φi jdt(∆ log yit − ∆ log Yrt) + εit, (1.2)
where φi j is measure of financial openness in country i, which is measured in j
different ways. The first is proxied by the value of capital held abroad relative to
domestic GDP. The variables dt are time dummies that take a value of one for the
year 2000 and forward. The purpose of adding time dummies is to capture for
the structural change of degree of risk sharing after CMI has been implemented.
Capital is decomposed into portfolio equity, portfolio debt, and FDI.The decom-
posed financial assets holdings are normalized in two ways. First, I normalize
holdings of portfolio equity, portfolio debt, and FDI by GDP;
φi1 =
ki
GDPi
, (1.3)
where k = {equity, debt, f di}.
Second, I compute the shares of financial holdings to overall capital, that is:
5Kose et al. (2007) found that financial openness improves risk sharing among industrial
economies but this risk sharing pattern is not found in cases of developing economies.
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φi2 =
ki
equityi + debti + f dii , (1.4)
where k = {equity, debt, f di}. Both measurements capture the importance of as-
set holdings in different ways. The first measure is normalized by the size of
economies, whereas the second measure focuses on portfolio composition. Not-
ing that both measures are time invariant, I compute averages over 1991 to 2007
and 2000 to 2007. Degree of risk sharing of country i is (1−β1−β2φi j). If there ex-
ists a significant structural change during 2000-2007, the degree of risk sharing
will be (1−β1− (β2+β3)φi j). I also use de jure capital openness index provided by
Chinn& Ito (2008) andAREAER index as ameasurement of financial openness.6
Risk sharing can be determined by the net position of current account. Re-
calling that current account is expressed as the difference between national (both
public and private) savings and investment. A current account deficit may
therefore reflect a low level of national savings relative to investment or a high
rate of investment, or both. In other words, a current account surplus increases
a country’s net foreign assets by the corresponding amount, and a current ac-
count deficit does the reverse. By Controlling the position of net current ac-
count allows us the see the pattern of regional risk sharing given a net position
of country members.
1.4.3 Scope of the Study and Source of Data
Panel regression with country and time fixed effect is used to estimate risk shar-
ing equation. The sample period is 1991–2007. Sample countries are China,
6Please see Chinn & Ito (2008).
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Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.7 Data
are obtained fromWDI, CPIS, IMF, and ASEAN Secretariat. Definition and data
description are in the Appendix A.
1.4.4 Empirical Results
Table 1.1 represents the degree of regional risk sharing of ASEAN+3. Results
are from full sample, that is, 1991–2007, and 2000–2007, using time dummies
to define the structural break. Column 1 represents result without any interac-
tion variables, results were obtained from suggesting the limited degree of risk
sharing for the full sample.
Columns 2 through 8 indicate results where interaction variables are intro-
duced into the model. The reason for doing so is to capture the extent to which
regional financial market openness and regional financial investment should af-
fect the degree of regional risk sharing. Different types of financial assets and
liabilities, which are portfolio equity, portfolio debt, and FDI that individual
countries in ASEAN+3 hold up against other countries in same region, are in-
cluded as interaction terms. De jure capital openness provided by Chinn & Ito
(2008) and AREAER are used to account for indicator of capital openness. Ta-
ble 1.1, column 2 through 8, presents the results of regression with interaction
terms where indicators of each financial assets holding were normalized with
GDP. Results of each column are categorized in two sample sets which are full
sample that is, 1991–2007, and 2000–2007. For the full sample, debt assets ac-
count for degree of regional risk sharing albeit their affects are offset by the
7Brunei , Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos PDR, and Myanmar are dropped because data on coor-
dinated portfolio investment is not available.
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high degree of co-movement between indyosyncratic consumption and output.
De jure measurement of capital openness shows the sign of improvement of
the degree of regional risk sharing while the other types of financial portfolio
investment do not make the contribution. However, time dummies of the pe-
riod 2000–2007 do not show any significance of structural break in any type of
portfolio and FDI investment. Table 1.2 shows the results where financial as-
sets and liabilities and FDI are normalized by total investment from 2000–2007.
Among all other types of financial investment and FDI, only debt liabilities are
conducive to promoting the degree of regional risk sharing. However, by tak-
ing the percentage of financial investment to total investment into account, the
degree of risk sharing is deteriorated by the high degree of consumption and
output co-movement which are higher than one in almost all cases.
The inability of ASEAN+3 markets to gain degree of risk sharing within a
region as suggested by Kose et al. (2007) is related to the domestic conditions of
the country. I examine the role of net savings position (ratio current account sur-
plus to GDP), financial development (ratio of M2 to GDP), and trade openness
(ratio of sum of exports and imports to GDP). Results of regression, as exhib-
ited in Table 1.3, suggest that for the full sample period, net savings position of
country in ASEAN+3 is statistically significant and positive, which means that
net savings position discourages regional risk sharing.8 Other country charac-
teristics do not show any significance. No strutural change is observed since
the time dummies do not pick any significant effects. This implies that the role
of regional financial investments as contributors to the degree of regional risk
sharing has not changed since CMI was instituted.
8Net borrowing position are not statistically significant and, so, the results are suppressed.
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Table 1.1: Regional Consumption Risk Sharing with Investment as Share of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES No Equity Equity FDI Debt Debt Chinn-Ito AREAER
Interactions Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities De Jure De Jure
1991–2007 1991–2007 1991–2007 1991–2007 2000–2007 2000–2007 1991–2007 1991–2007
GDP 0.829*** 0.769*** 0.869*** 0.770*** 1.353*** 1.231*** 0.879*** 1.008***
(0.110) (0.118) (0.128) (0.130) (0.229) (0.332) (0.117) (0.132)
Equity (Assets) 9.498
(7.416)
Equity(Assets) × 2000-2007 dummies -6.843
(7.348)
Equity(Liabilities) -6.371
(6.118)
Equity(Liabilities)× 2000-2007 dummies 2.178
(2.946)
FDI 10.99
(19.30)
FDI× 2000-2007 dummies 12.61
(28.28)
Debt(Assets) -3.483*
(2.353)
Debt(Liabilities) -7.846
(18.46)
Ito-Chinn De Jure Measurement -0.0907
(0.0815)
Ito-Chinn De Jure Measurement × 2000-2007 dummies 0.137
(0.127)
IMF De Jure Measurement -0.562***
(0.213)
IMF De Jure Measurement× 2000-2007 dummies 0.433
(0.416)
Constant -0.00398 -0.00191 -0.00457 -0.00232 -0.0897*** -0.0862*** -0.00605 -0.00789
(0.00592) (0.00611) (0.00611) (0.00626) (0.00733) (0.00903) (0.00669) (0.00607)
Observations 132 132 132 132 60 60 127 132
Adjusted R2 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.950 0.992 0.991 0.949 0.953
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
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Table 1.2: Regional Consumption Risk Sharing with Investment as Share of Total
Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Equity Equity FDI Debt Debt
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
2000–2007 2000–2007 2000–2007 2000–2007 2000–2007
GDP 0.879*** 1.354*** 1.041*** 1.503*** 1.290***
(0.365) (0.248) (0.205) (0.424) (0.197)
Equity (Assets) 0.778
(1.117)
Equity (Liabilities) -0.776
(0.600)
FDI 0.386
(0.732)
Debt (Assets) -0.740
(0.737)
Debt (Liabilities) -0.643*
(0.417)
Constant -0.00417 -0.000404 -0.00668 -0.00144 -0.00917***
(0.00764) (0.00777) (0.00576) (0.00836) (0.00490)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
Adjusted R2 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.992
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
Standard errors are in parentheses.
1.5 Bilateral Risk Sharing
This section extends the prevalent model of risk sharing by introducing the idea
of bilateral risk sharing into the analysis in order to measure the extent to which
two individual member countries share risk bilaterally. A country agrees to
smooth out the transaction with another country if their consumptions are cor-
related to each other, but there will be no reason to do so if the output fluctu-
ations are also perfectly correlated. The bilateral risk sharing is given by the
estimates of γ in the following equation:
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Table 1.3: Regional Consumption Risk Sharing with Country Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES CurrentAccountGDP
M2
GDP
Trade
GDP
1991–2007 1991–2007
GDP 0.725*** 0.521*** 1.012***
(0.123) (0.236) (0.201)
CurrentAccount
GDP 3.909***
(2.025)
CurrentAccount
GDP × 2000–2007 dummies -0.216
M2
GDP 0.369
(0.256)
M2
GDP × 2000–2007 dummies -0.0520
(0.160)
Trade
GDP -0.184
(0.220)
Trade
GDP × 2000–2007 dummies 0.177
(0.182)
Constant -0.00267 -0.00602 -0.00899
(0.00585) (0.00616) (0.00559)
Observations 130 132 122
Adjusted R2 0.953 0.950 0.970
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
∆ log cit − ∆ log c jt = αt + γ1(∆ log yit − ∆ log y jt) + γ2φ′i j,t(∆ log yit − ∆ log y jt)
+γ3φ
′
i j,tdt(∆ log yit − ∆ log y jt) + γl
l∑
3
T li j,t + εi j,t, (1.5)
where the term (∆ log cit − ∆ log c jt) and (∆ log yit − ∆ log y jt) are cyclical compo-
nents of consumption and income between country i and country j respectively.
The interaction variables, φ′i j, represents the bilateral portfolio investment be-
tween country i and country j, measured by the various types of capital assets
(liabilities) that country i holds against country j relative to the GDP of coun-
try i. They are decomposed into portfolio equity and portfolio debt.9 The de-
composed financial assets holdings are normalized by taking the holdings of
9FDI is suppressed due to data unavailability.
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portfolio equity, portfolio debt by GDP of country i:
φ′i j =
ki j
GDPi
, (1.6)
where k = {equity, debt}.
Note that φ′ is time invariant. I compute averages over 1991–2007 and 2000–
2007. Degree of risk sharing of country i is (1 − γ1 − γ2φ′i j). If there exists the
significance structural change during 2000–2007, the degree of risk sharing will
be (1 − γ1 − (γ2 + γ3)φ′i j). Controlled variables Ti j, comprise of distance, common
language, and border. Details of variables are in the Appendix A. Panel regres-
sion with time and country pair fixed-effect is used to estimate coefficients.
Table 1.4 shows the estimates of equation 1.2. Column 1 exhibits the coeffi-
cients obtained from the whole data set without interaction. It shows that the
degree of bilateral consumption risk sharing in ASEAN+3 is quite low. This cor-
responds to the results from the earlier section. The next three columns interact
the extent of risk sharing with different types of portfolios and FDI investment.
In bilateral terms, the results show that particular types of financial interaction
have been associated with the degree of risk sharing. The de facto measure-
ments of financial investment largely contribute to the degree of bilateral risk
sharing. Share of equity assets and equity liabilities to output appear to sup-
port the bilateral risk sharing in the full sample period. However, debt stocks
do not play a significant role in promoting bilateral risk sharing. Regarding the
structural change during 2000–2007, results in columns 2 and 3 indicate that
bilateral equity assets and liabilities investment worsen bilateral risk sharing
by approximately the same amount as they contribute to bilateral risk sharing
during 1990s. Debt liabilties coefficient remains insignificant. The result is con-
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Table 1.4: Bilateral Consumption Risk Sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES No Equity Equity Debt
Interactions Assets Liabilities Liabilities
1991-2007 1991-2007 1991-2007 1991-2007
GDP 0.857*** 0.875*** 0.873*** 0.857***
(0.0389) (0.0715) (0.0708) (0.0714)
Equity(Assets) -30.01***
(8.940)
Equity(Assets)× 2000-2007 dummies 30.20***
(12.75)
Equity(Liabilities) -23.12***
(9.048)
Equity(Liabilities)× 2000-2007 dummies 28.75***
(13.89)
Debt(Liabilities) 0.593
(4.821)
Debt(Liabilities)× 2000-2007 dummies 1.680
(4.165)
Distance -0.00668 -0.00718*** -0.00713*** -0.00700***
(0.00422) (0.00196) (0.00193) (0.00218)
Language 0.00290 0.00291*** 0.00297*** 0.00279***
(0.00576) (4.17e-05) (0.000154) (0.00144)
Land Continuity -0.00191 -0.00218*** -0.00216*** -0.00166
(0.00611) (0.00108) (0.00107) (0.00152)
Landlock 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Constant 0.0500 0.0535*** 0.0537*** 0.0521***
(0.0332) (0.0151) (0.0148) (0.0162)
Observations 882 882 882 882
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.463 0.462 0.456
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
Standard errors are in parentheses.
sistent with Kose et al. (2007) the results of which suggest that financial inte-
gration appears to have no significant impact on emerging market during the
globalization period.
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1.6 Degree of Risk Sharing and Regional Financial Markets
Based on the specifications that I have estimated, it is possible to obtain the de-
gree of regional and bilateral risk sharing of a change in the level of regional fi-
nancial integration. Tables 1.5 and 1.7 represent degree of regional and bilateral
risk sharing and their relationships with various measures of financial open-
ness. Themeasures of regional risk sharing ((1−β1−β2φi j) and (1−β1−(β2+β3)φi j)
if there exists a significant structural change during 2000–2007) are shown in
Table 1.5. The degree of regional risk sharing varies across different financial in-
vestments and FDI as share of GDP. Without interaction, degree of regional risk
sharing is 0.17 for the full sample period and is higher if equity assets, FDI, and
IMF’s de facto measurement of capital openness are incorporated. Degree of re-
gional risk sharing were reduced with equity liabilities and Ito-Chinn measure.
It becomes negative with debt assets and debt liabilities. Overall, focusing only
on positive term, regional risk sharing varies in the range of 0.12–0.56. The next
table (Table 1.6) represents the degree of regional risk sharing interaction with
financial investments and FDI as share of total investment. To this context, the
results vary across countries and type of financial investment. The regional risk
sharing is negative in all countries with the interaction with equity investment
and FDI. Debt liabilities as a share of total investment contribute positive risk
sharing to Japan, Singapore, and the Philippines.
For the degree of bilateral risk sharing, Table 1.7 shows that the degree of
bilateral risk sharing depends on country pair and the specification of financial
investment, the degree of which ranges from -0.13 to 1. Most of the financial
investments do not pick up the structural change after 2000, except equity assets
which account for the huge dramatic change in some particular country pair (for
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Table 1.5: Degree of Regional Risk Sharing With Investment as Share of GDP
No Interaction Equity Assets
1991–2007 1991–2007 2000–2007
China 0.17 China 0.23 0.23
Indonesia 0.17 Indonesia 0.23 0.23
Japan 0.17 Japan 0.23 0.23
Korea 0.17 Korea 0.23 0.23
Malaysia 0.17 Malaysia 0.23 0.23
Philippines 0.17 Philippines 0.23 0.23
Singapore 0.17 Singapore 0.23 0.23
Thailand 0.17 Thailand 0.23 0.23
Equity Liabilities FDI
1991–2007 2000–2007 1991–2007 2000–2007
China 0.13 0.13 China 0.23 0.23
Indonesia 0.13 0.13 Indonesia 0.23 0.23
Japan 0.13 0.13 Japan 0.23 0.23
Korea 0.13 0.13 Korea 0.23 0.23
Malaysia 0.13 0.13 Malaysia 0.23 0.23
Philippines 0.13 0.13 Philippines 0.23 0.23
Singapore 0.13 0.13 Singapore 0.23 0.23
Thailand 0.13 0.13 Thailand 0.23 0.23
Debt Assets Debt Liabilities Ito-Chinn AREAER (IMF)
2000–2007 2000–2007 2000–2007 2000–2007
China -0.33 -0.35 China 0.12 0.56
Indonesia -0.35 -0.35 Indonesia 0.12 0.56
Japan -0.34 -0.35 Japan 0.12 0.56
Korea -0.35 -0.35 Korea 0.12 0.56
Malaysia -0.35 -0.35 Malaysia 0.12 0.56
Philippines -0.34 -0.35 Philippines 0.12 0.56
Singapore 0.29 -0.35 Singapore 0.12 0.56
Thailand -0.35 -0.35 Thailand 0.12 0.56
Source: Author’s Calculation
instance, Singapore andMalaysia which share the perfect risk sharing in the full
sample period but are hit down to 0.01 during 2000-2007).
Taken all together both regionally and bilaterally, the results suggest that
degree of risk sharing in ASEAN+3 countries is determined by three factors (1)
consumption co-movement (2) risk sharing coefficient, and (3) magnitude of
regional and bilateral financial investment. Negative risk sharing stems from
the lack of any of the three determinants.
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Table 1.6: Degree of Regional Risk Sharing with Investment as Share of Total
Investment
Equity Assets Equity Liabilities FDI Debt Assets Debt Liabitlies
2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007
China 0.121 -0.35 -0.04 -0.5 -0.15
Indonesia 0.121 -0.35 -0.04 -0.5 -0.21
Japan 0.121 -0.35 -0.04 -0.5 0.28
Korea 0.121 -0.35 -0.04 -0.5 0.17
Malaysia 0.121 -0.35 -0.04 -0.5 -0.17
Philippines 0.121 -0.35 -0.04 -0.5 0.20
Singapore 0.121 -0.35 -0.04 -0.5 -0.05
Thailand 0.121 -0.35 -0.04 -0.5 -0.20
Source: Author’s Calculation
The results that I have presented thus far suggest that the degree of regional
and bilateral risk sharing is limited. To explain why it is so, I look closely at
each factor that contributes to degree of risk sharing. Exploring the first fac-
tor, consumption co-movement, I categorize the dependent variable, that is, the
idyosyncratic component of regional consumption (∆ log cit − ∆ log Crt), into dif-
ferent groups according to its corresponding year.10 And then I generate inter-
action of idiosyncratic component of consumption with each category, run re-
gression on the categories and interaction terms, and generate predicted values.
I repeat the same steps with bilateral terms. The predicted value of the idiosyn-
cratic component of regional and bilateral consumption is then plotted against
time and exhibited in figures 1.6 and 1.6. According to Kose et al. (2007), risk
sharing is observed if there exists a high degree of consumption co-movement
between two parties, that is, a small number of component of consumption.
Figure 1.6 shows that the idiosyncratic component of consumption is stable at a
narrow range close to zero over time and there is no structural change in year
2000. The structural change becomes significant for 2005–2007, since the do-
mestic consumption moves away from regional consumption causing the sharp
increase of idiosyncratic component of consumption from almost null to 0.25 in
10During the sample period 1991–2001,the total number of group is 17.
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Table 1.7: Degree of Bilateral Risk Sharing
No Equity Equity Equity Equity Debt Debt
Interaction Assets Assets Liabilities Liabilities Liabilities Liabilities
Country Pair 1991-2007 1991-2007 2000-2007 1991-2007 2000-2007 1991-1999 2000-2007
MI 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
MP 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
MT 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
MS 0.14 0.30 0.14 1.19 0.38 0.14 0.14
MC 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
MK 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
MJ 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.14
IM 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
IP 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
IT 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
IS 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.31 0.02 0.14 0.14
IC 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
IK 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
IJ 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
PM 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
PI 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
PT 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
PS 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.14
PC 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
PK 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
PJ 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
TM 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
TI 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
TP 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
TS 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.35 -0.44 0.14 0.14
TC 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
TK 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
TJ 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.04 0.14 0.14
SM 0.14 1.00 0.01 0.27 0.10 0.14 0.14
SI 0.14 0.30 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
SP 0.14 0.20 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
ST 0.14 0.53 -0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
SC 0.14 0.58 -0.20 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
SK 0.14 0.51 -0.26 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.14
SJ 0.14 0.64 -0.32 0.45 -0.04 0.14 0.14
CM 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
CI 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
CP 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
CT 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
CS 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.14
CK 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
CJ 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.14
KM 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
KI 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
KP 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
KT 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
KS 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.01 0.14 0.14
KC 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
KJ 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.14
JM 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
JI 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
JP 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
JT 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
JS 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.14
JC 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14
JK 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14
Source: Author’s Calculation
Note:See details of abbreviations in the Appendix A.
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year 2006 before dropping sharply in year 2007. The same pattern of change
in idiosyncratic component of consumption is observed in bilateral term (Fig-
ure 1.6) except that the structural change occurs in year 2001 and the degree is
milder than what was presented in figure 1.6.
Both figures infer that regional and bilateral financial interactions are not
able to pick up the improvement of risk sharing after year 2000, since the con-
sumption co-movement has not changed much over time. In addition, the huge
spike of regional consumption co-movement in year 2005 explains why the fi-
nancial interactions with 2000–2007 time dummies for CMI are not significant
in all cases.
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Figure 1.8: Piecewise Linear Idiosyncratic Component of Regional Consump-
tion
Since the risk sharing coefficients were already mentioned, the next factor
that is to be considered is the magnitude of regional and bilateral financial in-
vestment. Equity Markets in ASEAN+3 have grown, evidently, since the Asian
crisis aftermath. After year 2003, stock markets in ASEAN (as shown in Ta-
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Figure 1.9: Piecewise Linear Idiosyncratic Component of Bilateral Consumption
ble 1.8) rose by 160.6 percent. Average daily turnover rose by 800 percent alto-
gether with an impressive growth in capital due to both initial and secondary
public offerings.
However, market capitalization is below industrial countries, and there is
considerable diversity within the broad picture. Equity market in China re-
mains illiquid and small relative to the size of its domestic economy. In China,
the equity market reflects the dominance of state-own companies. In addition,
many high performing firms in the region mostly do the cross-list through de-
veloped exchanges in the United States and Europe. The majority of China’s
successful companies are listed overseas, primarily in Hong Kong Oura et al.
(2006). Cross-listing can be considered as channel for individual companies di-
verting away from regional capital markets.
As the source of financial funds, equities provide around 10 percent of cor-
porate financing (see Table 1.9). In spite of the growth of equity financing, Asian
29
finance continues to reply on bank loans, and as shown in figures 1.10, 1.11, and
Table 1.10, regional equity investment has yet to recover to pre-Asian crisis level
(Oura et al. (2006)).
Table 1.8: Stock Market Indicators (billion USD, 2003 and 2007)
Market Capitalization Average Daily Turnover IPOs Secondary Public Offering
2007 2003 %△ 2007 2003 %△ 2007 2003 %△ 2007 2003 %△
Asia
Bursar Malaysia 325.3 161.0 102.0 0.7 0.2 250.0 0.3 0.8 -62.5 2.2 0.95 131.6
Hong Kong Exchanges 2,654.4 714.6 271.5 8.7 0.8 987.5 37.5 7.6 393.4 36.5 19.9 83.4
Indonesia SE 211.7 54.7 287.0 0.5 0.05 840.0 2.0 1.1 81.8 3.4 0.5 580.0
Korea Exchange 1,122.6 293.9 282.0 8.3 2.4 245.8 3.2 0.6 424.6 3.8 0.0 NA
Osaka SE 212.2 1,951.5 -89.1 1.1 0.5 120.0 0.2 0.04 400.0 NA 4.9 NA
Philippine SE 103.0 23.2 344.0 0.1 0.01 900.0 0.4 0.003 13,233.3 1.6 0.02 7900.0
Shanghai SE 3,694.3 360.1 925.9 16.8 0.9 1,766.7 57.8 5.5 950.9 29.4 1.3 2161.5
Shenzhen SE 784.5 152.9 413.1 8.7 0.6 1,350.0 5.7 0.6 850.0 7.4 0.4 1750.0
Singapore Exchange 539.2 173.8 210.2 1.5 0.3 400.0 5.2 1.1 372.7 4.6 0.2 2200.0
Thailand SE 197.1 115.4 70.8 4.1 0.2 1,950.0 0.3 NA NA 0.6 NA NA
Tokyo SE Group 4,330.9 3,557.7 21.7 26.4 6.4 312.5 NA NA NA 17.9 29.0 -38.3
ASEAN5 1,376.3 528.1 160.6 6.9 0.8 803.9 8.2 3.0 173.1 12.4 1.7 642.5
Industrial Countries
Nasdaq 4,013.7 2,844.2 41.1 61.0 28.8 111.8 16.2 6.4 153.1 NA NA NA
NYSE Group 15,650.8 11,339.0 38.0 119.2 40.9 191.4 60.4 27.4 120.4 76.6 54.2 41.3
London SE 3,851.7 2,460.1 56.6 40.7 15.9 156.0 50.0 7.6 557.9 32.8 22.6 45.1
Source:World of Federation of Exchanges
Note: Average Daily Transaction is the sum of daily purchases and sales , average over a year.
Table 1.9: Role of Equity in Financial Sector as Source of Financing (percent of
GDP)
1996 2000 2005
Bank Equity Bond Total Bank Equity Bond Total Bank Equity Bond Total
Deposits Market Market Fin. Deposits Market Market Fin. Deposits Market Market Fin.
Sector Sector sector
CHN 26.4 14.4 11.8 52.6 38.8 32.2 23.6 94.5 45.6 25.3 27.6 98.5
JPN 101.9 118.4 103.7 323.9 113.3 113.3 128.7 355.3 124.5 123.2 194.1 441.9
KOR 36.3 24.9 50.3 111.5 68.3 45.6 62.1 176.0 67.1 90.5 88.9 246.4
ASEAN
INA 43.8 36.0 7.1 86.9 48.2 15.0 39.1 102.4 40.3 29.5 21.8 91.6
MAS 72.9 315.5 81.8 470.2 88.6 133.0 100.4 322.1 98.9 140.5 111.2 350.5
PHI 48.2 95.6 46.0 189.8 54.1 51.1 51.9 157.1 47.4 114.8 70.5 232.7
SNG 77.9 380.6 29.7 488.2 99.9 287.3 57.3 444.4 105.6 270.0 88.1 463.7
THA 73.9 54.9 16.9 145.7 93.8 36.3 36.3 166.5 83.6 73.7 51.2 208.5
Source:Oura et al. (2006)
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Source: CPIS, World Bank
Figure 1.10: Bilateral Equity Asset Holdings as Ratio to GDP
In addition to stock markets, bond markets have become one of the most
important policy issues in the region. Bond market development is essential to
avoid the maturity and currency mismatches and to channel regional savings
from regional supplier to regional demander. Through the multilateral efforts,
both from supply side, which is promoted by the Asian Bond Market Initiative
(ABMI), and from demand side, which has resulted from the effort of the Ex-
ecutives’ Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP)11 to promote the
development of domestic and regional markets by purchasing bonds issued in
the region. As a result, bond markets have developed in size from 4.6 trillion
USD in 1997 to 13.7 trillion USD in 2008,12 an almost threefold increase.
11This encourages regional bond trading by launching the Asian Bond Funds (ABF1 andABF2
details in Appendix A).
12Data are as of May, 2008.
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Source: CPIS, World Bank
Figure 1.11: Bilateral Equity Liabilities as Ratio to GDP
Table 1.11 shows that each country has seen remarkable bond market im-
provement in size.13 The major composition of local bond markets is govern-
ment bonds (as depicted in Figure 1.12). Corporate bonds do not play an im-
portant role in this region except in Korea and Malaysia where the corporate
bond markets are relatively bigger that the rest of countries in region.
13Hong Kong does not join in ASEAN+3 dialogue but has participated in the EMEAP frame-
work.
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Table 1.10: Portfolio Investment Flows: Equity Securities (million USD)
(a) Year 2001
P
P
P
P
P
Into
From
HKG INA JPN KOR MAS PHI SIN THA UK USA
China 5,449 0.03 789.45 15.48 7.97 1,035 4 1,462 2,370
Hong Kong 11.22 4,847.86 100.39 47.27 3,125 6 12,291 30,154
Japan 2,145 2.21 0.00 101.49 6.86 0.49 1,536 1 52,610 170,714
Korea 1,311 0.08 0.00 0.00 8.41 1,034 2,110 29,537
Indonesia 49.71 12.58 43.69 307 15 386 1,526
Malaysia 604 338.55 123.82 5,295 1,372 2,578
Philippines 60 212.82 3.48 60.56 420 1 300 1,344
Singapore 1,403 2.20 923.91 0.83 460.93 2.21 8 4,931 21,376
Thailand 488 0.01 289.72 20.29 14.71 0.80 1,520 1,481 1,916
Vietnam 0.76 6.48 10.40 25 3 10
UK 22,698 0.06 29,479.89 51.51 23.68 2,688 350,014
USA 11,458 123,511.15 454.46 68.23 91.90 6,034 14 129,190
ASEAN+3 (%)* 12.11 27.29 1.12 20.42 42.00 3.16 34.61 0.83 11.51 14.25
ASEAN+4(%)** 12.11 27.29 1.15 21.88 46.06 3.16 35.67 1.89 11.58 14.35
UK&USA(%) 36.10 0.37 67.29 38.93 6.90 82.92 27.85 0.83 23.14 21.70
ROW 51.79 4.62 29.43 31.46 43.49 13.92 26.50 96.93 63.08 62.08
Total 94,615 16.57 227,351.39 1299.77 1331.97 110.83 31,319 1,694 558,379 1,612,667
Source:CPIS
ASEAN+3 includes China ,Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
ASEAN+4 includes China , Hong Kong , Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
(b) Year 2006
P
P
P
P
P
Into
From
HKG INA JPN KOR MAS PHI SIN THA UK USA
China 100,009 9,853 1,681 13 6,913 10 14,976 73,912
Hong Kong 11,014 4,156 441 18,719 7 29,315 85,833
Japan 6,918 1,809 217 4,534 7 173,596 543,506
Korea 2,254 3,358 113 4,530 28,197 114,155
Indonesia 456 3 39 1,336 1 3,184 11,490
Malaysia 751 1 493 48 7,771 111 4,201 10,781
Philippines 192 109 1 12 423 1 976 6,050
Singapore 2,858 7 3,772 490 1,558 2 80 12,277 43,911
Thailand 872 12 1,049 9 53 1 3,248 5,455 11,054
Vietnam 120 109 14 238
UK 48,147 52,107 1,354 190 3,851 90 673,978
USA 15,537 3 224,136 5,180 236 95 15,801 113 340,777
ASEAN+3(%)* 32.43 5.60 3.72 11.35 53.38 2.60 30.69 13.21 17.89 18.80
ASEAN+4(%)** 32.43 5.60 5.88 22.63 65.13 2.60 50.61 13.62 20.04 20.79
UK & USA(%) 18.2 0.8 54.1 17.7 11.4 81.2 20.9 12.0
ROW 173,256 330 204,011 21,928 802 -65 26,664 1,234 748,796 2,754,270
Total 350,846 359 510,418 36,819 3,753 117 93,973 1,694 1,362,010 4,328,962
Source:Suk & Bum (2008),CPIS
ASEAN+3 includes China ,Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
ASEAN+4 includes China , Hong Kong , Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
ASEAN+3 economies have carried out various international standards and
reforms in order to create a good environment for bond investors. Improve-
ments have been driven by government initiatives to develop bond markets.
However, Asia’s bond markets are still very small by international standards,
particularly the corporate bond markets. Liquidity is still low and regional
bonds are not popular among local investors. According to Figure 1.13, bond
and equity markets in ASEAN+3 are still lagging behind other international
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Table 1.11: Local Currency Bond Market Outstanding (billion USD)
1997 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008(Mar)
China 83.5 342.2 448.4 623.7 900.48 1,184.86 1,885.4
Hong Kong 41.3 58.1 60.5 62.9 65.8 65.7 50.6
Japan 4,202.8 6,416.9 7,882.4 8,945.0 8,451 8,493 10,144.9
Korea 153.21 538.2 759.9 751.3 847.7 1,010.4 1,052.9
ASEAN
Indonesia 4.29 58.2 65.7 61.2 54.7 76.3 85.8
Malaysia 57 84.4 98.8 110.6 123.5 146.8 185.3
Philippines 16.59 27.6 30.7 35.6 41.2 44.9 57.6
Singapore 23.75 56.4 61.5 72.7 74.9 86.5 102.7
Thailand 10.43 48.3 59.6 68 80.5 111.4 156.1
Total 4,592.7 7,630.3 9,467.5 10,731 10,639.78 11,219.86 13,721.3
Source:Suk & Bum (2008),BIS
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Figure 1.12: Size and Composition of Local Currency Bond Market, as of De-
cember 2007 (percent of GDP)
markets.
Table 1.12 shows that regional savings have increased. Saving resources are
abundant and under–utilized. Countries in ASEAN+3 have accumulated huge
foreign exchange reserves since the financial crisis aftermath, and all countries’
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Bond and Equity Ranking, as of 2008
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Figure 1.13: Bond and Equity Ranking among 56 Countries, as of 2008
foreign exchange reserves grow more than twice as much as they did in 1990
(Figure 1.14). And unlike European investors who are in favor of pooling their
savings in Europe, ASEAN+3 investors invest in other countries ADB (2008).
This contributes to the exports of excess domestic savings from ASEAN+3 coun-
tries to developed countries and to the United States in particular. Excess re-
gional savings has flooded to finance current account deficit in United States.
As shown in Table 1.13, the amount of regional debt securities investment in
2006 fell slightly from 2001 in Japan, Korea, and Malaysia and rose slightly in
the Philippines and Thailand. However, the major destination of debt securities
investment is still the United States. According to Suk & Bum (2008), ASEAN+3
savings take a flight and invest in US treasury securities. The thinness of the
regional bond markets thus implies limited regional risk sharing through this
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channel.
Table 1.12: Domestic Savings, Capital Formation, and Resource Gap
Gross Domestic Saving Gross Domestic Investment Resource Gap
1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007 1990 2000 2007
China 35.2 38 48.6 36.1 35.1 44.2 -0.9 2.9 4.4
Indonesia 32.3 31.8 28.2 30.7 22.2 24.9 1.5 9.6 3.3
Japan 33.8 26.9 25.5 32.9 25.4 23.8 0.9 1.6 1.7
Korea 37.3 33.9 30.8 37.5 31 29.4 -0.2 2.9 1.4
Malaysia 34.4 46.1 42.2 32.4 26.9 21.9 2 19.2 20.3
Philippines 18.7 17.3 20.9 24.2 21.2 15.3 -5.5 -3.9 5.7
Singapore 44 46.9 51.4 37.1 33.3 22.6 6.9 13.6 28.8
Thailand 34.3 30.4 33.9 41.4 22.8 26.8 -7.1 7.5 7.1
Source: ADB
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Figure 1.14: Foreign Exchange Reserve Holdings as a percent of GDP
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Table 1.13: Portfolio Investment Flows: Long-term Debt Securities (million
USD)
(a) 2001
P
P
P
P
P
Into
From
HKG INA JPN KOR MAS PHI SIN THA UK USA
China 2,967 879.80 141.93 411.96 828 634
Hong Kong 96.21 1,268.42 305.85 27.87 25.03 1,621.53 119 8,597 1,893
Japan 7,103 0.96 0.00 74.84 15.40 4.98 9,013.88 41,480 27,125
Korea 3,877 5453.64 0.00 2.72 6.54 2,181.59 3,877 4,938
Indonesia 107.92 62.52 7.65 3.00 560.26 319 315
Malaysia 1,017 2.11 2,199.63 328.59 8.96 1,591.17 1,017 1,680
Philippines 1,179 1,347.05 106.46 41.26 761.35 712 2,671
Singapore 1,282 37.62 1,208.67 151.41 10.23 59.43 98 7,741 1,442
Thailand 659 748.20 159.02 21.27 841.10 425 782
Vietnam 29.92 15.31 23 21
UK 8,372 73.62 80,875.77 378.69 386.80 24.12 13,453.13 31 162,961
USA 27,795 248.95 366,688.98 3,309.40 140.09 1,752.31 11,977.07 278 179,796
ASEAN+3 (%) 16.29 5.81 1.12 15.22 10.40 4.10 20.78 13.19 7.56 5.73
ASEAN+4(%) 16.29 5.81 1.13 15.44 10.40 4.10 20.78 13.19 7.57 5.73
UK&USA(%) 32.59 46.05 42.13 54.76 55.61 87.76 34.40 41.59 24.11 23.59
ROW 51.12 34.41 56.63 25.25 31.05 6.91 42.63 29.21 67.17 70.41
Total 110,985 700.53 1,062,402.65 6,734.61 947.46 2,024.14 73,922.58 743 745,665 690,936
Source:CPIS
ASEAN+3 includes China ,Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
ASEAN+4 includes China , Hong Kong , Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
(b) 2006
P
P
P
P
P
Into
From
HKG INA JPN KOR MAS PHI SIN THA UK USA
China 2,484 3 414 152 731 1,052 1,305
Hong Kong 26 701 2,444 29 198 2,653 6,022 1,660
Japan 2,247 793 37 8 1,658 3 54,978 35,499
Korea 8,864 8 5,752 132 5,611 127 6,766 9,507
Indonesia 171 435 77 108 2,341 1,243 2,582
Malaysia 3,621 7 1,038 204 2,790 59 4,876 4,605
Philippines 720 1,493 21 14 516 2,978 4,939
Singapore 3,692 89 3,136 300 29 502 449 4,052 8,518
Thailand 475 111 94 25 933 807 1,702
Vietnam 226 37 5 66 202 238
UK 19,414 30 90,660 2,759 833 489 5,071 322 245,365
USA 45,849 91 563,401 25,075 579 1,535 19,951 168 458,441
ASEAN+3(%)* 11.91 11.74 0.66 3.57 9.53 11.46 17.83 20.80 4.91 5.35
ASEAN+4(%)** 11.91 14.60 0.70 8.83 10.40 15.70 21.06 20.80 5.30 5.48
UK & USA(%) 34.5 13.3 36.1 59.9 42.2 43.3 30.5 15.9
ROW 101,493 627 1,144,771 14,498 1,532 1,854 39,786 1,908 1,017,883 959,591
Total 189,303 909 1,811,986 46,491 3,346 4,670 82,159 3,073 1,559,315 1,275,516
Source:Suk & Bum (2008),CPIS
ASEAN+3 includes China ,Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
ASEAN+4 includes China , Hong Kong , Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia,Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
1.7 Imperfect Regional Risk Sharing
Results in the previous section suggest the limited risk sharing within the re-
gion. In this section, the perfect risk sharing assumption is relaxed an economic
agent is offered more investment choice. This analysis is done in order to com-
pare the degree of regional risk sharing vis-a`-vis the rest of the world. According
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to, Crucini (1999), Crucini &Hess (2000), and Asdrubali & Kim (2003), if the rep-
resentative agent in the region can pool fraction λreg regionally, and fraction λrow
of income goes to the rest of the world, with λy of income being unpooled, then
the consumption of country i will change by the following process:
∆ log cit = α + λreg,i∆ log Creg,t + λrow,i∆ log Crow,t + λy,i∆ log yit + εit, (1.7)
where α represents the difference of discount factor across countries and εit
reflects the preference shock. Equation 1.7 describes how the individual coun-
try’s consumption growth rate would co-move, either regionally or globally,
only up to the level risk sharing is achieved, while the leftover portion of con-
sumption should follow domestic output growth of that particular country. Ex-
pressing the risk sharing equation this way permits us to see to what extent that
individual country smooths out consumption regionally and globally.
Equation 1.7 is estimated by using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regres-
sion since there is an evidence of correlated errors across equations. Table 1.14
presents the estimated regression coefficients of equation 1.7 using data from
1961–2007. Overall, the high, positive, and significant co-movement between
consumption and output is observed in every individual ASEAN+3 country ex-
cept the Philippines, which has the coefficient of 0.346— relatively speaking, the
lowest among the group. Considering the degree of regional and global con-
sumption co-movement, one could infer that, given the limited degree of risk
sharing, half of the ASEAN+3 countries (Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Thai-
land) tended to have higher regional consumption co-movement than global
consumption co-movement. Coefficients belonging to the rest of country mem-
bers were not significant.
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Table 1.14: Imperfect Risk Sharing: SUREG
CHN INA JPN KOR MAS PHI SIN THA
∆ log Creg,t -0.076 -0.621* 0.233*** 0.429*** 0.049 -0.057 1.507*** 0.261*
(0.153) (0.352) (0.069) (0.154) (0.202) (0.046) (0.213) (0.153)
∆ log Crow,t -0.582* -1.468** 0.126 -0.608** -0.413 0.015 -0.762* -0.241
(0.353) (0.705) (0.131) (0.298) (0.398) (0.102) (0.407) (0.254)
∆ log yit 0.517*** 0.974*** 0.58*** 0.8516*** 1.021*** 0.346*** 0.546*** 0.693***
(0.052) (0.233) (0.062) (0.113) (0.149) (0.036) (0.137) (0.111)
Constant 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.005*** -0.011** -0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
Standard errors are in parentheses.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper examines the degree of regional consumption risk sharing of
ASEAN+3 countries and investigates the extent to which financial integration
determines degree of regional consumption risk sharing. The basic intuition be-
hind risk sharing through financial markets is that international portfolio diver-
sification helps to reduce volatility on investment returns, which in turn helps
smooth variations in consumption across countries.
There are three main questions that this paper attempts to answer. First, the
paper tries to understand if consumption risk sharing exists in ASEAN+3. Sec-
ond, if there exists a degree of regional consumption risk sharing then to what
channels should they contribute to degree of regional consumption risk sharing.
This question is answered by is examining specifically the role of financial inte-
gration, both de jure and de facto measurement, by focusing on different com-
positions of financial investment. The analysis is also done in bilateral terms
to capture the interaction between two member countries. Finally, this paper
examines to what extent the ASEAN+3 countries share the risk in the region,
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vis-a`-vis the rest of the world, by allowing an individual country to pool its con-
sumption stream either within a region or with the rest of the world.
The preliminary data sets suggest a limited degree of regional consumption
risk sharing. Summary statistics evidently show that an individual country’s
consumption moves closer with its own output as opposed to both regional
and global consumption. Regression of regional idiosyncratic components of
an individual country’s consumption on regional idiosyncratic components of
individual country’s output confirms the finding.
Extensions of this empirical analysis is done to investigate regional con-
sumption risk sharing given the degree of financial openness. For the whole
period of study, 1991–2007, I find limited evidence of risk sharing behavior
through de facto financial openness. Results are robust to various compositions
and ratios of portfolio investment. The explanation for this result would be the
fact that financial markets in ASEAN+3 on average are too small and less con-
ducive to attaining the risk sharing. Despite the above results, de jure financial
openness seems to have a significant impact on regional consumption risk shar-
ing while country characteristics do not provide any contribution to regional
consumption risk sharing. Moreover, no structural change in risk sharing is ob-
served after year 2000, indicating that the degree of risk sharing has stayed at
the same level.
The analysis is extended further to explain the risk sharing in bilateral terms.
Results agree with estimates obtained from regional risk sharing that the degree
of risk sharing is limited among country members. However, statistical esti-
mates suggest the role of bilateral equity and bilateral debt investment as main
determinants of degree of bilateral risk sharing. The same analysis was done
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using disaggregative data set, from 2000 to 2007 to see how the regional finan-
cial cooperation contributes to risk sharing when CMI was instituted in 2000.
Results show that degree of bilateral consumption risk sharing varies across
countries and the degree of bilateral risk sharing has not changed much dur-
ing 2000–2007. However, despite the limited degree of regional risk sharing,
countries that invest in ASEAN+3 in moderate proportion, that is, Singapore,
Korea, and Thailand, tend to have a higher degree of regional consumption risk
sharing than global consumption risk sharing.
The results from empirical analysis point to an interesting puzzle. The the-
ory suggests that financial integration should induce the higher degree of risk
sharing by diversifying the idiosyncratic consumption risk. However, countries
in ASEAN+3 have not experienced the higher degree of regional risk sharing
after CMI was instituted. In this context, I examine further the important deter-
minants and found that the degree of risk sharing in ASEAN+3 are determined
by three factors (1) consumption co-movement (2) risk sharing coefficients and
(3) magnitude of regional and bilateral nancial investment. Negative risk shar-
ing stems from the lack of any of these three. In order to reap the benefit of
regional risk sharing, countries in ASEAN+3 should put the higher proportion
of investment within the region.
ASEAN+3 governments put efforts to develop the financial markets (Fig-
ure 1.15); however, given the current stage of financial markets development,
the markets are still very small compared to international standard. Liquidity is
still low, and investors find the regional market difficult to access. In addition to
that, unlike European investors who are in favor of pooling their savings in Eu-
rope, ASEAN+3 investors invest in other countries ADB (2008). The preference
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Figure 1.15: Restrictions on Cross-Border Portfolio Investment in ASEAN+3,
2005
of regional investors is the main issue apart from the settings of financial mar-
kets. To approach investors’ preferences, a sound environment must be created
to attract regional investors and firms and the incentives should be provided
to them. For the stock markets, preferences of investors are induced by devel-
oping a wider product base, increased liquidity, and lower transaction costs.
Moreover, rating agencies are also important for promoting the soundness of
individual issuers. Information disclosure, promoting more corporate gover-
nance, and the facilitation of governments to improve trading and settlements
systems should be helpful in making regional stock exchanges a more attrac-
tive investment destination. More reforms and actions should be implemented
for bond markets as well and these should be done on both demand side and
supply side. On the demand side, regional investors would contribute volume
and liquidity to regional market development. On the supply side, the regional
bond market should provide more debt instrument menu for regional investors
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in order to shift their preference from US dollars or Euro bonds. Clearly defined
market regulations, degree of transparency, and supervision should be well es-
tablished to bolster investor protection.
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CHAPTER 2
INFLATION TARGETING IN THAILAND: SUCCESS AND CHALLENGES
2.1 Introduction
Inflation targeting has been adopted by an increasing number of central banks
over the past fifteen years. It is the economic policy by which the central bank
commits to the explicit target, that is, inflation rate allowing for some flexibility
in order to achieve price stability, growth, and nominal exchange rate stability.
In other words, inflation targeting lies between two extremes, policy rule and
policy discretion.
Many supporters of inflation targeting believe that explicit inflation targets
are able to eliminate fiscal dominance and increase degree of independence of
the central bank. And informing the public of the economic situation, would
promote accountability within the central bank system. Once the central bank
is capable of achieving the target, and the public will believe that central banks
can keep inflation rate at low level, and their expectation of inflation will be
low accordingly. Whenever the central bank gains a degree of credibility and
inflation expectation is at a low level, the inflation target will become manage-
able. Conceptually, inflation targeting sounds advantageous over other mone-
tary frameworks. In reality, evidence was mixed across countries and country
background.1
Thailand adopted inflation targeting in May 2002 under IMF’s supervisory.
The target rate was set within the range of 0 to 3.5 percent. Under the frame-
1Further details are in the literature review.
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work, emphasis has been given to maintaining core inflation. The short term
interest rate, that is, 14-day repurchase rate, was used as the policy instrument
until January 2007, when the Monetary Policy Committee decided to replace
it with a 1-day repurchase rate. After 6 years under inflation targeting, the
Bank of Thailand is being challenged by many economic situations. A surg-
ing of capital flows in 2003–2004 triggered a policy dilemma between exchange
rate management and inflation stabilization. Upward pressure of the exchange
rate resulted in huge losses from exports, especially labor-intensive products.
The Bank of Thailand decided to exercise sterilized intervention in the foreign
exchange market. the Bank of Thailand incurred huge costs from sterilized in-
tervention, the intervention was not sustainable. The role of exchange rate un-
der inflation targeting has received much attention recently. Managing the ex-
change rate while pursuing inflation targets is not an easy task due to problem
of trinity. Meanwhile, an exchange rate intervention through the foreign ex-
change market is costly and makes the public question the Bank of Thailand’s
priorities.
While the role of exchange rate under inflation targeting is unclear, the en-
ergy price crisis has created a new challenge to the Bank of Thailand. The oil
price surge in 2008 put a lot of pressure on the Thai economy. And as a net-oil-
importer, soaring oil prices are bad news for Thailand’s economy. Higher oil
prices caused headline inflation to rise to 8.9 percent in June, and even if core
inflation does not take energy price into account,the effect of higher oil prices
on other consumer goods pushed core inflation off the target. The Bank of Thai-
land had to raise key policy interest rates twice in 3 months to control inflation.
This would be a case where global energy prices are increasing and influenc-
ing domestic consumer prices. Up to this point, this paper has focused on the
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appropriateness of using core inflation as an intermediate target.I also consider
whether or not inflation targeting is appropriate for Thailand given the current
economic circumstances.
In this paper, I attempt to address the three major issues of inflation targeting
in Thailand. The first part includes an analysis of the extent to which inflation
targeting has contributed to price stability, output, and inflation expectation in
Thailand. The second part explains the role of nominal exchange rate under
inflation targeting and policy implication on exchange rate management. The
third part examines the effectiveness of inflation targeting by utilizing dynamic
simulations of SVAR models with and without inflation targeting, then oil price
shock is introduced to evaluate inflation targeting using the counterfactual case
as a benchmark. The final section is dedicated to policy implication and conclu-
sion.
2.2 Literature Review
Inflation targeting initially started in New Zealand in 1990 to achieve low and
stable inflation rates in this country and it has proved to be successful in reduc-
ing inflation rates and keeping the economy of New Zealand stable. Later, a
number of countries started to adopt inflation targeting as monetary policies.
As of 2008, twenty- two developed and developing countries have formally
adopted inflation targeting, and no country that has adopted it has abandoned
it.
The definition of inflation targeting varies in details. According to Svensson
(n.d.) , inflation targeting is characterized by
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(a) an announced numerical inflation target, (b) an implementation of monetary
policy that gives a major role to an inflation forecast and has been called “inflation-
forecast targeting,” (c) a high degree of transparency and accountability.
Svensson (n.d.) described inflation targeting as “decision making under dis-
cretion.” It is flexible in the sense that the central bank is given some room to
aim at other economic variables, for instance, output gap, rather than focusing
only on inflation rate. The policy instrument is set to make sure that inflation
rate moves within a target range while other economic variables are at stable.
In most cases inflation targeting is characterized by a high degree of trans-
parency, since the central bank publishes a periodic monetary policy report to
the public. The economic report includes the bank’s forecast of inflation, eco-
nomic analysis, policy action, and the implications of these variables on the
economic forecast. The communication from the central bank will give a clear
picture to the public of what is going on and, in turn, anchor private-sector ex-
pectations on inflation for the next few quarters, a crucial precondition of actual
inflation. And if the expectation of inflation is in the expected range and the cen-
tral bank can control inflation rate so that is stays within target range, a degree
of accountability and credibility will be finally achieved.
Economic studies express various outcomes inflation targeting. The empir-
ical results vary according to the countries in the sample, scope of time, and
methodologies used. Sterne (2002) used a survey of monetary framework de-
sign to quantify ten characteristics, including central banks’ objectives, targets,
independence, accountability, transparency, and analytical capacities. He found
that inflation targets had been chosen over money targets and the number of
countries that adopt inflation targeting had increased. He argued that the pos-
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sible explanation of the popularity of inflation targeting is that it provides a visi-
ble vehicle for guiding private sector expectations and communicating with the
government. The use of a target enhances the deeper level of communication
between the central bank and the public. And also, an inflation target is rela-
tively easy to obtain. Sterne showed that the number of inflation target misses
was less than half of money target misses. The median inflation for countries
that announce both inflation and money target was 1.5 percent, compared with
3.2 percent for broad money growth.
Agenor (2000) provided a survey of the analytical model for inflation tar-
geting in both closed and open economies. He introduced some unresolved
analytical issues in the design of inflation targeting regime, namely, the role of
nonlinearities and asymmetric effects in the Phillips curve, the uncertainty re-
garding behavioral parameters and the transmission process ofmonetary policy.
These features are relevant for monetary policy in developing countries, and ac-
cording to his findings, inflation targeting is applicable to developing countries.
The applicability of inflation targeting to developing countries has received
a lot of attention and Agenor’s conclusion has been the subject of an interest-
ing debate. Mishkin (2000) and Morande & Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) looked at
this issue in more cautiously. They denied that inflation targeting can be used
universally. They suggested that inflation targeting is possible for developing
countries, but at least for the case of high and middle income developing coun-
tries, where the financial system is sufficiently developed to permit the use of
indirect instruments monetary policy. Mishkin & Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) added
that the success of inflation targeting depends on the level of fiscal dominance.
The implementation of inflation targeting is associated with lower fiscal deficits,
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which confirms the absence of fiscal dominance under this regime. The reseach-
ers also found that the adoption of an inflation targeting regime is more likely
when the initial level of inflation is relatively high.
However, some other economic studies look at inflation targeting differ-
ently. McCallum (2001) portrayed the criticism of inflation targeting, namely,
that in countries that experience deflation, the nominal interest rate may ap-
proach zero. In addition, if the economy is in recession and requires an expan-
sionary monetary policy, the central bank will face a liquidity trap since it is not
able to place open market bonds at below-zero nominal rate. From the theo-
retical perspective, the dangers of an expectations trap and indeterminacy are
created by variants of inflation targeting. Ball & Sheridan (2003a) evaluated the
performance of inflation targeting in improving economy by comparing seven
OECD countries that adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s and they
found that there is no evidence that inflation targeting improves performance.
Levin et al. (2004) on the other hand, investigated the emerging economies that
adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s by looking at inflation persistence
and stability of economic variables and bymeasuring the level of expectation on
inflation. They found that the adoption of inflation targeting has generally not
been associated with an immediate adjustment of inflation expectations. While
most of the emerging economies have succeeded in reducing average inflation
to very low levels, the volatilities of inflation still persist. The success of infla-
tion targeting should come with some preconditions such as time length, since
policy adoption, government ’s fiscal discipline, and the central bank’s effort to
limit the movement of exchange rates, as proposed by Lin & Ye (2004).
The movement of exchange rate under inflation targeting has received much
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attention, especially from central banks in developing countries that switch the
monetary policies regime from rigid exchange rate to a combination of flexible
exchange rate and “inflation targeting.” The role of exchange rate has become
less central in economic policy debate in most emerging countries. However,
this does not mean that exchange rate is not a major issue. Some countries,
In Asia for instance, governments launched exchange rate policy measures in
2003–2004 to curb currency appreciation and potential speculation due to capital
flooding as a result of global imbalance. The central banks’ policy actions have
utilized exchange rates as shock absorbers. Many questions relating to exchange
rate under inflation targeting have been raised; some academicians have tried to
find tune between exchange rate and inflation targeting, while others strongly
argue against policy mix and claimthat emerging countries exhibited the “fear
of float2 behavior.”
Moreover, there are debates about oil shock as an indirect cause of recession
through the triggering of monetary contractions in 1980s and 1990s. Even in the
absence of monetary tightening, oil price-shock-induced-inflation reduces real
balance (see Mork (1989)). Dotsey & Reid (1992) showed in a VARmodel that in
the case of the United States, federal funds rate and measure of oil price shocks,
according to Mork (1989) are good predictors of output. However, Bernanke
et al. (1997) concluded that according to their findings, oil price shocks do not
cause economy-wide output decline once the impact of responses of monetary
policy to oil shocks is accounted for.
Clarida et al. (2000) explained that the impact from oil price shock in the
present time is not as severe as one in 1970s. The change in inflation expectation
is one of the reasons why the impact is milder than in the past. They also added
2SeeCalvo & Reinhart (2000).
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that the Federal Reserve credibility appears to be tied to this change in expec-
tation. Their findings showed that during the 1970s, households and firms did
not expect the Fed to act to offset the inflationary impulse created by a jump
in the price of oil and consequently led to the jump in expected inflation. On
the other hand, the Federal reserve is expected to act to counter the effect of oil
price surge and that it is expected to curb the expected inflation. Hooker (2002)
provided formal evidence of a change in the relationship between oil price and
inflation between 1962 and 2000. Statistical tests find a structural break in the
relationship. Estimated coefficients differ between 1962 and 1980 and between
1981 and 2000. Hooker found that oil price had a significant impact on inflation
in the earlier period but not the later, and he observed that the pass through
effect from oil price to core inflation is absent from 1981 to 2000. Results are
robust to various types of inflation.
The issues of oil price shock and inflation are discussed differently in the
case of a developing country. The surge of oil and food prices in the late 2000s
put high pressure on commodity price and inflation rate worldwide. The higher
of oil price has caused dramatic effects on the prices of other commodities, since
oil is one of the important factors of production ,that in turn, lead to the rising of
headline inflation. Headline inflation, however, is not the inflation that central
banks keep track of. Core inflation3 is instead in focus. McCauley (2001) studied
the monetary policies in Thailand from 2000 to 2006. He argued that specify-
ing the operational target is crucial especially when energy and food prices are
soaring. The implementation of inflation targeting by only keeping track only
of core inflation may limit the room that the Bank of Thailand has to properly
respond to this upward trend in energy prices.
3Core inflation excludes energy prices and food.
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2.3 Inflation Targeting in Thailand: Capital Flows and Ex-
change Rate Management
The development of the monetary policy framework in Thailand is divided into
three periods. The first period was after Second World War to June 1997 when
the Bank of Thailand started to adopt a pegged exchange rate regime. The value
of the baht was initially pegged either to gold, a major currency, or to a basket
of currencies. The basket regime was adopted from November 1984 until June
1997. The Thai baht was fixed at 25 baht/USD. According to Figure 2.1, the ex-
change rates were relatively stable from 1990 to 1996. Generally, the success of
a basket-peg regime depends on strong economic fundamentals, investor con-
fidence, and the amount of foreign reserves that the central bank has. Lacking
of these fundamentals, a currency is prone to be attacked by speculators. Thai-
land, at that time, had liberalized the economy and set up the special body,
the so called Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) in 1990 to facilitate
foreign capital flows initially aimed as serving the increasingly sophisticated
needs of international trade and investment and at enhancing the capacity of
the domestic banking business. Due to a weak financial system and a lack of
appropriate regulation of the resource allocation, the surge of capital flows to
Thailand did not go to real production and the productive sectors as initially
planned, but went to unproductive sectors instead. Those foreign capital flows
introduced the double mismatched loans, bubbling asset prices, and a greater
capital account deficit, and later lead to a depletion of foreign reserves. Pressure
on the Thai baht intensified in December 1996 and foreign investor confidence
was shaken, prompting investors to withdraw funds from Thailand and specu-
lation on the Thai baht was undertaken in February 1997. The bank of Thailand
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intervened heavily to stabilize national currency, but they could not keep things
under control since confidence in the Thai baht had been completely destroyed.
The peg thenwas abandoned on July 2, 1997, and replaced by themanaged-float
exchange rate regime.
Unlike the peg exchange rate regime, the value of the baht is determined by
market forces, that is, demand and supply in both the on–shore and off–shore
foreign exchange markets. The Bank of Thailand will intervene in the market
only when necessary, in order to prevent excessive volatilities and achieve eco-
nomic policy targets. In Figure 2.1, we can see that right after the exchange rate
policy switch, the Thai baht depreciated by almost two folds from 25 baht/USD
to 31.36 baht /USD in 1997 and to 41.36 baht/USD in 1998.
Nominal exchange rate and real exchange rate , 1990-2007
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Figure 2.1: Nominal Exchange Rate and Real Exchange Rate
After the financial crisis, monetary targeting was used by the Bank of Thai-
land for a couple of years by targeting the broad money supply level, that is,
M24.Under this regime, the Bank targeted domestic money supply using the fi-
4M2 consists of the total of all physical currency, plus accounts at the central bank that can
be exchanged for physical currency and most savings accounts, money market accounts, and
small denomination time deposits (certificates of deposit of under 100,000 USD)
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nancial programming approach in order to ensure macroeconomic consistency
as well as to reach the ultimate objectives of sustainable growth and price sta-
bility. The Bank would set the daily and quarterly monetary base targets, on
which its daily liquidity management was based. Daily liquidity management
was essentially aimed at ensuring against excessive volatility in interest rates
and liquidity in the financial system. This regime lasted until early of 2000.
Under the supervision of the IMF, the Bank of Thailand has adopted infla-
tion targeting as a conduct of monetary policy since April 2000 by targeting core
inflation5 with a main objective of maintaining price stability. Given the institu-
tional reforms required for an inflation targeting framework to operate success-
fully, it was envisaged that inflation targeting would help rebuild confidence
and credibility of the central bank and monetary system, going forward.
The target rate has been set within the range of 0 to 3.5 percent. Under the
framework, the emphasis has been given to maintaining core inflation. A 14-
day repurchase rate was used as the policy instrument until January 2007 when
the Monetary Policy Committee decided to replace it by a 1-day repurchase
rate. Since then, the 1-day repurchase rate has been officially used to keep the
quarterly average rate of core inflation within the target range. If there is an
upward inflationary pressure, for instance, the 1-day repo rate will be raised in
order to keep the inflation rate back in the target level. Figure 2.6 shows that the
core inflation rates were volatile and fluctuated before 2000 and relatively were
stable from 2000.
Thailand has seen a second surge of capital inflows after the first one dur-
ing the bubble economy in 1994. The new surge of capital inflows this time
5Core inflation rate is rate of inflation of goods other than food, energy price, and all other
items that have a high degree of price volatility.
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started in 2002. With strong capital inflows and chronic pressure for appreci-
ation during 2002–2003, the offshore rate was falling below onshore ones, but
arbitrage kept the rates in line. The Bank of Thailand oversaw an asymmetric
regime in the third quarter of 2003, with effective constraints on lending baht to
nonresidents, but no measure preventing the flow of baht held by nonresidents
into Thailand. Later in October 2003, the Bank of Thailand made its capital con-
trols symmetric by limiting onshore financial institutions from borrowing more
than 50 million baht from non-residents(BOT (2003b) and BOT (2003a)). Since
then, overnight differentials have shown more symmetry. Market participants
attempted to get around these restrictions on baht inflows by creating baht debt
securities and marketing them to non-residents. After several efforts to limit
particular forms of securities, the Bank of Thailand announced the unremuner-
ated reserved requirements (URR) against portfolio inflows. The subsequent
adverse reaction of the equity market led authorities to apply the reserve re-
quirements only to fixed income inflows.6
The measure led to a sharp slow down in capital inflows. In 2007, how-
ever, portfolio investment dropped and 5,179.73 million USD flowed out of the
country. Together with foreign direct investment, net capital inflows in 2007
were 1,450.39 million USD. Reserves have risen sharply since 2000. In 2007, for-
eign exchange reserves amounted to 99.38 billion USD increasing by 300 percent
from 2000.
According to impossible trinity, independentmonetary policy cannot coexist
with fixed exchange rate in the world of capital mobility. The surge of capital in-
flows and reserves accumulation introduced the rapid appreciation of the Thai
baht. Figure 2.4 shows that, Thai baht has continually appreciated against USD
6See the Appendix B for more details.
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Source: Bank of Thailand
Figure 2.2: Thailand’s Interest Rates Differentials (percent)
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Figure 2.3: Thailand’s Capital Account
since 2005. And even though the short-term interest rate has fallen since the end
2006, Thai baht value has not stopped rising. Exchange rate intervention was
used occasionally to stabilize the Thai baht exchange rate consequently result-
ing in an increase of foreign exchange reserves.
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Thailand's exchange rate and interest rate
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Figure 2.4: Thailand’s Exchange Rate and Interest Rate
Analysts have debated to what extent the Bank of Thailand should manage
the exchange rate market while implementing inflation targeting. As some ana-
lysts argue, one of the costs of inflation targeting is the increase in exchange rate
volatility, which is not a good news for country, that relies on labor-intensive ex-
ports. Appreciation of the Thai baht means a huge loss of competitiveness over
neighboring countries. The Bank of Thailand address this issue in the following
way.A study by Pongsaparn (2007), an economist from the Bank of Thailand,
points out that adjusting the exchange rate as one transmission to the economy
is unlikely since exchange rate is not strongly linked to domestic interest rates.
The efficacy of monetary policy through the exchange-rate adjustment can be
greatly diminished. Her study thus supported the Bank of Thailand foreign
exchange rate intervention in 2003–2004 is consistent with inflation targeting.
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Figure 2.5: Thailand’s Foreign Exchange Reserves
In addition to exchange rate management, recently Thailand has seen an
increasing inflationary pressures as shown in Figure 2.6 and 2.7, resulting from
the rising of oil prices. Figure 2.7 shows that benzine 95 and diesel prices rose
from 19.37 and 14.59 baht/litre in January 2005 to 41.44 and 40.86 baht/litre in
April 2008. On average the price of oil in early 2008 was almost 300 percent of
the average price in 2005. Headline inflation and core inflation, consequently,
rose to 7.5 and 2.8 percent compared with 2.8 and 0.7 percent, respectively, in
2005.
However, inflationary pressure in the Bank of Thailand’s point of view is
not the result of high energy costs alone. Added to that, they believed ris-
ing of oil price merely part of the story. According to S.Chuenchokesan &
T.Thanaditsuwan (2008) and Ashvin Ajula, head of the Monetary Policy Team
in the Bank of Thailand, domestic pressures in labor market and capacity uti-
lization, instead, create inflationary pressure. And due to the same sources,
inflation in Thailand at this moment is being pulled by demand side. Thailand
has achieved a low unemployment rate, hovering around 1.5 percent in 2008
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and a high capacity utilization rate ever, which in 2008 was the highest since the
1997 financial crisis.
Inflation rate was believed to be elevated for a while and the Bank of Thai-
land’s reaction to the oil price surge was that they would not be too spontaneous
to the high oil price as long as the oil price does not affect much on the core in-
flation. The bank would rather focus on longer–term objective and let the gov-
ernment’s stimulus packages tackle short–term difficulties. However, the Bank
of Thailand has raised the key interest rate twice in 2008: First 25 basis points in
July and 25 basis points in August. Key interest rate now stands at 3.75 percent.
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Figure 2.6: Inflation Rates and Interest Rates
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Figure 2.7: Oil Price
2.4 Effectiveness of Inflation Targeting: Inflation Persistence,
Output Growth, and Interest Rate Volatility
2.4.1 Inflation
The first part of the analysis starts by investigating the basic statistics of data on
inflation. Table 2.1 represents mean and standard deviation of core and head-
line inflation for 1996q2–2008q2. The results in Table 2.1 suggest that inflation
rates were relatively declining after inflation targeting was adopted. Overall,
the mean of core and headline inflation were 2.22 and 3.42 percent ,respectively,
whereas those during pre-inflation targeting were 4.24 and 4.56 percent. After
inflation targeting was adopted, core and headline inflation were reduced to
1.08 and 2.75 percent, respectively.
Volatility of inflation rates also declined over the study period. Standard
deviation of core and headline inflation were reduced to 1.79 and 0.81 percent
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compared with 3.34 and 2.54 percent prior to inflation targeting.
Table 2.1: Basic Statistics: Inflation
Core pi Headline pi
Mean
1996q1–2008q2 2.22 3.42
1996q1–2000q2 (Pre-IT) 4.24 4.56
2000q2–2008q2 (Post-IT) 1.08 2.75
Standard Deviation
1996q1–2008q2 2.58 2.24
1996q1–2000q2 (Pre-IT) 3.34 2.54
2000q2–2008q2 (Post-IT) 1.79 0.81
Source: Bank of Thailand and Author’s Calculation
In addition to mean and standard deviation, persistence of inflation explains
to what extent inflation targeting is successful in keeping inflation rate in con-
trol. Inflation rate should be less persistent over time if the central bank has
the ability to adjust the policy instrument so that they can achieve the inflation
target and actively stabilize the inflation rate around a preset range. Monetary
policies encountering inflation shocks will reduce inflation persistence.
To measure inflation persistence, I estimate a univariate autoregressive pro-
cess for each inflation series:
pit = α + Σ
j
i=1βipit− j + εt, (2.1)
where ε is a serially uncorrelated, homoscedastic random error term. Persis-
tence of inflation is measured by taking the summation of the autoregressive
coefficients, β ≡ Σ ji=1βi. I also construct a robustness check by performing boot-
strap estimation with 1,000 replications. Results are exhibited in Table 2.2. Au-
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toregressive lag order j is chosen for each inflation series according to Akaike
information criterion. Inflation persistence estimates are reported in Table 2.2.
The lag order chosen for each series is in brackets. Inflation persistence obtained
from actual and bootstrap estimations are lower than prior to inflation targeting.
Bootstrap estimation gives a little higher persistence than the actual estimates
whose core inflation and headline inflation persistence is less than unity.
Table 2.2: Persistence Estimates for Inflation
Core pi Headline pi
Actual Bootstrap Actual Bootstrap
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates
1996q1–2008q2 1.09(12) 1.076 1.387(12) 1.388
1996q1–2000q2(Pre-IT) -0.409(8) 17.119 9.367(8) 8.908
2000q2–2008q2(Post-IT) 0.887(5) 1.488 0.864(2) 3.89
Source: Bank of Thailand and Author’s Calculation
2.4.2 Output Growth
Regarding the relationship between inflation targeting and output growth,
Mishkin (1999) argued that
“A conservative conclusion is that, once low inflation is achieved, inflation targeting
is not harmful to the real economy. Given the strong economic growth after disinflation
was achieved in many countries that have adopted inflation targets, New Zealand being
one outstanding example, a case can be made that inflation targeting promotes real
economic growth in addition to controlling inflation...”
So I brought his idea to examine whether inflation targets spur growth. Ta-
ble 2.3 represents the results of output growth statistics. On average, output
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growth increased evidently from 2.86 percent prior to inflation targeting to 7.59
percent. Output volatility, on the other hand, did not change much.
2.4.3 Long-term Interest Rates and Short-Term Interest Rates
Volatility
Long-term interest rates should reflect inflation expectation in the sense that
targeting locks in low inflation permanently, while adverse events reignite in-
flation under“just do it” policies. If the public believes in this argument, the
inflation targeting should reduce both inflation and inflation uncertainty, which
can be reflected in low long-term interest rates. Table 2.3 shows that long term
interest rates were lower after inflation targets.
Short-term interest rates, on the other hand, tells how activethe central bank
are, by looking at how often short-term interest rates are adjusted. According
to table 2.3, standard deviation of short-term interest rates declines from 6.7
in 1996–2000 to 1.23 in 2000–2008. That means the Bank of Thailand has been
less activism while implementing inflation targeting. Noting that the Bank of
Thailand switched key policy interest rates from the 14-day repurchase rate to
the 1-day repurchase rate in January 2007 shows that the Bank of Thailand is
inclined to use a more liquid and instantaneous policy instrument.
63
Table 2.3: Basic Statistics: Output Growth and Interest Rates
Output Growth Short–Term Long–Term
Interest Rates Interest Rates
Mean
1996q1–2008q2 6.14 4.96 6.64
1996q1–2000q2(Pre-IT) 2.86 9.00 9.38
2000q2–2008q2(Post-IT) 7.59 2.50 5.17
Standard Deviation
1996q1–2008q2 13.65 3.83 2.43
1996q1–2000q2(Pre-IT) 4.45 6.70 1.84
2000q2–2008q2(Post-IT) 2.35 1.23 .89
Source: Bank of Thailand and Author’s Calculation
2.4.4 Mean Reverting Regression
Effectiveness of inflation targeting can be determined by considering how infla-
tion targets affect dimensions of economic performance such as inflation, out-
put growth, and long-term interest rates. The effectiveness of inflation targeting
is measured by taking the performance of each variable, relative to its perfor-
mance on average, prior to inflation targets. OLS regressions based on the gen-
eral specification are as follows:
∆xt = α + βD + εt, (2.2)
where x represents core inflation, headline inflation, output growth, long-term
interest rates. ∆xt = xpost − x¯pre, xpost in a country’s value of x is the post -targeting
period, x¯pre is the average value in the pre-targeting period, and D is a dummy
variable equal to one after adopting inflation targeting and zero otherwise. If
economic performance of each variable is relatively better, that is, lower infla-
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tion, higher growth, and lower long-term interest rates.7 Coefficients obtained
from 2.2 should be negative in case of inflation and long-term interest rates and
positive in case of output growth.
From Table 2.4, signs of estimated coefficients are as expected and all of them
are 99 percent statistically significant except headline inflation, which is statisti-
cally significant at 95 percent level of confidence. The above results indicate that
inflation targeting has performed relatively well in promoting higher growth
while keeping inflation and inflation expectation low. R2 produced from each
estimate is moderate except for headline inflation for which R2 is 0.12. One
possible explanation is that inflation targeting in Thailand has hardly targeted
headline inflation, only taking the pass-through effect from headline inflation to
core inflation into account.
Table 2.4: Mean Reverting Regression
Core pi Headline pi Output Long-Term
Growth Interest Rate
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Dummy -1.844*** -1.978* 5.044*** -4.334***
(0.337) (0.867) (1.286) (0.463)
Constant 2.441*** 0.168 -0.314 0.123
(0.328) (0.808) (1.216) (0.436)
N 50 50 45 50
F 30 5 15 88
¯R2 0.504 0.116 0.350 0.724
RMS error 0.867 2.430 3.089 1.275
∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Standard errors are in parentheses.
The statistical analysis from the previous session suggested that Thailand ex-
perienced the lower volatility of inflation and degree of inflation persistence af-
ter adopting inflation targeting framework. Output growth improved on aver-
7Noting that a relatively lower long-term interest rate implies a low inflation expectation.
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age while inflation expectation remained lower. Next I compare the results with
non-inflation-targeting countries to see if the improvement was due to inflation
targeting. The thirteen non-inflation targeting countries are selected based on a
paper by Ball & Sheridan (2003b). The non-inflation- targeting-countries are the
United States, Japan, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Norway, and Sweden. Data are from 2000–2008,
since the quarterly data is not available for all countries. Figure 2.8(a) represents
the comparison of average inflation rate and GDP growth rate among Thailand
and non-inflation-targeters. The results do not show a significant difference be-
tween Thailand and the rest. In addition, the EMS countries8 seem to have a
lower average inflation than Thailand. Figure 2.8(b) examines the variability of
inflation, which is measured by the standard deviation of inflation rate of sam-
ple countries using the same format as the average inflation figure. From the
finding, there is no evidence to show that inflation targeting helps to reduce the
inflation variability in Thailand. And in addition, inflation variability in Thai-
land is largest among sample countries.
I now ask whether inflation targeting affects the behavior of output. I ex-
amine the average and standard deviation of real GDP growth using annual
data from 2000–2008. As exhibited in Figure 2.9(a), average GDP growth in
Thailand is higher than most of non-inflation-targeters except Ireland. About
output variability,Cecchetti & Ehrmann (1999) argued that inflation targeting
makes output more variable. Figure 2.9(b) represents results about variability of
annual output growth. The results show that Thailand’s output growth is more
volatile than non-inflation targeters which confirms the argument proposed by
8EMS countries are European countries that participated in the European Monetary System.
They are Denmark, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
Norway, and Sweden.
66
Cecchetti & Ehrmann (1999). That said, inflation targeting does not contribute
any distinctively better economic outcomes to Thailand than other policies do
to non-targeters.
2.5 Exchange Rates Management Under Inflation Targeting
Exchange rate is a part of monetary mechanism under inflation targeting frame-
work in two ways, through the uncovered interest parity(UIP) channel and
through the pass-through effect. The first exchange rate channel connects ex-
change rate and inflation rate through the uncovered interest parity (indi-
rect channel), where interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign
economies induce change in foreign exchange rates which subsequently deter-
mine the level of trade transaction, that is, exports and imports, and in turn
affect the level of the country’s aggregate output and inflation (see Figure 2.16).
The second exchange rate channel (direct channel) can effect inflation di-
rectly through the so-called pass-through effect. Exchange rate depreciation
would induce the imported inflation, since imported goods become relatively
more expensive. Imported inflation passes the effect to the domestic consump-
tion basket and consequently affects the domestic consumer price index.
In this section, I test the role of exchange rate under inflation targeting in
order to assess the effectiveness of the exchange rate under both channels. In
Evaluating the efficacy of exchange rate, I segmented the mechanism into two
blocks, (1) Taylor’s reaction function (indirect channel) and (2) pass-through
effect model (direct channel).
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Figure 2.8: Thailand’s and Non-IT Targeters’ Average Inflation Rate and Stan-
dard Deviation, 2000–2008
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Figure 2.9: Thailand and Non-IT Targeters’ Average GDP Growth Rate and
Standard Deviation,2000–2008
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Figure 2.10: Monetary Policy Mechanism
2.5.1 Taylor’s Reaction Function
One way to stabilize the exchange rate is to intervene in the market. Interven-
tion could take two forms : sterilized intervention and non-sterilized intervention.
While sterilized intervention is done through operations involving the issuance
of domestic securities to absorb excess liquidity with the cost incurred to the
central bank, non-sterilized intervention results in changing monetary aggre-
gates, which might effect domestic inflation. Both types of intervention come
with different drawbacks and central bank has choose which drawback is more
acceptable.
Another way to manage foreign exchange rate is to include exchange rate
into monetary policy rules. This is quite a controversial issue of policy imple-
mentation in many countries that adopt inflation targeting especially in Latin
America and emerging countries (Edwards (2006)). There has been a discussion
about appropriateness of prioritizing exchange rate under inflation targeting.
To study to what degree instruments of monetary policy react to exchange rate,
I use the central bank’s reaction function incorporate with exchange rate as sug-
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gested by Taylor (2001):
it = γ0 + γ1E(pit) + γ2yt + γ3∆exrt + γ4∆exrt−1 + εt−1, (2.3)
where it is the short-term interest rate and E(pit) is the expected inflation. Ex-
pected inflation takes four measurements: realized inflation, one-period lead of
inflation, long-term interest rate, and Bank of Thailand’s estimates of expected
inflation at the end of the current year and at the end of the following year.9 yt
is the deviation from potential output.10, ∆exrt is the first difference of exchange
rates. The details of sources of data and descriptions are mentioned in the sec-
ond chapter of appendix.
According to Taylor (2001), the exchange rate is likely to have only a
marginal effect on interest rate since exchange rate does not have any signifi-
cant impact on the central bank’s inflation forecast. The central bank, however,
in some cases may allow a certain degree of flexibility to adjust the interest rate
in response to the change of exchange rate, but only in the very short term, since
exchange rate by its nature is mean-reverting if inflation targeting is the major
policy anchor. In an extreme case, if coefficients on exchange rate , that is, γ3
and γ4 are both zero, exchange rate development should not be incorporated in
to policy rule and the Taylor rule reverts to its traditional form.
Equation 2.3 or the baseline model is estimated by OLS with robust HAC
standard deviation to correct for first-order autocorrelation and heteroscedas-
ticity.
9Estimates of expected inflation are given as fan charts. I
use the expected weighted average in the estimation. Please see
http://www.bot.or.th/English/MonetaryPolicy/Inflation/Pages/index old.aspx for details.
10The output gap was derived using an HP filter. Smoothing parameter µ is set to equal 1600
for quarterly data.
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Robustness check is performed to check whether the estimated relationship
has undergone significant changes comparing with baseline model. There are
major possible sources of instability due to the nature of data, for example, infla-
tion and exchange incorporate sources of instabilities due to cyclical factors and
noises. Due to unavailability of expected inflation rate, actual inflation is used to
estimate the reaction function. That means the baseline estimates are obtained
in the context of the central bank’s response to an observed figure of inflation
instead of the estimated one. This might not be valid with a forward-looking
policy setting.
The alternation specification is estimated by replacing the absolute value of
variables with (1) seasonally adjusted data and (2) de-trended data. In the latter
case, trend components are removed by HP filter with smoothing parameter
µ = 1, 600, and first difference of exchange rate remained unchange. Rolling
recursive regression is performed to see the stability of coefficient estimates over
time.
2.5.2 Empirical Results
Table 2.5 represents results of Taylor’s reaction function for the whole period
of 1996q1–2008q2. Columns 1–6 are models with core inflation with different
specifications. According to column 1 of Table 2.5, core inflation does not sig-
nificantly relate to short-term interest rate, while output gap has only marginal
impact on short-term interest rate. Exchange rate, on the other hand, has a sta-
tistically significant relation with short-term interest rate, except that the signs
are perverse. Short-term interest rate is highly determined by its previous quar-
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ter value. The results obtained from de-trended and seasonally adjusted value
of current and lead value of core inflation as presented in columns 2–6 give sim-
ilar interpretations. Columns 7–12 of table 2.5 and columns 13–15 of Table 2.6
represent the results when using different specifications of headline inflation
and long-term interest rate as expected value of inflation. Results are robust to
the choice of core inflation.
Later I analyze the data with respect to two periods, prior to 2000q2 and after
2000q2, in order to see how inflation targeting changed the Bank of Thailand’s
decision on setting a short-term interest rate. Results prior to and after the adop-
tion of inflation targeting are in Table 2.7– 2.8 and 2.9– 2.10, respectively.
Prior to inflation targeting, core inflation (columns 1–4 of Table 2.7) does not
statistically determine short–term interest rate. Short–term interest rates were
set according to exchange rate. As we can see in columns 1–4, both of the first
differences between exchange rate for the current quarter and exchange rate
for the previous quarter produce the perverse sign of the coefficients. Results
are robust to deviation from trend and seasonally adjusted data, as shown in
columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.5.
Noting that from 1997–2000, the Bank of Thailand maintained monetary tar-
geting and floating exchange rate system. Under this regime, the Bank targeted
domestic money supply in order to reach the ultimate objectives of sustainable
growth and price stability. So I add the growth of money supply (M2) to the orig-
inal Taylor’s open economy reaction function. Results are shown in column 4.
As expected, growth of monetary aggregates is the major source of short-term
interest rate determination prior to inflation targeting. Coefficients produced
are high and statistically significant.
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Table 2.5: Taylor’s Reaction Function, Whole Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Expected Inflation corepit corepit,hp corepit,sa corepit+1 corepit+1,hp corepit+1,sa headpit headpit,hp headpit,sa headpit+1 headpit+1,hp headpit+1,sa
corepit -0.272
(0.278)
gdpt 3.32e-05*** 2.94e-05*** 3.28e-05*** 1.92e-05*** 3.12e-05*** 1.88e-05*** 2.91e-05*** 3.23e-05*** 2.72e-05*** 2.12e-05*** 3.10e-05*** 1.98e-05***
(1.03e-05) (8.97e-06) (9.52e-06) (9.77e-06) (9.45e-06) (1.04e-05) (1.04e-05) (9.61e-06) (1.03e-05) (9.49e-06) (1.01e-05) (1.00e-05)
∆exrt 0.414*** 0.392*** 0.357*** 0.415*** 0.420*** 0.406*** 0.392*** 0.414***
(0.155) (0.153) (0.131) (0.154) (0.156) (0.158) (0.147) (0.152)
∆exrt−1 0.226 0.241 0.173 0.247 0.238 0.257 0.188 0.240
(0.173) (0.157) (0.175) (0.194) (0.180) (0.173) (0.183) (0.203)
it−1 0.944*** 0.885*** 0.610*** 0.840*** 0.816*** 0.857*** 0.777*** 0.836***
(0.122) (0.0585) (0.166) (0.0639) (0.0721) (0.0615) (0.0766) (0.0681)
corepit,hp -0.286
(0.176)
corepit,sa -0.222
(0.210)
∆exrsa,t 0.398*** 0.351*** 0.412*** 0.380***
(0.135) (0.109) (0.138) (0.129)
∆exrsa,t−1 0.205 0.165 0.218 0.173
(0.171) (0.173) (0.175) (0.176)
it−1,sa 0.932*** 0.632*** 0.806*** 0.778***
(0.105) (0.173) (0.0779) (0.0792)
corepit+1 0.656
(0.460)
corepit+1,hp -0.0264
(0.212)
corepit+1,sa 0.608
(0.469)
headlinepit 0.0568
(0.112)
headlinepit,hp -0.110
(0.124)
headlinepit,sa 0.100
(0.110)
headlinepit+1 0.224***
(0.107)
headlinepit+1,hp 0.00825
(0.138)
headlinepit+1,sa 0.237***
(0.111)
Constant 0.603*** 0.333 0.591*** 0.400 0.544*** 0.408 0.492 0.468*** 0.431 0.174 0.566*** 0.149
(0.288) (0.253) (0.297) (0.295) (0.274) (0.295) (0.357) (0.257) (0.323) (0.347) (0.271) (0.315)
Observations 46 46 46 46 45 46 46 46 46 46 45 46
Adjusted R2 0.933 0.935 0.933 0.937 0.932 0.936 0.932 0.933 0.932 0.936 0.932 0.936
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Taylor’s Reaction Function, Whole Period (continuted)
(13) (14) (15)
Expected Inflation bondit bondit,hp bondit,sa
bondit 0.0980
(0.118)
gdpt 2.92e-05*** 3.05e-05*** 2.83e-05***
(8.87e-06) (1.04e-05) (8.91e-06)
∆exrt 0.405*** 0.417***
(0.154) (0.157)
∆exrt−1 0.245 0.241
(0.173) (0.179)
it−1 0.802*** 0.831***
(0.0866) (0.0656)
bondit,hp 0.0633
(0.231)
bondit,sa 0.118
(0.113)
∆exrt,sa 0.392***
(0.135)
∆exrt−1,sa 0.225
(0.170)
it−1,sa 0.801***
(0.0880)
Constant 0.100 0.592*** -0.00160
(0.575) (0.266) (0.535)
Observations 46 46 46
Adjusted R2 0.933 0.932 0.933
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
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I test the robustness of the results by using lead values of core inflation, head-
line inflation, and long-term interest rate as proxy for expected inflation rate. I
also rerun the regression of each of the variables over HF filter and seasonal-
ization. The results, as shown in columns 5–12 of Table 2.7 and columns 13–20
of Table 2.8 correspond to results produced by core inflation, except the lead
value of core inflation (columns 5–8 of Table 2.7). The results suggest that the
response of short-term interest rate to inflation is significant while the response
of short-term interest rate to money supply is not.
Monetary policy responses to inflation rate are stronger right after inflation
targeting was adopted. From Table 2.9 and table 2.10, coefficients representing
relationships between various measures of expected inflation and short-term
interest rate are positively significant in all columns except those of weighted
expected core and headline inflation (columns 10–12 of Table 2.9 and columns
19–21 of Table 2.10, respectively). The results suggest that the Bank of Thailand
react to realized inflation rather than the forecasted value of expected inflation.
In addition, several findings show that a response of the short-term policy in-
terest rate to the exchange rate is significant with the correct signs in most cases,
which implies that short-term policy interest rate becomes more responsive to
the exchange rate after inflation targeting is in place.
Results estimated from equation 2.3 suggest a significant relationship be-
tween short-term policy interest rate and exchange rate. Any upward interest
rate adjustment as a means of controlling inflation rate would compromise the
international trade competitiveness and aggregate output that results from do-
mestic currency appreciation. In this section, I investigate further to what extent
aggregate output has to be sacrificed if interest rate is raised to control inflation.
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Table 2.7: Taylor’s Reaction Function, 1996q1–2000q2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Expected Inflation corepit corepit,hp corepit,sa corepit,m2 corepit+1 corepit+1,hp corepit+1,sa corepit+1,m2 headpit headpit,hp headpit,sa headpit,m2
corepit 0.948 1.253
(0.694) (1.222)
gdpt 7.17e-05*** 5.99e-05 7.75e-05*** 3.18e-05 3.38e-05 7.26e-05*** 4.45e-05*** 6.00e-06 5.25e-05*** 7.10e-05*** 5.94e-05*** 2.26e-07
(2.04e-05) (4.90e-05) (1.73e-05) (3.38e-05) (1.99e-05) (3.29e-05) (1.82e-05) (2.42e-05) (1.77e-05) (2.81e-05) (1.48e-05) (1.40e-05)
∆exrt 0.478*** 0.484*** 0.365*** 0.269 0.426*** 0.255 0.496*** 0.484*** 0.389***
(0.180) (0.191) (0.182) (0.165) (0.175) (0.196) (0.149) (0.167) (0.134)
∆exrt−1 0.453*** 0.330 0.451*** 0.168 0.281 0.176 0.382*** 0.344 0.348***
(0.166) (0.201) (0.148) (0.107) (0.227) (0.114) (0.145) (0.202) (0.0738)
it−1 0.415 0.804*** 0.157 0.00637 0.653*** 0.0668 0.328 0.659*** 0.118
(0.298) (0.280) (0.475) (0.236) (0.205) (0.300) (0.217) (0.170) (0.206)
corepit,hp -0.0432
(0.856)
corepit,sa 0.989***
(0.541)
∆exrt,sa 0.503*** 0.331*** 0.498***
(0.142) (0.108) (0.122)
∆exrt−1,sa 0.484*** 0.238*** 0.409***
(0.125) (0.106) (0.119)
it−1,sa 0.395 0.201 0.410***
(0.232) (0.208) (0.194)
m2,t -39.24*** -24.26 -42.24***
(9.515) (13.63) (7.585)
corepit+1 2.235*** 1.825***
(0.665) (0.947)
corepit+1,hp 0.546
(0.763)
corepit+1,sa 1.672***
(0.569)
headlinepit 0.939*** 1.069***
(0.413) (0.407)
headlinepit,hp 0.340
(0.365)
headlinepit,sa 0.763***
(0.358)
Constant 0.445 0.677 0.412 340.0*** 0.154 2.111 0.305 210.2 1.143 2.016 1.083*** 366.8***
(0.711) (2.562) (0.461) (82.24) (0.304) (1.916) (0.366) (117.9) (0.705) (1.626) (0.582) (65.67)
Observations 16 16 16 14 16 16 16 14 16 16 16 14
Adjusted R2 0.930 0.922 0.959 0.951 0.962 0.926 0.973 0.964 0.944 0.926 0.964 0.971
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
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Table 2.8: Taylor’s Reaction Function, 1996q1-2000q2 (continued)
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Expected Inflation headpit+1 headpit+1,hp headpit+1,sa headpit+1,m2 bondit bondit,hp bondit,sa bondit,m2
headlinepit+1 0.721 0.822***
(0.447) (0.407)
gdpt 3.16e-05 6.13e-05*** 5.42e-05*** -4.01e-05 1.71e-05 6.16e-05*** 4.32e-05 -3.26e-06
(2.47e-05) (2.23e-05) (1.86e-05) (3.52e-05) (2.98e-05) (2.22e-05) (2.67e-05) (2.61e-05)
∆exrt 0.363*** 0.465*** 0.265 0.494*** 0.483*** 0.404***
(0.180) (0.194) (0.181) (0.203) (0.189) (0.198)
∆exrt−1 0.172 0.309 0.108 0.397*** 0.336 0.314***
(0.225) (0.231) (0.160) (0.167) (0.199) (0.146)
it−1 0.531*** 0.765*** 0.343*** 0.534*** 0.785*** 0.592***
(0.184) (0.104) (0.175) (0.139) (0.0824) (0.135)
headlinepit+1,hp 0.102
(0.286)
headlinepit+1,sa 0.322
(0.368)
∆exrt,sa 0.431*** 0.493***
(0.141) (0.153)
∆exrt−1,sa 0.286 0.389***
(0.191) (0.140)
it−1,sa 0.674*** 0.641***
(0.142) (0.120)
m2,t -44.95*** -38.77***
(13.17) (20.22)
bondit 1.126*** 0.297
(0.393) (0.706)
bondit,hp 0.0458
(0.492)
bondit,sa 0.659***
(0.323)
Constant 0.599 1.068 0.683 389.4*** -7.105*** 0.832 -3.858*** 334.1
(0.692) (0.959) (0.540) (113.8) (2.544) (0.596) (2.080) (179.1)
Observations 16 16 16 14 16 16 16 14
Adjusted R2 0.933 0.922 0.952 0.958 0.935 0.922 0.954 0.942
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
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Table 2.9: Taylor’s Reaction Function, 2000q2-2008q2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Expected Inflation corepit corepit,hp corepit,sa corepit+1 corepit+1,hp corepit+1,sa bondit bondit,hp bondit,sa E(corepit ) E(corepit,hp) E(corepit,sa )
corepit 0.527***
(0.0963)
gdpt -2.05e-07 1.43e-06 5.27e-06 1.52e-06 2.04e-06 7.13e-06 1.05e-05*** 7.51e-06*** 1.71e-05*** 1.18e-05*** 1.19e-05*** 2.02e-05***
(3.18e-06) (2.77e-06) (6.11e-06) (3.76e-06) (3.42e-06) (9.83e-06) (2.82e-06) (2.80e-06) (5.87e-06) (3.10e-06) (3.08e-06) (6.38e-06)
∆exrt -0.0739*** -0.00359 -0.0949*** -0.0449 -0.120*** -0.0680 -0.107*** -0.107***
(0.0318) (0.0359) (0.0361) (0.0403) (0.0530) (0.0420) (0.0496) (0.0493)
∆exrt−1 -0.00592 0.0336 0.0225 0.0387 0.0690 0.0794*** 0.0999*** 0.100***
(0.0373) (0.0332) (0.0462) (0.0475) (0.0438) (0.0340) (0.0565) (0.0558)
it−1 0.733*** 0.855*** 0.816*** 0.904*** 0.885*** 0.889*** 0.898*** 0.897***
(0.0493) (0.0379) (0.0526) (0.0414) (0.0589) (0.0506) (0.0649) (0.0651)
corepit,hp 0.454***
(0.0903)
corepit,sa 0.611***
(0.160)
∆exrt,sa -0.0633 -0.110 -0.144 -0.148
(0.0703) (0.0857) (0.0940) (0.112)
∆exrt−1,sa -0.0927 -0.0555 -0.0595 -0.0251
(0.0938) (0.111) (0.110) (0.118)
it−1,sa 0.588*** 0.693*** 0.742*** 0.739***
(0.0808) (0.0932) (0.104) (0.113)
corepit+1 0.398***
(0.0930)
corepit+1,hp 0.403***
(0.0977)
corepit+1,sa 0.396***
(0.207)
bondit 0.145***
(0.0592)
bondit,hp 0.279***
(0.0811)
bondit,sa 0.223***
(0.0963)
E(corepit ) -0.0173
(0.0858)
E(corepit,hp) -0.0131
(0.0880)
E(corepit,sa) 0.0591
(0.173)
Constant 0.163*** 0.453*** 0.437*** 0.0877 0.312*** 0.398 -0.404 0.352*** -0.459 0.345*** 0.316*** 0.583
(0.0832) (0.0993) (0.245) (0.107) (0.105) (0.330) (0.302) (0.118) (0.627) (0.189) (0.146) (0.382)
Observations 31 31 31 31 30 31 31 31 31 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.973 0.968 0.870 0.962 0.962 0.828 0.945 0.958 0.830 0.933 0.933 0.807
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
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Table 2.10: Taylor’s Reaction Function, 2000q2-2008q2 (continued)
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
Expected Inflation headpit headpihp headpisa headpit+1 headpit+1,hp headpit+1,sa E(headpit ) E(headpit,hp) E(headpit,sa)
headpit 0.167***
(0.0517)
gdpt 2.13e-06 1.30e-06 8.48e-06 6.65e-06 4.59e-06 1.37e-05 1.23e-05*** 1.23e-05*** 2.20e-05***
(3.81e-06) (3.17e-06) (8.23e-06) (3.96e-06) (4.24e-06) (9.05e-06) (3.04e-06) (3.01e-06) (6.69e-06)
∆exrt -0.0620 -0.0583 -0.0818*** -0.0799*** -0.106*** -0.0999***
(0.0416) (0.0378) (0.0433) (0.0437) (0.0479) (0.0474)
∆exrt−1 0.0579 0.0377 0.0894*** 0.0774 0.0921*** 0.0898***
(0.0516) (0.0500) (0.0514) (0.0545) (0.0513) (0.0482)
it−1 0.865*** 0.935*** 0.896*** 0.961*** 0.885*** 0.877***
(0.0460) (0.0359) (0.0554) (0.0525) (0.0653) (0.0647)
headpit,hp 0.229***
(0.0522)
headpit,sa 0.162***
(0.0884)
∆exrt,sa -0.0646 -0.110 -0.157
(0.0954) (0.0939) (0.102)
∆exrt−1,sa -0.0190 -0.00786 -0.0719
(0.114) (0.129) (0.129)
it−1,sa 0.743*** 0.762*** 0.702***
(0.0966) (0.115) (0.113)
headpit+1 0.0955***
(0.0421)
headpit+1,hp 0.170***
(0.0611)
headpit+1,sa 0.0713
(0.0847)
E(corepit ) 0.0370
(0.0549)
E(corepit,hp) 0.0724
(0.0588)
E(corepit,sa ) 0.140
(0.104)
Constant -0.0301 0.219*** 0.290 0.0702 0.158 0.466 0.265 0.364*** 0.472
(0.158) (0.104) (0.367) (0.177) (0.138) (0.413) (0.183) (0.142) (0.328)
Observations 31 31 31 31 30 31 30 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.958 0.964 0.826 0.946 0.951 0.807 0.934 0.936 0.816
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
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The following simultaneous equations are estimated:
ln exrt = γ0 + γ1(pit) + γ2 ln yt + Σ2i=0θi ln it−i + εt
ln Yt = β0 + β1 ln E(pit) + β2 ln it + Σ4i=0αi ln exrt−i + υt, (2.4)
where ln Yt is log of output growth and all other variables are the same as in
earlier Taylor’s reaction function. Time period of the study is from 2000q2 to
2008q2. Estimated results (Table 2.11) represent empirical results with differ-
ent proxies for expected inflation: core inflation, lead value of core inflation,
long-term interest rate, and weighted average of expected inflation as shown in
columns 1–4 respectively. The results obtained from different specifications of
expected inflation robustly illustrate the significant relationship between short-
term policy rate and exchange rate and, thus, the exchange rate in turn results in
output volatility since the signs of their coefficients are switched every period.
Empirical results are consistent with the trinity problem.11
11The formal model for this hypothesis is the Mundell-Fleming model developed in the 1960s
by Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming. The trinity hypothesis suggests that central banks
cannot attain three policy objectives, which are (1) an independent monetary policy, (2) free
capital movement, and (3) fixed exchange rates at the same time. At least one of them has to be
foregone.
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Table 2.11: Estimated Results of Simultaneous Equation
DEPENDENT (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
ln exrt ln Yt ln exrt ln Yt ln exrt ln Yt ln exrt ln Yt
ln it 0.299*** 0.431*** 0.278*** 8.32e-05 0.291*** 0.231*** 0.375*** 0.0829
(0.0653) (0.0781) (0.0592) (0.0937) (0.0665) (0.0559) (0.0766) (0.0804)
ln it−1 -0.629*** -0.675*** -0.495*** -0.628***
(0.138) (0.117) (0.144) (0.171)
ln it−2 0.197*** 0.303*** 0.120 0.182
(0.0929) (0.0849) (0.0949) (0.114)
ln corepit 0.0351*** -0.142***
(0.0159) (0.0324)
ln exrt -0.749 -2.305*** -0.297 -3.375***
(0.783) (0.984) (0.826) (1.491)
ln exrt−1 -1.369 -0.452 -0.935 0.498
(0.874) (1.011) (0.944) (1.447)
ln exrt−2 2.401*** 1.696*** 1.919*** 3.644***
(0.593) (0.663) (0.583) (1.043)
ln exrt−3 -2.175*** -1.272*** -2.190*** -3.119***
(0.560) (0.594) (0.539) (0.964)
ln exrt−4 2.564*** 2.056*** 2.359*** 3.308***
(0.448) (0.475) (0.433) (0.709)
ln yt -0.00743 -0.0154*** -0.00217 -0.0118***
(0.00624) (0.00518) (0.00736) (0.00668)
ln corepit+1 0.0621*** 0.141***
(0.0192) (0.0499)
ln bondit 0.112*** -0.550***
(0.0568) (0.111)
ln E(corepit) -0.00767 -0.119***
(0.0127) (0.0596)
Constant 3.824*** 11.27*** 3.904*** 14.94*** 3.587*** 11.52*** 3.857*** 10.43***
(0.0537) (1.300) (0.0468) (1.768) (0.144) (1.285) (0.0582) (1.938)
Observations 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Adjusted R2 0.942 0.967 0.954 0.960 0.933 0.967 0.921 0.935
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
Standard errors are in parentheses.
2.5.3 Exchange Rate Pass-Through under Inflation Targeting
There has been a concern about nominal exchange rate changes under infla-
tion targeting as shock absorbers of economy. The mechanism works through
real exchange rate. Any appreciation or depreciation of nominal exchange rate
affects real exchange and, consequently, creates the pass-through effect from ex-
change rates to domestic prices. If the inflationary effects created by changes
of exchange rate are large, the monetary authorities have to implement either
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monetary or fiscal policies to offset inflationary consequences of exchange rate
changes. On the other hand, if exchange rates in one particular country can ab-
sorb most of the economic shock themselves and leave inflation rate marginally
unaffected, the correction policy might be unnecessary.
To address this issue, I begin with the concept of real exchange rate which is
the ratio between tradable and non-tradable goods:
ρ =
Pt
Pnt
, (2.5)
where Pt is the domestic price of tradable goods and Pnt is the price of non-
tradable goods. In order to have nominal exchange rate (E) as an effective shock
absorber, we need real exchange rate to be responsive to change in the nominal
exchange rate. For example, a depreciation of nominal exchange rate generates
an increase in real exchange rate, which in turn leads to expenditure switching
effect. Also three additional assumptions have to be imposed: (1) the “law of
one price” holds for tradable goods; (2) Pn is the result of the clearing conditions
in the non-tradable goods market; and (3) economic authorities pursue mone-
tary and fiscal policies so that wages do not adjust automatically as a result of
change in nominal depreciation. First two assumptions are written as:
Pt = EP∗t (2.6)
N s{
W
Pnt
} = Nd(ρ, A), (2.7)
where E is nominal exchange rate, P∗t is international price of tradable goods; N s,
Nd, W, and A are supply and demand for non-tradable goods, nominal wages,
and absorption. Absorption in addition, is affected by fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. Assuming that P∗t is unchanged and taking differentiation on both equa-
tions with respect to nominal exchange rate:
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d log ρ
d log E = 1 − {α1 + α2
d log W
d log E + α3
d log A
d log E }, (2.8)
where 1 =
η
η−ε
, α2 =
−ε
η−ε
, α3 =
φ
η−ε
, and η ≥ 0, ε ≤ 0, φ ≥ 0 are elasticities.
According to the theory, pass-through from exchange rates to domestic price
of tradable goods is unitary and pass-through to domestic price of non-tradable
goods depends on wage rate behavior and absorption policies. From equa-
tion 2.8, if d log W = d log A = 0 then d log ρd log E > 0 and nominal exchange rate is a
shock absorber. On the other hand, if monetary authorities have low credibility
and the labor union expects higher inflation, that is, d log Wd log E > 0, the effectiveness
of nominal exchange rate as shock absorber will decline.
An empirical analysis of the pass-through from real exchange rate to infla-
tion can be done in a way that tests to what extent nominal exchange rates affect
domestic tradable and non-tradable goods. According to Campa & Goldberg
(2005) and Gagnon & Ihrig (2001), an empirical studies on pass-through have
estimated variants of the following equation:
logPt = β0 + β1 log Et + Σβ2ixit + β3logP∗t + β4 log Pt−1 + εt, (2.9)
where Pt is a price index, either of imported, tradable, or non-tradable goods,
Et is nominal exchange rate, P∗t is an index of foreign prices, the βs are param-
eters to be estimated, xis are other controls expected to capture changes in the
markup, and εt is an error term conforming to standard econometric assump-
tion. Short-run pass-through is β1 while long-run pass-through is
β1
(1−β4) .
I extend equation 2.16 by adding dummy variables that take a value of one,
after Thailand adopted inflation targeting, and zero otherwise, to see if the pat-
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tern of exchange rate pass-through would change if inflation targeting was im-
plemented or not. The estimated regression equation is:
log Pt = β0 + β1 log Et + Σβ2ixit + β3 log P∗ + β4 log Pt−1 + β5 log Et × D
+β6 log Pt−1 × D + εt. (2.10)
From equation above, short-term pass-through in post-inflation targeting is
β1 + β5 and long-term pass-through in post-inflation targeting is
β1+β5
1−(β4+β6) . Long-
term pass-through after adopting inflation targeting could be either higher or
lower than prior-to inflation targeting depending on coefficient β5 and β6. Two
equations are to be estimated; one that CPI used as proxy for non-tradable goods
and another that PPI used as proxy for tradable goods. Zellner’s seemingly un-
related regression is used to correct correlations of errors between CPI and PPI.
Controlled variables are suppressed.12 And since nominal exchange rate (Et) po-
tentially creates endogeneity problems and correlates with error terms , Equa-
tion 2.10 is estimated by using the three-stage least square method with nominal
effective exchange rate as an endogenous variable. The results obtained are pre-
sented in Table 2.12 and results on exchange rate pass-through are presented in
Table 2.13.
According to both tables mentioned earlier, results are robust to type of price
index and time frame. Short-term exchange-rate pass-through increases from
0.018 to 0.40 and 0.153 to 0.27 for CPI and PPI equations, respectively. Long-term
exchange rate pass-through coefficient in the CPI equation increases from 0.018
to 0.51, whereas PPI equation increases from -0.29 to 0.57 after the adoption of
inflation targeting.
12Please see Gagnon & Ihrig (2001) for further explanation
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In most cases, the pass-through effect from exchange rate changes to infla-
tion is incomplete and declining. Several studies explain that low pass-through
effect could result from low inflation environment and credibility gained from
monetary policy.Amitrano et al. (1997), Hakura & Choudhri (2001), Taylor
(2001) and Gagnon & Ihrig (2001) posited that whenever the country’s inflation
is low, the pass-through effect will be low as well. These findings are consis-
tent for both developed countries (Gagnon & Ihrig (2001)) and emerging coun-
tries (Zorzi et al. (2007): Hakura & Choudhri (2001)). However, in the case of
Thailand, the Bank of Thailand experienced an increase of exchange-rate pass-
through after the adoption of inflation targeting.
Table 2.12: 3SLS Estimates: Exchange Rate Pass-Through
CPI PPI
b/se b/se
log Et 0.018* 0.153***
(0.009) (0.045)
log P∗t 0.038* 0.582***
(0.018) (0.174)
log Pt−1 0.955*** 1.064***
(0.022) (0.115)
log Et × D -0.010 -0.439***
(0.021) (0.077)
log Pt−1 × D 0.010 0.435***
(0.021) (0.078)
constant -0.048 -3.656***
(0.122) (0.938)
N 49 49
¯R2 0.99 0.98
RMS error .00445 .0232882
legend: ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Endogenous Variable: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate
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Table 2.13: Short-Term and Long-Term Exchange Rate Pass-Through
Short-Run Long-Run
CPI
Pre-Inflation Targeting 0.018 0.018
Post-Inflation Targeting 0.40 0.51
PPI
Pre-Inflation Targeting 0.153 -0.29
Post-Inflation Targeting 0.27 0.57
Source : Author’s Calculation
2.5.4 Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism and Oil Price
Shock: Inflation Targeting and Counterfactual Scenario
This section studies the relationships among macroeconomic variables under
the adoption of inflation targeting versus counterfactual scenario. The adoption
of inflation targeting might change the responses of macroeconomic variables
in the economy to inflationary shocks. For instance, as the commitment of price
stability becomes a concern, the given one-time shock to inflation may introduce
output loss resulting from raising interest rates in order to contain inflationary
impulses and preventing them from affecting the trend or long-term inflation
rate.
I provide evidence of this by estimating the statistical model of the joint be-
havior of inflation and related variables. Specifically, counterfactual scenario is
constructed by using unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) as suggested by
McCallum (1997). The VAR model consists of first difference log of short-term
interest rate , that is, the 14-day repurchase rate which is the policy instrument,
money supply, exchange rate, GDP, and core inflation. Sample periods are from
1990q1 to 1999q4. I forecast the behavior of these five variables forward for
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32 quarters. The forecast of each variable generated by statistical models can
be thought of as representing how the system would have behaved if the pre-
adoption policy regime had been retained. The predicted variables then can be
compared with the actual post-adoption of the same variables.
Figure 2.11 shows the result of the simulation (dashed line) versus the actual
paths of interest rate, money supply, exchange rate, GDP, and core inflation over
the post-adoption period, that is, from 2000q1 onwards. From Figure 2.11, one
can see that the forecasted inflation rate tends to be higher than the actual rate
except during the early period of inflation targeting adoption where the fore-
casted inflation rate is a bit lower than that of the actual one. Importantly, the
lower-than-forecasted inflation rate is accompanied by the more volatile GDP
movement and a bigger money supply, while exchange rate and interest rate
are pretty much the same. This pattern is another confirmation of the earlier
finding that the adoption of inflation targeting is achieved at the expenses of
short fall and more volatile output.
Next, I examine whether inflation targeting should be able to handle oil price
surge using counterfactual scenario as a benchmark using structural vector au-
toregression model includes macroeconomic variables to describe inflation tar-
geting in Thailand. Oil price is introduced into the SVAR system to examine
to what extent oil price affects the entire economy and how the Bank of Thai-
land reacts to oil price surge. Considering a pth–order structural vector autore-
gression model that has (N × 1) vector of macroeconomic variables: GDP (yt),
Consumer Price Index (cpit), monetary aggregates (m2,t) , nominal short-term of
interest rate (it), nominal exchange rate (exrt), and oil price (oilt).13 For stationar-
ity purpose, all variables are logged and taken first difference.
13Please see the Appendix B for details of variables.
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Figure 2.11: Dynamic Simulations
The reduced-form VAR model is the following:
Yt = c + R(L)Yt + ut, (2.11)
where R(L) = R1 + R2L2 + . . . + RpLp is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator
L, and ut is the generalization of a white noise process with variance covariance
matrix ut ∼ i.i.d.(0,Σu).
According to equation 2.11, all variables are treated symmetrically, and there
is no economic meaning attached to the model. Economic content has to be
put on VAR to provide more meaningful results. The structure of identification
restriction is imposed to make VAR more helpful in examining the relationship
among economic variables. VAR with structure of residual terms or SVAR is
described by:
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A0Yt = A0c + A0R(L)Yt + εt, (2.12)
where εt is a white noise vector with variance-covariance matrix given by the
identity matrix. SVAR assumes that the disturbance terms ut are related to white
noise εt via matrix A0 such that A0ut = εt,
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(2.13)
The above relations, as depicted in equation 2.13, are contemporaneous re-
strictions on the structural parameters of A0 without further restrictions on the
lagged structural parameters. The restriction identification follows what was
suggested by Lee & Ni (2002), Gordon & Leeper (1994), and Kim & Roubini
(2000). I assume that aggregate output is only contemporaneously influenced
by oil price shocks, and the prices only react immediately to innovations in ag-
gregate output and oil prices. The first two equations of the system 2.13 support
the idea that the reaction of real sector to shocks in monetary sector is sluggish.
The third equation of the system 2.13 is a money demand equation. Money
demand is allowed to respond contemporaneously to output, prices, and in-
terest rate. The fourth equation is the monetary policy reaction function. The
monetary authority under flexible inflation targeting sets the interest rate after
observing the current inflation, monetary aggregates, oil prices, and exchange
rate. Oil price here is assumed to be contemporaneously exogenous. Restric-
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tions are exactly identified.14
2.5.5 Empirical Results
The analysis focuses on the response of macroeconomic variables, that is, aggre-
gate output, money supply, short-term interest rate, and exchange rate, to the
price of oil shock. Restriction identifications are imposed to represent monetary
policy and the economic system in Thailand. According to results in Figure 2.12,
an oil price increase produces only a slight impact on other macroeconomic vari-
ables. Output, money supply, exchange rate, and core inflation are unaffected.
Short-term interest rate, on the other hand, is rising in the first two quarters
before declining and reaches its original level in the sixth quarter.
Structural forecast-error variance decomposition (SFEVD) from oil price
shock as shown in Figure 2.14, represents the extent to which oil price shock
creates fluctuations in macroeconomic variables. It can be inferred that oil price
shock does not play much role in explaining other variables’ forecast error vari-
ance. However, given the obtained results (see Figure 2.14), aggregate output’s,
core inflation’s, and interest rate’s forecast error variance are mostly explained
by oil price shock in the first quarter. Results obtained from SVAR are consis-
tent with the counterfactual scenario in which Cholesky restriction is imposed
(as shown in Figure 2.13) except that interest rate response under inflation tar-
geting lasts longer than under the counterfactual scenario.
Results from SVAR indicate that oil price shock in Thailand is demand-
driven. High oil prices have not so far had much of an impact on the Thai
14 n(n−1)
2 restrictions are necessary but not sufficient conditions to solve for variables in SVAR.
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economy and inflation. The limited impact reflects the demand-driven nature
of the run up in oil prices since 2002, as well as lower energy intensity, more-
competitive labor markets, and the improved credibility of monetary policy
frameworks. In the case of Thailand, short-term interest rate is adjusted to curb
inflationary pressure from high oil prices and leave other macroeconomic vari-
able unaffected. Impact of oil shock on interest rate persists for longer period
than in the case of no inflation targeting.
−.05
0
.05
.1
−.05
0
.05
.1
0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
Oil price, Core inflation Oil price, Exchange rate Oil price, GDP
Oil price, Interest rate Oil price, Money supply
90% CI orthogonalized irf
step
Graphs by impulse variable, and response variable
Impulse Response Function: Inflation Targeting
Source: Author’s Calculation
Figure 2.12: Impulse Response Function: Inflation Targeting
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Figure 2.13: Impulse Response Function: Counterfactual Scenario
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|        |    (1)    |    (2)    |    (3)    |    (4)    |    (5)    |    (6)    |
|  step  |  sfevd    |  sfevd    |  sfevd    |  sfevd    |  sfevd    |  sfevd    |
|--------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
|0       | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         |
|1       | 7.9e-14   | 8.7e-13   | 1.2e-14   | 9.4e-14   | 1.3e-15   | 2.0e-12   |
|2       | 2.5e-13   | 1.2e-12   | 1.6e-14   | 9.7e-13   | 5.1e-14   | 1.7e-12   |
|3       | 2.1e-13   | 1.3e-12   | 3.5e-14   | 8.4e-13   | 3.8e-14   | 1.3e-12   |
|4       | 1.9e-13   | 1.2e-12   | 3.7e-14   | 6.9e-13   | 4.1e-14   | 1.3e-12   |
|5       | 1.6e-13   | 1.2e-12   | 3.7e-14   | 6.8e-13   | 6.0e-14   | 1.3e-12   |
|6       | 1.5e-13   | 1.1e-12   | 3.7e-14   | 6.8e-13   | 6.2e-14   | 1.3e-12   |
|7       | 1.5e-13   | 1.1e-12   | 3.7e-14   | 6.9e-13   | 6.2e-14   | 1.3e-12   |
|8       | 1.5e-13   | 1.1e-12   | 3.7e-14   | 6.8e-13   | 6.2e-14   | 1.3e-12   |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
(1) irfname = v9, impulse = dloil, and response = dlgdp_b
(2) irfname = v9, impulse = dloil, and response = dlcpi_core
(3) irfname = v9, impulse = dloil, and response = dlm2
(4) irfname = v9, impulse = dloil, and response = dli
(5) irfname = v9, impulse = dloil, and response = dlexr
(6) irfname = v9, impulse = dloil, and response = dloil
Source: Author’s Calculation
Figure 2.14: Structural Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition from Oil Price
Shock: Inflation Targeting
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+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
|        |    (1)    |    (2)    |    (3)    |    (4)    |    (5)    |    (6)    | 
|  step  |   fevd    |   fevd    |   fevd    |   fevd    |   fevd    |   fevd    | 
|--------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------| 
|0       | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 
|1       | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | 0         | .580397   | 
|2       | .043561   | .000044   | .028449   | .173672   | .000399   | .497895   | 
|3       | .04012    | .002915   | .03919    | .150069   | .002023   | .426219   | 
|4       | .039968   | .002798   | .042814   | .150631   | .002781   | .394143   | 
|5       | .037731   | .004173   | .042316   | .129925   | .003947   | .387659   | 
|6       | .036882   | .004293   | .041905   | .121789   | .004673   | .383335   | 
|7       | .036046   | .004262   | .041808   | .114537   | .004824   | .381628   | 
|8       | .036019   | .00434    | .041589   | .111284   | .00483    | .381399   | 
|9       | .03534    | .004384   | .041383   | .110116   | .004921   | .37966    | 
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
(1) irfname = cho1, impulse = dloil, and response = dlgdp_b 
(2) irfname = cho1, impulse = dloil, and response = dlcpi_core 
(3) irfname = cho1, impulse = dloil, and response = dlm2 
(4) irfname = cho1, impulse = dloil, and response = dli 
(5) irfname = cho1, impulse = dloil, and response = dlexr 
(6) irfname = cho1, impulse = dloil, and response = dloil 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation
Figure 2.15: Forecast-Error Variance Decomposition from Oil Price Shock:
Counterfactual Scenario
2.6 Conclusion and Policy Implication
Thailand’s economy has undergone many economic reforms since the financial
crisis. One of the policy reforms is the adoption of inflation targeting as mon-
etary policy under the IMF supervision. Empirical evidence in the first section
of this paper shows that the volatility of inflation and the degree of inflation
persistence have dropped after adopting inflation targeting framework. Output
growth has improved on average while inflation expectation have been lower
than before inflation targeting was adopted. However there is no evidence that
inflation targeting has contributed to such improvement since Thailand does
not perform any better, and even worse in terms of output stability, than non-
inflation-targeting countries.
As a small open economy, Thailand relies heavily on exchange rate and, thus,
the exchange rate policy constitutes an important part of monetary policy even
under inflation targeting. There are several reasons why exchange rate is impor-
tant for inflation targeting in developing countries. First, exchange rate move-
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ments provide an additional transmission channel of monetary policy. The ex-
change rate transmission channel operates both directly and indirectly. Changes
in nominal exchange rate directly affect the domestic prices of imported final
goods and core inflation and, also, indirectly affect those through domestic de-
mand. Changes in real exchange rate affect domestic and foreign demand for
domestic goods, thus enhancing standard aggregate demand channel. Second,
the exchange is one channel through which foreign disturbances could be trans-
mitted to the domestic economy especially for developing countries, which are
more vulnerable to the large exchange rate movement.
Interest Rate Exchange Rate
Output Inflation Rate (
UIP
High Pass-Through
Sterilized Intervention
Figure 2.16: Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism
On the indirect channel of policy transmission mechanism (please see Fig-
ure 2.16), econometric results reveal that there exists a significant relationship
between exchange rate and interest rate after inflation targeting was adopted.
The economic condition in Thailand does not meet criteria suggested by Taylor
(2001). That means any increasing of interest rate to keep inflation rate in con-
trol would induce the exchange rate appreciation. Exchange rate appreciation
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hurts exports due to declining of profits and deteriorating price competitive-
ness in the world markets and consequently affects output growth. The results
obtained from different specifications of expected inflation robustly illustrate
the significant relationship between short-term policy rate and exchange rate,
and thus the exchange rate in turn results in output volatility since the signs of
their coefficients are switched every period. The findings are consistent with
the Impossible Trinity Hypothesis: that the Bank of Thailand has to forgo trade
competitiveness and output stability to achieve inflation target.
Moreover, results show the validity of the direct channel between exchange
rate and inflation, Thailand experiences higher pass-through than other coun-
tries15 that show low exchange rate pass-through effects after adopting inflation
targeting.
In the case of Thailand’s economy, the Thai baht could not be used as a buffer
against other economic shocks since the exchange rate itself would transmit
shocks to inflation. High exchange rate pass-through would impose a difficult
task to the Bank of Thailand to keep inflation rate in check whilemaintaining ex-
change rate at a competitive level. In addition, the indirect impact of exchange
rate movement on aggregate output are too significant to be neglected. From
empirical findings, exchange rate channel under the transmission mechanism
plays a major role that contracts the inflation targeting framework and contra-
dicts to traditional inflation targeting where exchange rate should have been
decentralized and merely a messenger passing effect from interest rate to oper-
ating targets. Since exchange rate is a major concern, the role of exchange rate
under a traditional inflation targeting framework, thus, does not fit Thailand’s
15Please see Amitrano et al. (1997), Hakura & Choudhri (2001), Taylor (2001), Gagnon & Ihrig
(2001) for details.
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economy.
Likewise, forecasting exercises described by SVAR indicates that inflation
rate is lower than the counterfactual case after inflation targeting. However, that
disinflation is accompanied by decline and volatility in output, suggesting that
the adoption of inflation is not free from expenses. Regarding the oil price surge,
results obtained from SVAR estimation suggest that oil price rise is demand-
driven. An active interest policy, not only inflation targeting, is able to help
relieve the oil price shock and leave other variables unaffected while having a
shorter duration than inflation targeting does.
The most critical aspect of the implementation of inflation targeting in Thai-
land is the role exchange rate, which affects both directly and indirectly through
monetary mechanism. Moreover, the success of disinflation is challenged by
unstable output growth. The Bank of Thailand should carefully weigh the costs
and benefits of adopting inflation targeting, reconsidering the compatibility of
inflation targeting with the Thai economy.
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CHAPTER 3
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, HOUSINGMARKET, AND U.S. HOUSING
BUBBLE SPILLOVER
3.1 Introduction
The subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 and 2008 is thought to have been the most
severe financial crisis ever in U.S. history. The boom and bust in the hous-
ing markets threatened to have large economic repercussions. The role of the
housing sector in the economic system has changed thanks to the innovation of
financial instruments. These changes have broadened the spillovers and ampli-
fied their impact since U.S. mortgage markets are highly developed and closely
linked to financial institutions.
To understand the mechanism by which the housing bust caused the eco-
nomic crisis, it is useful to examine the evolution of financial institutions, the
investment behavior of each economic agent, and the relationship between the
financial and non-financial sectors over time. In the first part chapter 3, I allow
the useful data, which the so called flow of funds to tell the story of the U.S.
fund allocation and the shifting pattern of investment through uses and sources
of funds from the 1950s to present.
The second part of the paper shed some light on the key factors that form
housing bubbles, and lead to the situation in which the bubble burst and which
ended with the widespread damage to other financial institutions and the econ-
omy. The third part explores the dynamic of U.S. house price, its fluctuation
due to changes of macroeconomic variables, the disequilibrium of house price
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in the short-run and its convergence to the long-run equilibrium through the
application of ECM estimation on panel data of 18 major cities in the U.S.
Last but not least, the fourth part explains how the housing sector bubble has
created a ripple effect on the entire economy. The impact is explained through
these three important channels: (1) Wealth channel arises when a homeowner ’s
wealth increases due to the home price bubble which in turns affects the home-
owner’s consumption. (2) Credit channel is leniently increasing when financial
institutions, especially the non-banks, become more optimistic about housing
markets. The unsustainablility of housing is later explained by the freezing of
the third type of channel (3) Balance sheet effect occurs when financial institu-
tions’ asset prices drop and capital values worsen, causing “liquidity crunch.”
This difficult environment within the financial system cannot be relieved un-
less the housing situation is resolved. The empirical result in the fourth section
indicates that the credit crunch within financial institution is relieved as more
houses are sold. That said, the recovery of credit within the financial institu-
tion depends a lot on the extent to which excess houses inventories can be liq-
uidated. The new round of demand for houses should increase when prices
deflate enough. This will help to stabilize the uncertain value of home equity
that is crucial as a buffer for all mortgages and as collateral for those mortgage-
backed securities and, consequently, make the financial institution able to re-
sume operations as its liquidity improves.
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3.2 The U.S. Flow of Funds and Financial Institutions
The financial sector is known to be the intermediator among economic sectors.
Its major role is to channel funds to household, government, and corporation.
The financial sector’s share of aggregate income reveals the value that the rest of
the economy attaches to its services. Historical data shows that the financial sec-
tor in the U.S. has grown significantly. In 1952, the financial sector contributed
to GDP value added by 11 percent of the U.S. GDP. As shown in Figure 3.1, in
2007, the fraction had risen to 20.4 percent. This shows an upward trend in the
size of the financial sector and also the fact that the financial sector has become
an important element of the U.S. economy. Not only the fast pace of growth in
the financial sector itself, but the extent to which other economic sectors engage
themselves in financial activities is also growing and expanding. To get a clearer
picture of the interrelationship among financial sectors and other economic sec-
tors, I utilize the information provided by U.S. flow of funds.
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Figure 3.1: Financial Sector as Value Added to GDP, 1952–2007
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Figure 3.2: Flow of Funds
Basically, the emphasis of flow of funds has been on providing statements
of total sources of funds flowing to economic sectors and the sectors’ uses of
funds. The structure of the flow of funds accounts reflects innovations in finan-
cial instruments and the emergence of a new institution. The simple chart below
describes how the loanable funds are channeled. From the chart, flows among
economic sectors were transferred by financial sector both ways, sources and
uses.
The flow of funds measures the acquisition of physical and financial assets
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throughout the U.S. economy and the sources of funds used to acquire the as-
sets. Figure 3.3 represents uses of funds of different sectors in the economy from
year 1952–2007. Economic sectors spend their funds two ways. The first one is
on capital expenditures, the second is on financial instruments. From Figure 3.3,
uses of funds from all sectors were relatively low and stable during the early
1950s to the early 1970s. Capital expenditure was marginally bigger than finan-
cial uses in most cases except for the financial sector and the rest of the world,
the biggest contributors to financial uses. Right after the 1970s, the pattern of
uses of funds became more expansive. Capital expenditure had risen steadily
and the growth of capital expenditure spent by all sectors was relatively stable.
Uses of funds on financial instruments, on the other hand, were more unstable
increasing after the 1980s due to the fact that financial markets were more open
at that time. All economic sectors have participated more in financial invest-
ment. The pattern of increase in financial uses of funds stems from the fact that
the financial sector has been growing both domestically and globally. Volatility
of financial uses might be caused by the fact that financial investment is intan-
gible and relatively easier to be liquidated and resold. So it is not surprising to
see growth in financial uses reach its peak in one year and sink to the bottom
in another year. In 2001, the U.S. economy was experiencing a recession in a
decade when the September 11 terrorist attack occurred leading to sluggish and
volatile capital investment in all sectors. The federal government’s fiscal fund
deficit has been widening due to tax cut. Right after the recession in 2001, the
flow of fund data reflects a number of changes. The effect of tax cuts on the
federal deficit can still be observed. Another major change is the sharp rise in
mortgage financing which is a result of the interest rate cut. These domestic
financial uses of funds are financed by the rest of the world. The foreign funds
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continually flow in as current account deficit grows causing a deteriorating of
The United States’ net foreign investment position.
Along with increasing of financial investment, Debt transactions of domestic
non-financial sectors have increased since 1980. Figure 3.4 depicts flow of net
borrowing by domestic non-financial sectors, net lending by financial sectors,
and prime lending rate. The amount of borrowing was relatively stable dur-
ing the period before 1980. However, right after that, net borrowing expanded
instantaneously. The explosion was especially striking for non-financial cor-
porations, for which the replacement of equity by debt led to a restructuring
of the capital base. Household and governments also borrowed heavily, with
individuals increasing their mortgage and consumer-credit indebtedness and
governments issuing more debt securities.
In 1990, one could observe the slowing of debt growth that accompanied
economic recession. The borrowers during that period tried to reduce debt bur-
dens by borrowing less, refinancing existing debt with the lower costs or longer
maturities. However, debts started to rise again in 1992 due to a relatively low
lending rate. Financial institutions are the major lender to the entire economy,
while domestic non-financial sectors are the main borrower. Adding to that,
financial institutions also started to lend to each other. Financial sectors’ bor-
rowing had never been significant until the early 1990s, which can be inferred
from ,Figure 3.4, which depicts the large gap between net lending from finan-
cial sectors and net borrowing from domestic non-financial sectors. The gapwas
widest in the year 2000 and closed before getting wider again in year 2005–2006.
That means part of the funds was lent and circulated among financial sectors
and not released to the real sectors. Large borrowing by financial sectors were
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(b) Non-Financial Business
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Source: U.S. Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve System
Figure 3.3: Uses of Funds (billion USD), 1952–2007
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observed in two periods as highlighted in Figure 3.4. The first is the beginning
of 1990s until 2004, the second is during 2005–2007. The first period fell into the
stock bubble of the 1990s resulting from an information technology boom, the
rapid expansion of the dot-com industry, and the growing of long term capi-
tal management (LTCM). The latter period corresponded to the housing boom.
Both economic bubbles involved heavy borrowing from financial sectors.
Source: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve System
Figure 3.4: Lending and Borrowing Among Economic Sectors, 1952–2007
There has been a significant evolution of financial intermediation over the
past fifty years. The interactions of changes in regulation, tax law, introduction
of international financial services, and the development of new types of finan-
cial instruments have changed the pattern of savings flow and major fund sup-
pliers. Table 3.1 exhibits the total credit assets held by financial sectors. Deposi-
tory institutions, that is, commercial banks were the major suppliers of funds in
the United States during the 1950s–1970s, holding almost 50 percent of the total
credit market. The introduction of other types of financial institutions and finan-
cial instruments, for instance, pension funds, investment funds, and debt secu-
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ritization, increased the degree of competition within the industry and shrank
the percent of credit held by depository institutions. In the 1990s and 2000s, the
share of credit assets held by commercial banks decreased to about 25 percent.
Debt securitization has become the alternative sources of credit. Home mort-
gage loans were increasingly financed by the issuance of securities backed by
pools of loans and that increased the share of credit held by agency- and GSE-
backed mortgage pools and also induced the expansion of mortgage markets.
From the information here, we could infer that source of credit becomes more
diversified across different financial institutions instead of centering at deposi-
tory institutions as it did in the 1950s.
The change in pattern is noticeable in the dimension of credit borrowers as
well. Finance companies as a major borrower in the 1950s were defeated by
government-sponsored enterprise, agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pools,
and ABS issuers in the 1980s–2000s. The most popular instruments have fallen
into the category of agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pool and corporate
bonds. Bank loans only accounted for 1 percent of total instruments in the 2000s
compared with 30 percent in the 1950s. This reflects the growth of new financial
services and instruments and also the changing of lending/borrowing practice
in the United States. Instead of obtaining a loan from commercial banks as in
the past, loans were given out by special agencies. Later, those special agen-
cies pooled the bundle of debts and created some kind of securities backed by
stream of debt income and sold it out to themarket. This explains the popularity
of ABS and GSE- mortgage pool securities in the 2000s.
Resulting from this innovation, non-financial sectors fromwhichmajor share
of loans comes from to mortgages could obtain loans through the new channel
106
of financial servicing or the so called parallel banking system. Krugman (2008)
used this term to name the set of institutions and arrangements that are non-
bank financial institutions. Securitization of home mortgages offered by those
financial institutions provided the liquidity to mortgage lending, while low-
level interest rates made houses attractive since house prices kept rising, as can
be seen in Figure 3.5, which shows the ratio of average U.S. home prices to av-
erage rents. Due to the expectation of a rise in house prices, borrowers can get
away with the traditional principle of lending practices Krugman (2008).The
lenders require little or no down payment. Much of those lendings go under
the “subprime” category (as shown in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.2). And risks as-
sociate with those lenient lending are transferred from financial institutions to
investors through the securities the earning of which are backed by subprime
loan payment. Table 3.4 describes the rising trend of mortgage borrowing by
the non-financial sector. In the 2000s, mortgage loans are 40 percent, or twice as
much, as compared with the Figure in 1950s.
Mortgage borrowing and lending do not limit themselves to the parallel
banking system, thanks to the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which paves
the way for commercial banks and depository institutions to participate in these
cobweb financial transactions. They both lend and issue mortgage-backed secu-
rities. Their assets are held in terms of those mortgage-backed securities as well.
Putting it all together explains the booming housing market and the increasing
of mortgage lending in most of financial institutions in the 2000s, as shown in
Figure 3.7. Financial institutions, unlike in the past, become a dominant player
in the economic system. Their functions and activities are complicated and in-
evitably involve the rest of the society. They provide a great contribution to the
economy, aswell as cause damage when thing goes wrong.
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Table 3.1: Total Credit Assets Held by Financial Sectors (billion USD)
1950–1959 1950–1959 1960–1969 1960–1969 1970–1979 1970–1979 1980–1989 1980–1989 1990–1999 1990–1999 2000–2007 2000–2007
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Financial sectors 378.62 100 794 100 2030.54 100 6170.19 100 13534.46 100 27565.61 100
Monetary authority 24.46 6.46 40.02 5.04 91.34 4.50 182.81 2.96 365.51 2.70 667.64 2.42
Commercial banking 156.87 41.43 298.47 37.59 769.84 37.91 1922.42 31.16 3516.36 25.98 6558.14 23.79
U.S.-chartered commercial banks 154.92 40.92 294.23 37.06 731.39 36.02 1762.33 28.56 3065.62 22.65 5827.13 21.14
Foreign banking offices in U.S. 1.47 0.39 3.24 0.41 30.68 1.51 138.34 2.24 398.53 2.94 615.65 2.23
Bank holding companies 0 0.00 0.39 0.05 5.02 0.25 10.31 0.17 20.53 0.15 34.04 0.12
Banks in U.S.-affiliated areas 0.51 0.13 0.63 0.08 2.75 0.14 11.45 0.19 31.71 0.23 81.34 0.30
Savings institutions 61.63 16.28 163.31 20.57 426.78 21.02 1045.04 16.94 973.51 7.19 1352.44 4.91
Credit unions 1.98 0.52 8.18 1.03 32.41 1.60 96.81 1.57 254.13 1.88 526.56 1.91
Property-casualty insurance companies 10.84 2.86 20.67 2.60 60.95 3.00 194.11 3.15 449.36 3.32 666.15 2.42
Life insurance companies 78.4 20.71 135.23 17.03 242.2 11.93 651.17 10.55 1527.04 11.28 2492.04 9.04
Private pension funds 10.93 2.89 27.8 3.50 67.12 3.31 292.86 4.75 585.72 4.33 671.59 2.44
State and local govt. retirement funds 10.07 2.66 30.87 3.89 80.02 3.94 254.92 4.13 521.07 3.85 708.38 2.57
Federal govt. retirement funds 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.87 0.01 20.63 0.15 65.71 0.24
Money market mutual funds 0 0.00 0 0.00 3.63 0.18 169.64 2.75 609.93 4.51 1517.53 5.51
Mutual funds 0.9 0.24 3.55 0.45 8.69 0.43 146.41 2.37 740.92 5.47 1589.10 5.76
Closed-end funds 0.71 0.19 1.96 0.25 2.84 0.14 10.14 0.16 83.18 0.61 144.41 0.52
Exchange-traded funds 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 10.70 0.04
Government-sponsored enterprises 5.38 1.42 19.47 2.45 85.95 4.23 279.18 4.52 775.66 5.73 2419.73 8.78
Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pools 0.11 0.03 1.19 0.15 35.94 1.77 413.9 6.71 1569.88 11.60 3378.45 12.26
ABS issuers 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 59.09 0.96 632.92 4.68 2672.19 9.69
Finance companies 14.91 3.94 39.66 4.99 105.86 5.21 328.87 5.33 577.15 4.26 1302.03 4.72
REITs 0 0.00 0.28 0.04 7.37 0.36 11.19 0.18 31.99 0.24 150.30 0.55
Brokers and dealers 1.35 0.36 2.72 0.34 8.01 0.39 43.48 0.70 146.18 1.08 445.84 1.62
Funding corporations 0.09 0.02 0.6 0.08 1.58 0.08 67.32 1.09 153.41 1.13 226.65 0.82
Source: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve System
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Price-Rent Ratio, 1987-2007
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Source: Case-Shiller Home Price Index, BEA
Figure 3.5: Ratio of Mortgages Price to Rent, 1987–2007
Source: Jaffee (2008)
Figure 3.6: Subprime Mortgage Originations, Annual Volume, and Percentage
of Total
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Table 3.2: Home Sales, Total and Attributable to Subprime Loans
Existing New home Total home Subprime Subprime
Year home sales sales sales originations home sales
(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (percent) (thousands)
2000 4,603 877 5,480 13.2 722
2001 4,734 908 5,642 7.2 408
2002 4,975 973 5,948 6.9 412
2003 5,443 1,086 6,529 7.9 513
2004 5,959 1,203 7,162 18.2 1,300
2005 6,180 1,283 7,463 20 1,495
2006 5,677 1,051 6,728 20.1 1,355
2000-2006 37,571 7,381 44,952 6,204
Source:Jaffee (2008)
Ratio of Mortgages to Total Financial Assets, 1945-2007
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Figure 3.7: Ratio of Mortgages to Total Financial Assets, 1952–2007
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Table 3.3: Credit Market Debt Owed by Financial Sectors (billion USD)
1950–1959 1950–1959 1960–1969 1960–1969 1970–1979 1970–1979 1980–1989 1980–1989 1990–1999 1990–1999 2000–2007 2000-2007
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
By instrument 15.69 100 61.03 100 269.71 100 1326.52 100 4348.06 100 11690.33 100
Open market paper 2.55 16.25 13.92 22.81 59.74 22.15 252.62 19.04 583.28 13.41 1124.10 9.62
GSE issues 3.34 21.29 15.31 25.09 75.36 27.94 255.51 19.26 803.59 18.48 2464.40 21.08
Agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pool s.e.c. 0.11 0.70 1.19 1.95 35.94 13.33 413.9 31.20 1569.88 36.11 3378.45 28.90
Corporate bonds 3.61 23.01 15.41 25.25 53.79 19.94 255.76 19.28 1114.66 25.64 3851.74 32.95
Bank loans n.e.c. 4.81 30.66 10 16.39 23.58 8.74 43.98 3.32 73.19 1.68 176.03 1.51
Other loans and advances 1.26 8.03 5.12 8.39 19.81 7.34 102.13 7.70 173.86 4.00 572.34 4.90
Mortgages 0 0.00 0.06 0.10 1.48 0.55 2.59 0.20 29.5 0.68 119.25 1.02
By sector 15.69 100 61.03 100 269.71 100 1326.52 100 4348.06 100 11690.33 100.00
Commercial banks 0.82 5.23 4.56 7.47 22.17 8.22 75.82 5.72 118.98 2.74 388.36 3.32
Bank holding companies 0 0.00 0.43 0.70 17.08 6.33 95.15 7.17 147.81 3.40 382.30 3.27
Savings institutions 1.31 8.35 5.36 8.78 21.42 7.94 112.49 8.48 142.45 3.28 327.60 2.80
Credit unions 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.66 0.02 12.70 0.11
Life insurance companies 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.04 0.02 10.53 0.09
Government-sponsored enterprises 3.43 21.86 15.43 25.28 75.99 28.17 260.42 19.63 805.51 18.53 2464.40 21.08
Agency- and GSE- backed mortgage loans 0.11 0.70 1.19 1.95 35.94 13.33 413.9 31.20 1569.88 36.11 3378.45 28.90
ABS issuers 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 61.94 4.67 685.62 15.77 2773.39 23.72
Brokers and dealers 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 3.07 0.23 28.37 0.65 53.63 0.46
Finance companies 10.03 63.93 33.82 55.42 89.9 33.33 239.18 18.03 510.03 11.73 1020.83 8.73
REITs 0 0.00 0.23 0.38 7.19 2.67 11.49 0.87 67.58 1.55 292.16 2.50
Funding corporations 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 53.03 4.00 270.05 6.21 581.94 4.98
Source:U.S. Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve System
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Table 3.4: Credit Market Debt Owed by Nonfinancial Sectors(billion USD)
1950–1959 1950–1959 1960–1969 1960–1969 1970–1979 1970–1979 1980–1989 1980–1989 1990–1999 1990–1999 2000–2007 2000–2007
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Domestic 534.86 96.89 994.11 96.53 2,305.99 95.91 6,796.94 96.61 13,616.71 96.16 24,099.81 94.67
By instrument 534.86 96.89 994.11 96.53 2,305.99 95.91 6,796.94 96.61 13,616.71 96.16 24,099.81 94.67
Commercial paper 0.39 0.07 2.02 0.20 11.46 0.48 60.53 0.86 148.52 1.05 135.33 0.53
Treasury securities 224.39 40.65 256.7 24.93 438.79 18.25 1,469.09 20.88 3,357.9 23.71 4,167.26 16.37
Agency- and GSE-backed securities 1.45 0.26 5.87 0.57 8.56 0.36 7.91 0.11 26.12 0.18 25.13 0.10
Municipal securities 42.44 7.69 98.57 9.57 231.33 9.62 757.85 10.77 1314.17 9.28 2,003.29 7.87
Corporate bonds 53.95 9.77 103.11 10.01 247.21 10.28 603.5 8.58 1,422.93 10.05 2,918.56 11.47
Bank loans n.e.c. 32.76 5.93 79.19 7.69 217.18 9.03 560.42 7.97 876.31 6.19 1,273.76 5.00
Other loans and advances 14.51 2.63 38.46 3.73 123.24 5.13 433.05 6.16 715.17 5.05 1,169.98 4.60
Mortgages 125.56 22.75 320.13 31.08 807.98 33.60 2,341.37 33.28 4,640.3 32.77 10,251.41 40.27
Home 83.74 15.17 209.04 20.30 503.32 20.93 1,529.77 21.74 3,481.96 24.59 7,969.10 31.31
Multifamily residential 13.37 2.42 36.12 3.51 98.25 4.09 203.76 2.90 286.91 2.03 576.66 2.27
Commercial 19.62 3.55 54.66 5.31 155.2 6.45 514.26 7.31 797.82 5.63 1,609.33 6.32
Farm 8.83 1.60 20.31 1.97 51.18 2.13 93.57 1.33 73.62 0.52 96.30 0.38
Consumer credit 39.58 7.17 91.72 8.91 221.34 9.21 563.42 8.01 1,115.34 7.88 2,155.14 8.47
By sector 534.86 96.89 994.11 96.53 2,305.99 95.91 6,796.94 96.61 13,616.71 96.16 24,099.81 94.67
Household sector 130.25 23.60 322.95 31.36 769.85 32.02 2,210.56 31.42 4,801.97 33.91 10,221.88 40.15
Nonfinancial business 135.64 24.57 307.24 29.83 865.58 36.00 2,488.27 35.37 4,341.13 30.66 8,029.10 31.54
Corporate 101.2 18.33 212.29 20.61 570.55 23.73 1,585.24 22.53 3,044.3 21.50 5,342.40 20.99
Nonfarm noncorporate 20.87 3.78 63.59 6.17 210.76 8.77 744.68 10.58 1,162.85 8.21 2,508.10 9.85
Farm 13.55 2.45 31.37 3.05 84.28 3.51 158.34 2.25 133.95 0.95 178.64 0.70
State and local governments 43.14 7.82 101.36 9.84 223.19 9.28 621.1 8.83 1,089.62 7.70 1,656.45 6.51
Federal government 225.83 40.91 262.56 25.49 447.38 18.61 1,477.02 20.99 3,384 23.90 4,192.40 16.47
Credit market held in U.S. 17.17 3.11 35.76 3.47 98.38 4.09 238.35 3.39 543.21 3.84 1,356.46 5.33
Commercial paper 0 0.00 0 0.00 1.14 0.05 30.75 0.44 69.82 0.49 308.80 1.21
Bonds 3.67 0.66 9.16 0.89 26.61 1.11 74.29 1.06 372.31 2.63 931.45 3.66
Bank loans n.e.c. 1.51 0.27 5.54 0.54 23.87 0.99 35.56 0.51 36.3 0.26 77.98 0.31
Other loans and advances 12 2.17 21.06 2.04 46.76 1.94 97.73 1.39 64.81 0.46 38.26 0.15
Domestic and foreign 552.01 100 1,029.88 100 2,404.36 100 7,035.32 100 14,159.93 100 25,456.26 100
Source: U.S. Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve System
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3.3 Mortgages Markets and Subprime Crisis
Trends in the banking industry contributed significantly to the lending boom.
This section explains in details the mechanism in the banking industry that laid
the foundation for the crisis. Unlike in the past when banks held loans on their
own balance sheet, banks moved to an “originate and distribute” system that
is, banks created financial innovations that passed loans to various investors,
thereby off-loading risk. To do that , banks created “collateralized debt obli-
gations (CDOs)” by forming portfolios of mortgages and other types of loans,
corporate bonds, and other assets including credit card receivables. Next, they
sliced portfolios into tranches. Each tranche carried different payment prior-
ity. For example, the super-senior tranche offered to pay investors first, at a
relatively low interest rate. While the most junior tranche would be paid only
after tranches were paid. Investor groups thereby could invest in a particular
tranche that matches their risk appetite while the bottom tranches was mostly
kept at the banks to ensure that they adequately monitor loans. With assistance
by rating agencies, the top tranches received a AAA rating, which would later
be found to be attractive to pension funds or certain money market funds that
were allowed to invest only in AAA- rated fixed–income securities. Investors
could protect themselves against loss from tranches by purchasing “credit de-
fault swaps (CDSes)”, contracts insuring against default on particular bonds or
tranches. This is how the insurer, AIG, for instance, got involved with the situ-
ation.
Banks do not limit themselves to repacking loans, they seek the profit op-
portunity to earn more profits by setting up a special entity that separates them
from their major banking transactions. These entities are “special investment
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vehicles (SIVs).” SIVs may be thought of as “virtual bank” which instead of
gathering deposit from public, borrows money by selling short maturity (of-
ten less than a year) commercial papers (CPs) in money market. They then
use the gathered fund to purchase long-term (longer than a year) bonds with
higher interest and they earn profits by spread between CPs they issue and long
term bonds they invest in. The ambiguity of SIVs doings and the way that they
are set up introduces a large amount of risk into financial system. First of all,
most of the SIVs’ primarily source of profits are from maturity mismatch in-
vestment leading to maturity and funding liquidity exposures, since investors
might suddenly stop buying their CPs and prevent these vehicles from rolling
over their short-term debt. Second of all, as mentioned earlier, these vehicles act
as if they are banks, except that they provide funds for mortgages, credit cards,
and student loans through securitized bonds. Unlike traditional banks which
have expertise in screening borrower applicants and have personal oversight
with borrowers, SIVs lending is conducted through a process known as secu-
ritization. Instead of assessing individual credit risk, each loan (for example,
mortgage or credit card) are bundled with thousands (or tens of thousands or
more) of the same loans. So there are no ways for SIVs’ manager to keep track of
the borrowers and instead rely entirely on the risk assessment provided by the
rating agencies. This exposes SIVs to default risk since in most cases, mortgage
loans put in a bundle turn out to be liar’s loans with some borrower essentially
being NINJA (No Income No Job No Assets). And last but not least, to en-
sure enough liquidiy for SIVs, the sponsoring banks grants a credit line to the
vehicles which is a“liquidity backstop,” to support their off-balance sheet vehi-
cles. Turns out bankings system could not get rid of liquidity risk from asset and
liability mismatching, even though they do not appear on the bank’s balance
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sheet. Figure 3.8 sums up the interlinkage among mortgage, financial innova-
tions, banks and financial institutions, insurance companies, and investors. The
flows seem to work fine as long as liquidity is ample enough to be channelled
to all counter-parties. Prior to the crisis that began in 2007, since banks are so
vulnerable in funding liquidity, sooner or later liquidity would dry up and this
would unfold into crisis.
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structured investment vehicle; SPV = special purpose vehicle.
Figure 3.8: Mortgage Market Flows
The trigger for the crisis was an increase in subprime mortgage default. Typ-
ically more borrowers stop paying their mortgage payments, foreclosures and
the supply of homes for sale increase. As shown in Figure 3.9, the delinquency
rate of subprime mortgages rose dramatically from year 2004 and stood at 21.31
and 18 percent for adjustable and fixed rates respectively. This placed down-
ward pressure on house prices, which further lowered homeowners’ equity. The
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decline in mortgage payments also reduced the value of mortgage-backed secu-
rities, which eroded the net worth and financial health of banks. This vicious
cycle is at the heart of the crisis. Table 3.5 represents the selected financial insti-
tutions that were negatively affected and suffered from huge capital loss. The
first and the second column show the total assets prior to recapitalization and
the off-balance sheet commitments to lend that were in commitment. The next
four columns in the table present information about the exposure of the banks
to the real estate market and other activities. These measures are all ratios, in
which the denominators are the sum of total assets plus total commitments. The
last column is the ratio of total bank equity to total assets. From Table 3.5 we can
infer that U.S. major financial institutions put a high proportion of their assets
in off-balance sheet activities and most of them were in real estate sectors. Thus,
when housing loans and the related investment instruments started to defaults,
the financial institutions had to write down their holdings in subprime-related
securities and consequently Lehman Brothers and other financial institutions
failed in September 2008. In effect, the money market was subject to the bank
run since the liquidity dried up. The TED spread (see Figure 3.10), a measure of
the risk of interbank lending, quadrupled shortly after the Lehman failure. This
credit freeze brought the domestic and global financial system to the collapse,
not to mention the insurers who provided the credit default swaps (CDSes),
upon the losses of the mortgage subprime-related securities. Hedging proved
to be useless when insurance companies, such as American International Group
(AIG), MBIA, and Ambac, faced ratings downgrades because widespread mort-
gage defaults increased their potential exposure to CDSes losses.1
In terms of indirect economic effects, the subprime crisis convey tremendous
1Timeline of subprime crisis is in the Appendix C.
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adverse effects to US economy.The subprime crisis has had a number of adverse
effects on the overall U.S. economic situation. GDP contracted at a 5.5 percent
annual rate during the last quarter of 2008. U.S. employers laid off 2.6 million
jobs during 2008. There were significant job losses in the financial sector, with
over 65,400 jobs lost in the U.S. as of September 2008. In addition to that, declin-
ing house prices reduced household wealth and the collateral for home equity
loans, which is still placing downward pressure on consumption. The credit
and liquidity shortage in financial institutions has caused a major decline in the
business sector and investment.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Figure 3.9: Residential Mortgage Delinquency Rate, as of September 2008
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Table 3.5: Major Leveraged Financial Institutions with Exposures
Data as of September 2008 (billion USD) Exposure to (percent)
except Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs as of August
Name Total Assets Total Commitment Lending Real Estate Credit Card Other EquityAsset
Consumer (percent)
JP Morgan Chase 2,251.5 1,223.6 57.8 19.2 25.3 1.8 6.5
Bank of America 1,836.5 1,836.5 73.3 29.4 28.8 3.0 8.8
Merrill Lynch 875.8 123.7 20 8.8 0 0.5 4.4
State Street Corp 286.7 50.9 20.3 7.4 1.1 2.7 4.6
Citi Group 2,050.1 1,560 65.0 12.4 32.9 4.3 6.1
Bank of NY Mellon 267.6 45.5 33.4 9.9 0.2 0.4 10.3
Wells Fargo 1,382.9 476.9 75.5 45.7 6.2 5.2 7
Morgan Stanley 987.4 162 15.8 21.9 0 0 3.6
Goldman Sachs 1,081.8 78.5 9.3 8.3 0 0 4.2
Total 11,020.3 5,144.3 54.5 21.1 19.3 2.6 6.3
Source: Hoshi & Kashyap (2008)
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Figure 3.10: TED Spread, January -December 2008
3.4 House Price in the United States
In this section, I develop the model that explains U.S. house prices before the
mortgage crisis, during 1991–2006. The model is based on the asset market ap-
proach introduced by Buckley & Ermisch (1982), Dougherty & Order (1982),
Poterba (1984),Meen (1990), and Garcia et al. (2007). Notations here is related to
Dougherty & Order (1982), assuming there are two goods, housing h, and non-
durable consumer goods, c, with a price ph and p, respectively. In this case p is
treated as numeraire. Relative price is defined as q. The variable at represents
the non-housing assets net of loans, earning a nominal interest rate i. House-
hold has to pay income tax on real value of labor income y. Tax rate is θ. The
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budget constraint is
ct + st + qtxt = (1 − θ)y + (1 − θ)iat, (3.1)
where xt and st are real gross housing purchases and real financial saving. Both
of them are defined by
˙h = xt − δht, (3.2)
a˙ = st + piat, (3.3)
where δ is the depreciation rate and pi is inflation rate.
Household maximizes a standard utility function;
U(c0, c1, · · · cn; h0, h1, · · · hn), (3.4)
taking all budget constraints 3.1- 3.3. First-order conditions of the utility maxi-
mization implies [
(1 − θ)i − pi + δ − q˙
qt
]
qt =
Uh
Uc
(3.5)
Meen (1990) rewrote equation 3.5 as
Rt =
[
(1 − θ)i − pi + δ − q˙
qt
]
qt, (3.6)
where equation 3.6 represents the “real rental price,” which can be defined as
the value of compensation given to household to give up one unit of housing.
From equation 3.6, house price under capital market equilibrium can be defined
as;
qt =
Rt[
(1 − θ)i − pie + δ − ˙qeqt
] , (3.7)
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where pie and qe are expected inflation and expected relative price.
Note that the derivation as stated in equation 3.7 is under the assumption
that there are no credit constraints, households can borrow and lend at nominal
rate i. However, in most empirical studies, typically some measure of mortgage
rationing is added to housing demand equations. Dougherty & Order (1982)
and Ermisch (1984) demonstrated that the user cost of capital may be higher
than in equation 3.7 in the presence of capital market constraints. Suppose that
there exists the differential interest rates on borrowing (im) and lending (ia), the
budget constraint as presented in equation 3.6 should separate net financial as-
sets (at) into gross assets and loan outstanding (mt). Dougherty & Order (1982)
and Ermisch (1984) showed further that the effect of borrowing constraint de-
pends on the form of credit rationing constraint, for instance, whether there is
a limit on the total volume of borrowing (mt ≤ m¯t) or whether there is a limit
on the loan-to-value-ratio. In this case I assume that the credit rationing, which
takes form of the ceiling to borrowing exists and treat that ceiling as an equality.
In this case the user cost of capital becomes
qt =
Rt[
(1 − θ)im − pie + λ1tUc + δ −
˙qe
qt
] , (3.8)
where λ1 is the credit constraint and Uc is marginal utility of non-durable con-
sumer good. Equation 3.8 implies that real rental price Rt increases by λ1tUc . Em-
pirically, equation 3.8 can be expressed as;
qt = f(Rt,
[
(1 − θ)im − pie + λ1tUc + δ −
˙qe
qt
]
). (3.9)
Meen (1990) suggested that the unobservable real rental price of housing (Rt)
is proxied by real income (ryt), demographic variables (POPt), and real housing
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stock (hst );
Rt = f(ryt, POPt, hst ). (3.10)
The reduced form of equation 3.9 is expressed as
qt = f(ryt, popt, hst , (1 − θ)im, pie,mt,
˙qe
qt
) (3.11)
where mt is credit variable, which is proxy for credit constraint.
3.4.1 Econometric Estimation
As shown in the previous section, house prices relate to personal income, mort-
gage interest rates, expected inflation, housing supply and constraints, and de-
mographic variables. To determine the dynamics of the house price bubble in
the U.S., the error correction model is applied in the context of multi-city data to
determine the short-term behavior of house prices and the adjusting process to-
ward long-term equilibrium. Assume an autoregressive distributed lag (ADRL)
(p, r1, r2, ..., rk) dynamic specification of the form
ln(qit) = αi + Σpj=1λi jk ln(qit− j) + Σrj=0δ
′
i j ln(Xit− j) + εit, (3.12)
where the number of groups i is the number of msa; the number of periods t is
the number of months; δit is the k × 1 coefficient vectors; λi j is a scalar; and µi is
the group specific effect. Variable qit is the dependent variable that in this case
is house price. Xit is k × 1vector of explanatory variables consisting of
i = post-tax real mortgage lending rate
pie = expected inflation rate
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hs = housing stock
m = mortgage credit constraint
ry = real personal income
pop =total population
u = unemployment rate.
If the variables in 3.12 are I(1) and cointegrated, then the error term is I(0)
process for all i. The cointegrated variables will response to any deviation from
long-run equilibrium. This implies an error correction model inwhich the short-
run dynamics of the variables in the system are influenced by the deviation from
the equilibrium. Thus the equation 3.12 can be rewritten in simple ECM form
as follows:
∆ ln(qit) = αi + φi(ln(qit) − θ′i Xit) + Σp−1j=1λ∗i j∆ ln(qit−1) + Σr−1j=0δ′∗i j∆ ln(Xit− j) + εit, (3.13)
where φi = −(1 − Σpj=1λi j); θi = Σrj=0
δi j
(1−Σkλik) ; λ
∗
i j = −Σ
p
m= j+1λim j = 1, 2, ..., p − 1; and
δ∗i j = −Σ
r
m= j+1δim j = 1, 2, ...r − 1.
The parameter φi is the error-correcting speed of the adjustment term. It
shows how the house price adjusts back to the equilibrium state. In the simple
ECM, the parameter φi is expected to be negative in order to adjust the short-
term disequilibrium back to long-term equilibrium condition. The vector θ′i con-
tains the long-run relationships between variables. The long-run relationship of
inverted housing demand is assumed to be
ln(qit) = αi + θ′i ln(Xit) + εit. (3.14)
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The data includes monthly figures for 18 major metropolitan areas from
1991m1 to 2006m12. The variables include post-tax real mortgage lending rate,
expected inflation rate,2 housing stock, loan-to-value ratio, real personal in-
come, total population, and unemployment rate. Details of data description and
sources are in the Appendix C. I follow the estimation technique proposed by
Pesaran & Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (2004) that develop the maximum
likelihood method to estimate nonstationary dynamic panels for the case in
which the panel data is incorporated into with a large number of cross-sectional
observation (N) and a large number of time-series (T ). Dynamic fixed effect
are used in the estimation. This methods restricts the speed of adjustment φi
coefficient and keeps the short-term coefficients across panel groups equal.
3.5 Data Snapshot
Table 3.6 represents the summary statistics of variables both in values and in
log form. Figure 3.11 gives the overall picture of housing conditions of 18
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the U.S.3 Panels (a) and (b) represent the
mean of variable housing stock, Case-Shiller index, and loan-to-value ratio by
MSAs during 1991–1999 and 2000–2006 respectively. The first diagram of panel
(a) shows that housing stocks, measured by building permits, of 6 major cities
(Atlanta, Dallas, Chicago, New York, Phoenix, andWashington) were above the
fitted line while the rest of the cities were below the fitted line. The number of
housing stocks of each city in this period stayed within close range. However,
during 2000–2006 as depicted in the first diagram of panel (b) there was greater
2Expected inflation rate is obtained from the surveys of consumers, University of Michigan.
3Definition of MSA abbreviation can be found in the Appendix C.
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variation in of housing stocks. The average number of housing stocks grew
significantly in Atlanta, Dallas, Chicago, New York, Phoenix, and Washington,
while the housing stocks of cities below the fitted line did not change much over
time.
The second diagram at the right of each panel represents the mean of the
Case-Shiller index, which represents repeated sale house price index. In 1990–
1999, as shown in the top right diagram of panel (a), house prices were pretty
much the same in all cities. The Case-Shiller indices were between 80 and 90,
and the fitted line was relatively flat during this period. All cities experience a
great price rise in 2000–2006 especially cities in the southwest and the west, that
is, Los Angeles, Miami, San Francisco, andWashington. Case-Shiller indices are
pushed upward from 80 to 90 in the 1990s to above 120.
The diagram at the bottom left of each panel shows the loan to value ratio.
That is the ratio of the amount of a first mortgage lien as a percentage of the
total appraised value of real property, do not change much over time. The ratio
stays around 70 to 80 percent. This implies that the amount of loans for first
time borrowers increased as the price of houses increased in 2000–2006 in most
cities.
3.6 Empirical Results
A panel unit root test was performed on each variable. This test was introduced
by Levin et al. (2002). The test assumes that each unit in the panel shares the
same AR(1) coefficient, but allows for individual effects, time effects, and pos-
sibly a time trend with the corresponding null hypothesis of non-stationarity
125
ATL
BOS
ORD
CLE
DFW
DEN DTW
LAXMIAMSP
NYC
PHX
PDX
SAN SFO
SEA
TPA
WAS
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
H
o
u
si
n
g
 S
to
c
k
0 5 10 15 20
MSA
(mean) hs Fitted values
Housing Stock by MSA
ATL
BOS
ORDCLE
DEN
DTW
LAXMIA
MSP
NYC PHXPDX SAN
SFOSEA
TPAWAS
70
95
120
145
170
C
a
se
-S
h
ill
e
r 
P
ri
c
e
 I
n
d
e
x
0 5 10 15 20
MSA
(mean) case Fitted values
 Case-Shiller Index by MSA
ATL
BOS
ORDCLE
DFW
DEN DTW
LAXMIA
MSP
NYC
PHX
PDX SAN SFOSEA
TPAWAS
70
80
90
100
L
o
a
n
 t
o
 V
a
lu
e
 R
a
ti
o
0 5 10 15 20
MSA
(mean) lv Fitted values
Loan to Value Ratio by MSA
(a) 1991m1–1999m12
ATL
BOS
ORD
CLE
DFW
DEN
DTW
LAXMIA
MSP
NYC
PHX
PDX SAN SFO
SEA TPA
WAS
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
H
o
u
si
n
g
 S
to
c
k
0 5 10 15 20
 Housing Stock by MSA
(mean) hs Fitted values
Housing Stock by MSA
ATL
BOS
ORD
CLE DFW
DEN
DTW
LAX
MIA
MSP
NYC
PHX
PDX
SAN
SFO
SEA
TPA
WAS
70
95
120
145
170
M
e
a
n
 o
f 
C
a
se
-S
h
ill
e
r 
P
ri
c
e
 I
n
d
e
x
0 5 10 15 20
Case-Shiller Index by MSA
(mean) case Fitted values
Case-Shiller Index by MSA
ATL
BOS
ORD
CLE
DFW
DEN
DTW
LAX
MIA
MSP
NYC
PHX
PDX
SAN
SFO
SEA
TPA
WAS
70
80
90
100
M
e
a
n
 o
f 
L
o
a
n
 t
o
 V
a
lu
e
 R
a
ti
o
0 5 10 15 20
Loan to Value Ratio by MSA
(mean) lv Fitted values
Loan to Value Ratio by MSA
(b) 2000m1–2006m12
Figure 3.11: Housing Stock, Case-Shiller Index, and Loan to Value Ratio by
MSA, 1991m1–2006m12
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Case-Shiller House Price Index (case) 108.4 43 48.94 280.16 3,348
Tax-Adjusted Real Mortgage Rate, percent (i) 4.01 0.72 2.52 5.5 3,456
Expected Inflation Rate, percent (pie) 2.87 0.42 0.4 4.60 3,456
Housing Stock, unit (hs) 2107.42 1356.62 160 7734 3,456
Loan to Value Ratio, percent (m) 76.17 4.06 60.7 84.60 3,420
Per Capita Real Personal Income, USD (ry) 32,157.4 4,678.40 23,511.79 49,327.59 3,456
Total Population (pop) 5,016,119.99 4,018,932.87 1,555,084 19,000,000 3,456
Unemployment Rate, percent (u) 5.13 1.58 1.8 10.8 3,456
ln(case) 4.62 0.34 3.89 5.64 3348
ln(i) 1.37 0.19 0.93 1.71 3456
ln(pie) 1.04 0.2 -0.92 1.53 3456
ln(hs) 7.44 0.67 5.08 8.95 3456
ln(m) 4.33 0.05 4.11 4.44 3420
ln(ry) 10.37 0.14 10.07 10.81 3456
ln(pop) 15.21 0.6 14.26 16.76 3456
ln(u) 1.59 0.31 0.59 2.38 3456
Source: Author’s Calculation
I(1) behavior. The series of tests on panel data do not reject the null hypothesis
except ln(pop) which is used as a control variable. Following the panel VECM
specification developed in the previous section, I estimated the changes in real
house prices on macroeconomic variables. The regression estimates, as shown
in Table 3.7, represents the long-term equation and short-term adjustment for
the house price. Results without controlled variables, with all controlled vari-
ables, and with controlled variables except population are presented in column
(1), (3), and (5), respectively. When estimating the long-term equation for the
house price I find that all coefficients are significant except tax-adjusted real
mortgage rate. After controlling for MSA-specific variables, that is, personal
income, population, and unemployment rate, the tax-adjusted real mortgage
rate becomes significant. The exclusion of population, due to the stationarity
issue, does not change the degree of coefficients while the signs are still the
same. So I stick with the results as shown in column (5). All coefficients in
column (5) are statistically significant at 99 percent level of confidence except
expected inflation. That said, in the long-term, all the variables’ coefficients are
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consistent with economic theory except the relationship between housing stock
and house prices which, according to Meen (1990) and Muellbauer & Murphy
(1997), should be negative. The possible explanation for positive housing stock
and house price is that during the bubble period, there is always a housing de-
mand as a respond to an increasing of housing supply.
In addition, I found that house price has a negative relationship with tax-
adjusted real mortgage rate and ratio of loan-to-value of the first-time buyer.
This suggests that the historically low interest rates have encouraged buyers to
borrow more money, which drives up the house price, and the buyer who pos-
sesses the low loan-to-value ratio are obliged to pay at higher house price. The
error correction term for the short-term basis, in addition, is significantly neg-
ative (-0.004), indicating that in the long run house price moves in line with its
fundamentals. However, the adjustment process may take time since only about
0.4 percent of deviation from the long-term value is corrected each month. Not-
ing that the selected lag of all variables appears to have a significant influence
on house price in the short run as well. The high significance of house price in
all lags indicates the “sticky” pricing process in U.S. housing market.
Next, I performed the panel ECM by regions– the midwest, the northeast,
the south, the west, and the southwest.4 Results as shown in Table 3.9 show the
low-adjusting parameter in all regions. Given the results, the midwest seems
to adjust back to long-run equilibium quicker than the rest, whereas the south-
west takes the longest time to convert back to long-run equilibrium. Taking
half-life, it will take approximately 7, 9, 15, 16, and 18 years for the midwest, the
northeast, the south, the west, and the southwest respectively.5 Region-wise,
4Southwest U.S. in this context consists of cities in Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada,
and Texas.
5Half-life or t∗ = − ln(0.5)
λ
, where λ is the rate of decrease per year. In this case λ = (1 + φ)12 − 1,
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Table 3.7: Panel ECM Regression of House Prices
(1) (3) (5)
VARIABLES
LR SR LR SR LR SR
Long-Run
ln(i)it -0.108 -0.365** -0.376***
(0.315) (0.143) (0.143)
ln(hs)it 1.025*** 0.249*** 0.266***
(0.205) (0.0845) (0.0810)
ln(pie)it -0.798** -0.0195 -0.0212
(0.397) (0.138) (0.139)
ln(m)it -4.999*** -2.692*** -2.673***
(1.177) (0.514) (0.517)
ln(ry)it 2.223*** 2.307***
(0.417) (0.373)
ln(pop)it 0.0459
(0.328)
ln(u)it -0.251*** -0.246***
(0.0863) (0.0867)
Short-Run
Adjusting Parameter (φ) -0.00157*** -0.00392*** -0.00388***
(0.000321) (0.000539) (0.000534)
∆ ln(case)it−1 0.626*** 0.615*** 0.616***
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171)
∆ ln(case)it−2 0.247*** 0.245*** 0.244***
(0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0196)
∆ ln(case)it−3 -0.265*** -0.262*** -0.263***
(0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0193)
∆ ln(case)it−4 0.255*** 0.252*** 0.252***
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169)
∆ ln(i)it 0.000716 0.00171 0.00176
(0.00144) (0.00146) (0.00146)
∆ ln(i)it−1 0.00174 0.00264* 0.00262*
(0.00147) (0.00149) (0.00149)
∆ ln(i)it−2 -0.00275* -0.00180 -0.00179
(0.00148) (0.00149) (0.00149)
∆ ln(i)it−3 -0.00109 -0.000387 -0.000438
(0.00148) (0.00150) (0.00150)
∆ ln(i)it−4 0.000183 0.00117 0.00115
(0.00143) (0.00146) (0.00146)
∆ ln(pie)it 0.00136*** 0.000547 0.000554
(0.000491) (0.000527) (0.000526)
∆ ln(pie)it−1 0.00226*** 0.00152*** 0.00156***
(0.000467) (0.000496) (0.000494)
∆ ln(pie)it−2 0.00183*** 0.00110** 0.00116**
(0.000455) (0.000475) (0.000472)
∆ ln(pie)it−3 0.00149*** 0.000977** 0.00103**
(0.000406) (0.000423) (0.000421)
∆ ln(pie)it−4 -0.000133 -0.000549 -0.000502
(0.000383) (0.000395) (0.000394)
∆ ln(hs)it -0.00124*** -0.000720** -0.000758**
(0.000300) (0.000322) (0.000313)
∆ ln(hs)it−1 -0.000908*** -0.000510* -0.000538*
(0.000290) (0.000308) (0.000301)
∆ ln(hs)it−2 -0.000519* -0.000276 -0.000297
(0.000276) (0.000289) (0.000283)
∆ ln(hs)it−3 -0.000382 -0.000246 -0.000260
(0.000256) (0.000265) (0.000261)
∆ ln(hs)it−4 -0.000380* -0.000240 -0.000257
(0.000223) (0.000229) (0.000227)
Constant 0.0315*** -0.0321 -0.0334
(0.00782) (0.0256) (0.0226)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.8: Panel ECM Regression of House Prices (continued)
VARIABLES
LR SR LR SR LR SR
∆ ln(m)it 0.00323 0.00710 0.00695
(0.00647) (0.00666) (0.00665)
∆ ln(m)it−1 0.0112* 0.0173*** 0.0173***
(0.00647) (0.00669) (0.00668)
∆ ln(m)it−2 0.0102 0.0115* 0.0115*
(0.00648) (0.00672) (0.00671)
∆ ln(m)it−3 -0.000378 0.00293 0.00298
(0.00649) (0.00672) (0.00671)
∆ ln(m)it−4 0.00503 0.00453 0.00429
(0.00641) (0.00666) (0.00665)
∆ ln(ry)it -0.00340 -0.00351
(0.00638) (0.00634)
∆ ln(ry)it−1 0.00393 0.00343
(0.00763) (0.00759)
∆ ln(ry)it−2 0.0176** 0.0170**
(0.00795) (0.00792)
∆ ln(ry)it−3 0.0110 0.0106
(0.00771) (0.00767)
∆ ln(ry)it−4 0.0143** 0.0145**
(0.00651) (0.00645)
∆ ln(pop)it -0.0185
(0.0222)
∆ ln(pop)it−1 -0.0350
(0.0282)
∆ ln(pop)it−2 -0.0417
(0.0299)
∆ ln(pop)it−3 -0.0341
(0.0288)
∆ ln(pop)it−4 -0.00545
(0.0239)
∆ ln(u)it 0.000263 0.000272
(0.000802) (0.000801)
∆ ln(u)it−1 -0.000588 -0.000544
(0.000806) (0.000804)
∆ ln(u)it−2 -0.000304 -0.000259
(0.000784) (0.000781)
∆ ln(u)it−3 -0.00169** -0.00167**
(0.000790) (0.000788)
∆ ln(u)it−4 1.01e-05 1.27e-05
(0.000767) (0.000766)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
tax-adjusted real mortgage rate is not significant in all cases. Housing stock has
the positive relation with house price and is significant in the northeast and the
west. Loan-to-value ratio is negatively significant in all regions and its effect
is greatest in the southwest. Personal income is the major price determinant
in the midwest and the south while its effect on house price is smallest in the
southwest. The finding indicates that the housing bubble are significantly ex-
perienced due to rising demand, income gain, and the relaxation of mortgage
where φ is adjusting parameter.
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credit constraint.
Table 3.9: Panel ECM Regression of House Prices by Region: Adjusting Param-
eter and Long-Run Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES
Midwest Northeast South West Southwest
Adjusting Parameter (φ) -0.00861*** -0.00623*** -0.00384*** -0.00360*** -0.00328***
(0.00232) (0.00208) (0.00101) (0.000762) (0.000820)
ln(i)it -0.0661 -0.258 -0.260 -0.396 -0.299
(0.135) (0.236) (0.319) (0.261) (0.318)
ln(hs)it 0.566*** 0.142 0.265 0.294*** 0.255*
(0.160) (0.108) (0.184) (0.144) (0.168)
ln(pie)it 0.0903 -0.221 -0.00105 -0.0375 -0.339
(0.116) (0.287) (0.284) (0.249) (0.334)
ln(m)it -1.463*** -3.804*** -2.453*** -2.613*** -3.024****
(0.674) (1.050) (1.463) (0.778) (0.913)
ln(ry)it 3.167*** 2.041*** 2.863*** 2.106*** 1.878***
(0.364) (0.696) (1.287) (0.566) (0.711)
ln(u)it -0.161*** -0.364*** -0.0294 -0.208 -0.180
(0.0845) (0.192) (0.211) (0.157) (0.184)
*** p<0.1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
Standard errors are in parentheses.
3.7 Housing Bubble and Its Spillover
The fourth part of this paper explains how the housing sector bubble has cre-
ated a ripple effect in the entire economy. The impact is explained through
three important channels: (1) wealth channel arises when a house owner’s wealth
increases due to the home price bubble, and this, in turn affects his or her
consumption; (2)credit channel rises when financial institutions, especially non-
banks become more optimistic about housing markets. The unsustainability of
housing is later explained by the freezing of the third type of channel; (3) bal-
ance sheet effect occurs when financial institutions’ asset prices drop and capital
values worsen, causing “liquidity crunch.” In this section, I use vector error cor-
131
rection model (VECM) to assess the presence of crisis mechanisms. The vector
error correction model is similar to the single error correction equation as pre-
sented in the previous section, except that it is presented in multivariate system.
Consider the system of equations in vector autoregressive (VAR) form
yt = v + A1yt−1 + A2yt−2 + · · · + Apyt−p + εt, (3.15)
where yt is a K × 1 vector of variables, v is a K × 1 vector of parameters, A1 − Ap
are K × K matrices of parameters, and εt is a K × 1 vector of disturbances. Any
VAR(p) can be written as VECM, which is as follows:
∆yt = v + Πyt−1 + Σp−1i=1 Γi∆yt−i + εt, (3.16)
where Π = Σpj=1A j − Ik and Γi = −Σ
p
j=i+1A j. According to Engle & Granger (1987),
for the case where variables yt are I(1) if the matrix Π has reduced rank r < k,
then there exists k × r matrices φ and θ, each with rank r such that Π = φθ′ and
θ′yt is I(0). The variable r is the cointegration rank and θ is the cointegrating
vector. Variable φ is adjustment parameter. In order to form the basis of the
VECM specification, at least one cointegrating relationship must exist. In this
step, Johansen’s estimation is used to estimate the Πmatrix.
In addition, Engle & Granger (1987) suggested that all variables within the
cointegration relationship must have the same order of integrations and should
not be integrated at order zero. According to them, the linear combination of
non stationary-series may produce the stationarity if data are I(1). And if that
stationary linear combination exists, the non-stationary time series are said to
be cointegrated. Therefore, the unit root test and Johansen’s cointegrating rank
estimation of VECM have to be performed on each variable to check to see if the
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series were I(1) and to determine the cointegrating relationship.
In this context, vector yt consists of house price index, number of houses sold,
GDP per capita, and consumption per capita, which represent housing market
condition and wealth effect. The ratio of mortgage loans by non-bank financial
institutions over total mortgage loans is also included. This variable is used in
the analysis of lending and credit channel since the majority of housing loans
in the U.S. are obtained through non-bank financial institutions. The next vari-
ables to be included are CDX index, and spread between LIBOR and T-Bill with
equivalent maturity reflecting the degree of liquidity in financial markets, Ap-
propriate number of lags is determined by series of information criterion pro-
vided by the -varsoc- routine in STATA. Impulse response function is calculated
from VECM to show whether the house price shock would have an impact on
the aforementioned channels and macroeconomic varibles. Monthly national
data from 2003m10 to 2008m12 in log form are used in this section. Details of
variables and sources of data are in the Appendix C.
3.7.1 Empirical Results
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests were performed on the log of the vari-
ables and their first differences. The tests suggest that all variables were I(1).
The results from cointegration tests indicate that there were two cointegrating
vectors under the chosen 1 lag in VECM form. Table 3.10 shows the coefficients
obtained from ECM estimation. Series of test on residuals, as shown in the Ap-
pendix C insured that the residuals are I(0). Note that the adjustment parame-
ters are relatively low, this implies that the adjustment to long-run cointegration
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may not have been made in a fashion.
Table 3.10: Time Series ECM Regression of Housed Price Spill over Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES
∆ ln(hp) ∆ ln(mort) ∆ ln(spread) ∆ ln(cdx) ∆ ln(ry) ∆ ln(rc) ∆ ln(hsold)
α1 -0.0530 0.0239 5.071*** -2.889*** 0.0458 0.0235 -0.408
(0.0349) (0.0463) (1.932) (0.776) (0.0534) (0.0529) (0.494)
α2 0.238*** -0.300** 3.217 -1.159 -0.390*** -0.291** 0.342
(0.0922) (0.122) (5.106) (2.052) (0.141) (0.140) (1.307)
∆ ln(hp)t−1 0.591*** 0.480*** -9.183 4.918* 0.887*** 0.767*** 2.833
(0.131) (0.174) (7.255) (2.915) (0.200) (0.199) (1.856)
∆ ln(mort)t−1 -0.277*** -0.522*** 2.416 2.576 0.178 0.109 -0.397
(0.0978) (0.130) (5.420) (2.178) (0.150) (0.148) (1.387)
∆ ln(spread)t−1 -0.00548** -0.00536* 0.0858 -0.172*** 0.000183 0.00183 -0.00996
(0.00222) (0.00295) (0.123) (0.0494) (0.00340) (0.00337) (0.0315)
∆ ln(cdx)t−1 -0.00277 -0.00465 0.145 0.339*** 0.0108 0.00968 -0.0805
(0.00549) (0.00729) (0.304) (0.122) (0.00840) (0.00833) (0.0778)
∆ ln(ry)t−1 -0.419 0.364 -0.756 23.26*** 0.205 -0.605 1.069
(0.344) (0.457) (19.05) (7.656) (0.526) (0.522) (4.876)
∆ ln(rc)t−1 0.350 -0.351 -17.32 -26.03*** -0.479 0.291 -1.088
(0.341) (0.453) (18.91) (7.597) (0.522) (0.518) (4.838)
∆ ln(hsold)t−1 -0.00974 -0.000295 -0.0684 0.0439 0.0242 0.0218 -0.428***
(0.0107) (0.0142) (0.593) (0.238) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.152)
Constant -0.00243* 0.00332* 0.0178 0.0361 0.00456** 0.00341* -0.0328*
(0.00131) (0.00175) (0.0728) (0.0293) (0.00201) (0.00199) (0.0186)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in are parentheses.
Figure 3.12 shows the responses of variables of interest to the positive house
price shock using monthly data from 2003m10 to 2008m12. I use the cumulative
impulse response function (CIRF) to determine all impulse responses. Recall
that data used in the model are I(1), the possible effect from innovations can
be either transitory or permanent. In this case, all responses do not dies out
through out time, then shocks are said to be permanent.6 The first impulse re-
sponse function of Figure 3.12 shows the increase of the number of houses sold
which rose as a response to the positive innovation of house price. This indicates
the strong demand of house price during the bubble period, and the finding is
consistent with the previous section. The rest two subfigures of Figure 3.12 rep-
resents the response of real GDP per capital and real consumption per capita.
Both per capita GDP and real consumption increases almost instantaneously af-
6On the other hand, the shocks are transitory if the effects taper off to zero
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ter house price shock. According to WEO (2008), the marginal propensity of
consumption out of housing is high in the United States compared with other
developed countries. The importance of home values as a share of household to-
tal wealth suggests that fluctuations in house prices may affect consumer spend-
ing, and in turn, income through wealth effect channel in the United States.
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Figure 3.12: Impulse Response Function Estimated From VECM
The analysis of the ratio of mortgage loan obtained through non-bank fi-
nancial institution supports the strong credit channel in U.S. non-bank financial
institutions are actively giving out mortgage loans as mortgage prices climb up.
This is represented by the first impulse response shown in Figure 3.13. The
rising mortgage prices contributes to the collateral benefits to borrowers and re-
sulting in easier mortgage loan approvals. The next two diagrams in Figure 3.13
display how the positive innovation of house price generates the spill-over ef-
fect to other financial markets. The analysis is done on CDX index and TED
spread. CDX index is used as benchmarks for credit default swap. From the
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finding, the one standard deviation increases in house price causes CDX index
to decline further. The negative response of CDX index indicates that insurers
charge the cheap premium for credit default swap on any subprime related in-
vestment transaction as house price rises. This implies a positive expectation
on housing market during times of higher housing prices. However the hous-
ing bubble proves to be unsustainable. In addition, housing bubble in the first
month caused the rising of TED spread to decline starting in the fifth month,
which reflects the liquidity dry up among financial institutions since the asset
side of their balance sheets worsen. The rising of house price in the United
States was not sustainable and, consequently, resulted in a deepening of liquid-
ity shortage in the U.S. financial markets and the economy.
Figure 3.13 suggests on a strong effect of the housing bubble to the liquid-
ity condition and credit channel of financial institutions. Next, I determine the
2-way relation between credit channel and housing market by asking whether
the credit channel has a pronounced effect on housing market condition. The
left panel of Figure 3.14 reports that the total number of houses sold declines in
response to a widening TED spread, that is, credit crunch. Financial institutions
decided to cut the supply of mortgage loans as liquidity shortage advanced. In
fact, this is the normal practice among financial institutions when they expe-
rience a liquidity problem. They were unable to find enough capital to cover
their high level of leverage. And eventually the shrinkage asset put a pressure
on mortgage credits and so they aggressively applied more rigid criteria to all
new potential borrowers.
This difficult environment of the financial system will continue unless the
housing situation is resolved. The right panel of Figure 3.14 indicates that the
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credit crunch among financial institutions is relieved as number of houses are
sold. This implies that the recovery of credit among financial institutions de-
pends a lot on to what extent excess houses inventories can be liquidated. The
new round of demand for houses should pick up when prices fall enough. This
will help stabilize the uncertain value of home equity, which is crucial as buffer
for all mortgages and as collateral for those mortgage-backed securities.
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Figure 3.13: Impulse Response Function Estimated From VECM (continued)
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Figure 3.14: Impulse Response Function Estimated From VECM (continued)
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3.8 Conclusion
The sharp drop of the housing sector over the past few years and the increasing
defaults in the subprime mortgage market that triggers the financial turbulence
in the United States, have raised concerns that, as a result of innovations in
the mortgage market and the related products and services offered by financial
institutions, the housing sector could be a source of macroeconomic instability.
I have carried out a deep analysis of the interrelation between financial in-
stitutions and housing sector in the United States. This paper makes use of flow
of funds data to disentangle the pattern of uses and sources of fund and the role
of financial investment over time. The evidence presented in the first section
suggests that all economic sectors have increasingly participated into financial
investment and have exposed to the higher degree of volatility in financial in-
vestment. The financial institutions, in addition, have experienced a significant
evolution of financial intermediation over the past fifty years. The interactions
of changes in regulation, tax law, introduction of international financial services,
and the development of new types of financial instruments have changed the
pattern of flows of savings and fund suppliers. As financial service providers
have been growing and offering wider ranges of sources of financing, borrowers
do not have to limit themselves to “old fashioned” commercial banks. Combin-
ing all these factors with low interest rate and abundance of capital from lenders
and investors, these created the boom in the U.S. housing markets during the
late 1990s and early 2000s.
However, the housing bubble was not sustainable. According to the second
section, the high foreclosure rate in late 2005, the inappropriate securitization,
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and improper credit ratings, and pervasive weaknesses of financial regulations
led to the collapse of underlying financial securities and caused the major ad-
verse consequences to the entire U.S. economy.
The third section sheds light on the dynamics of house price through the
panel error correction formulation. The empirical results suggest that house
price during 1990–2006 was sensitive to the movements of general economic
conditions. Therewas always a demand for an increase of housing supplies dur-
ing the bubble period. Income gain and low mortgage constraint were also the
contributors to the housing price inflation. The econometric estimation shows
the sticky price process in the U.S housing market and the slow adjustment to-
wards long-run equilibrium.
The last section examines the spill-over effects of housing markets on other
financial institutions and macroeconomic conditions through housing-related
channels. The estimated results obtained from VECM indicate a strong and
statistically significant effect of all three channels: wealth effect, credit effect,
and balance sheet effect. The rising of house price in the United States was
not sustainable, as mentioned earlier, and consequently resulted in an increas-
ing of default risk and liquidity shortage in U.S. financial markets and caused
the undesirable effects to the rest economy. As the findings suggest, financial
institution recovery from liquidity shortage largely depends on how much the
number of houses sold could be after house prices deflate, that is, this depends
on the new round of demand for houses after house prices slump. As more
houses are resold, the value of home equity is restored and that would help
to stabilize the uncertain value of home equity, which is crucial as a buffer for
all mortgages and as collateral for those mortgage-backed securities, resolving
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the credit crunch ,and consequently, making the financial institution able to get
back to operation again.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 List of Abbreviations
• ABMI: Asian Bond Market Initiative
• ABF1: The first Asian Bond Fund initially amounted to 1 billion USD. The
ABF invests in a basket of USD-denominated bonds issued by sovereign
and quasi-sovereign Asian issuers in EMEAP economies (other than
Japan, Australia , and New Zealand).
• ABF2: The ABF2 invests in local currency bonds issued by sovereign and
quasi-sovereign issuers in EMEAP economies (other than Japan, Australia,
and New Zealand). It consists of two components, a Pan-Asian Bond In-
dex Fund (PAIF) and Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF).
• ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations
• ASEAN+3: A forum that functions as a coordinator of cooperation be-
tween ASEAN and the three East Asian nations of China, Japan, and South
Korea.
• EMEAP: Executives Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks which in-
cludes the Reserve Bank of Australia, the People’s Bank of China, the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank Indonesia, the Bank of Japan, the
Bank of Korea, Bank Negara Malaysia, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
Bangko Sentral Ng Phillipinas, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and
the Bank of Thailand.
• FoBF: Fund of Bond Funds is a two-tiered structure with a parent fund
investing in eight single-market funds, each of which will invest in local
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currency sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds issued in their respective
markets.
• PAIF: Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund is a single bond fund index invest-
ing in sovereign and quasi-sovereign local currency bonds issued in eight
EMEAP.
A.2 Country Abbreviations
• BRU: Brunei
• CAM: Cambodia
• CHN or C: China
• JPN or J: Japan
• KOR or K: Korea
• INA or I: Indonesia
• JPN or J: Japan
• MAS or M: Malaysia
• PHI or P: Philippines
• SIN or S: Singapore
• THA or T: Thailand
• VIE: Vietnam
142
A.3 Financial Sector Regulations and Reforms in Selected
ASEAN+3 Countries (information gathered from ADB
(2008))
A.3.1 China
Regulations
• By mid-2005, financial restructuring of three of the four major commercial
banks was completed through capital injection and sales of nonperform-
ing loans.
• Foreign financial institutions were permitted to provide services in foreign
currency without restrictions since WTO accession to the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) in 2001.
• Lowered restrictions to foreign exchange transactions and cross-border
capital inflows.
• In August 2005, the People’s Bank of China announced that banks satisfy-
ing certain requirements will be permitted to conclude foreign exchange
forward and swap transactions in the interbank market.
Further Reforms
• The government to reform the equity market by easing restrictions on the
sale of government-owned shares in listed companies and allowing the
pricing of initial public offerings to be more market determined.
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• Also, the newly revised Securities Law has streamlined and reduced fi-
nancial requirements for stock-exchange listing (making it easier for firms
with less capital to list), strengthening disclosure requirements for firms.
• Established a special working group in February 2004 to improve regu-
latory practices including access of non-government enterprises, relaxing
approval limits on issuance, and easing interest rate controls, although
there is still a cap on the interest rate that can be paid on corporate bonds.
• Significant progress achieved in developing the short-end of the bond
market by opening the short-term corporate bill market, which has be-
come very active as a number of the People’s Republic of China’s largest
corporations, has tapped this segment of the market.
• Establishment of the interbankmarket for asset-backed securities withma-
turities of 110 years has been announced.
• New Securities Act for the bond market has removed some of the legal
impediments that had kept the market from expanding, although the cur-
rent merit-based bond issuance system, requiring government selection of
each bond issue, remains a hurdle.
A.3.2 Indonesia
Regulations
• Strengthening of regulations regarding loan classification and provision-
ing
– legal lending limits,
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– net open positions,
– liquidity monitoring,
– capital adequacy,
– bank management and ownership, and
– risk management practices.
Supervision
• Implemented risk-based supervision.
• Improved information systems and technology in banks.
Disclosure
• Pursued consolidation through mergers.
• Pursued privatization of state-owned banks.
Further Reforms
• Scope remains for strengthening state-owned banks.
• Resolve controversy in setting up the Financial Services Authority.
• With respect to Basel II, there is uncertain capability of enforcing risk
weights for holdings of government securities.
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A.3.3 Malaysia
Regulations
• Enhanced safety and soundness through expanded andmore frequent dis-
closure.
• Reduced limits on exposure to a single customer.
• Introduced market risk-based capital adequacy rules and accreditation re-
quirements in credit risk management.
• Introduced measures to improve competition and efficiency including
benchmarking, mergers of finance companies into commercial bank
groups, and the creation of an investment banking industry.
• Introduced measures to enhance consumer protection.
Supervision
• Reforms focused on enhancing supervisor capacity, including supervisory
techniques, such as, regular stress testing, risk-based consolidated super-
vision, more rigorous on-site examination.
Disclosure
• To enhance market discipline, BNM undertook an educational program
for consumers and introduced the Financial Mediation Bureau for con-
sumer protection and redress.
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Further Reforms
• Inability of domestic banks to integrate information on exposures to bor-
rowers and related parties and on collateral pledged for risk mitigation
purposes.
• BNM is preparing for a more-effective supervisory process by developing
an enhanced methodology to assess internal models and advanced risk
management systems.
A.3.4 Philippines
Regulations
• Focused on corporate governance reforms (board oversight of compliance
and internal risk management systems), ownership limitations, opera-
tional limitations on many aspects of banking operations, including on
open foreign exchange positions.
• Introduced Basel I capital adequacy ratio for credit risk (in 2001) and mar-
ket risk (in 2002).
• Rationalized regulations to promote mergers and consolidation, microfi-
nance, role of external auditors, and new accounting and disclosure stan-
dards.
Supervision
• Introduced consolidated supervision of bank groups and shifted to risk-
based approach to supervision, introducing a risk assessment system to
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supplement the risk-based examination approach and a new rating system
for branches of foreign banks.
Disclosure
• Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas (BSP)mademandatory disclosure of informa-
tion such as capital adequacy ratios, credit concentration, quality of loans,
adequacy of loss provisions, and related party transactions in quarterly
published statements and annual reports.
• BSP also introduced safeguards to ensure independence of auditors. Also
recognized credit rating agencies for bank supervision purposes and ac-
credited five rating agencies (two national and three international).
A.3.5 Singapore
Regulations
• Reforms foster competition and strengthen bank governance.
• Liberalized access to the domestic banking sector required banks to focus
on core activities to limit risk of contagion from nonfinancial business to
the bank: issued rules on corporate governance.
• Embarked on review to enhance the management of concentration risk to
a single counterparty.
• Reduced the minimum capital adequacy ratio to give banks incentives to
better manage their risks.
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• Minimum liquidity requirements were made forward-looking, taking into
account supervisory reviews of banks’ liquidity policies and practices.
• Rules and regulations made more transparent and policy changes become
subject to public consultation
Supervision
• Focused on risk-based supervision of financial institutions and examina-
tion of banks’ internal controls and risk management systems.
• Authorities harmonized risk assessment frameworks applied to all classes
of institutions (banks, insurance companies, capital market intermedi-
aries, trust companies and payment systems), aiming to enhance ability
to assess large, complex financial groups.
• Authorities also enhanced macro-financial surveillance capabilities.
Disclosure
• Banks raised their disclosure standards in line with industry develop-
ments and international best practice. In their annual reports, banks
disclose information on corporate governance practices, financial perfor-
mance, risk exposure, risk management practices and risk-taking philoso-
phy.
Further Reforms
• Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) considers management of super-
visory resources for Basel II implementation a major challenge. MAS has
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therefore embarked on several initiatives to raise the awareness of man-
agement and staff withinMAS and embarked on amajor training program
of its staff.
A.3.6 Thailand
Regulations
• Issued new rules and procedures for loan classification and provisioning;
accrual of interest; collateral valuation; debt restructuring; loan portfolio
review; related lending; capital adequacy; capital requirements for market
risk; eligible capital; management of interest and currency risk, including
interest rate risk in the banking book; and limits on net open forex posi-
tions (for single and aggregate currency positions).
• Bank of Thailand (BOT) issued rules on auditing and disclosure, conform-
ing with Thai Accounting Standards.
• BOT required banks to disclose uniform financial statements, items that
have material effects on their financial conditions, and payments to direc-
tors and senior management.
Supervision
• Management encouraged reorganization of the Supervision Group at BOT
to support new risk-based supervision approach.
• BOT also strengthened capacity for off-site supervisory risk assessments
at both macro and micro levels.
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• BOT also supported the creation of a Bank Examiner School to increase
competency and commission examiners, particularly those involved in
risk-focused examinations, and a financial institutions data base to sup-
port all supervisory activity.
Disclosure
• BOT strengthened regulations and guidelines on accounting and disclo-
sure, requiring more frequent audits of financial statements.
• BOT also issued guidelines on the scope of audit work for internal and
external auditors.
• BOT required banks to appoint audit committees with the majority of
members being independent directors.
A.4 Data and Source of Data
151
Table A.1: Variables Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
Consumption Real consumption per capita (2000 USD) WDI
Income Real GDP per capita (2000 USD) WDI
Portfolio equity and debt: asset Average asset holdings of source country i to ASEAN+3 CPIS, IMF
Portfolio equity and debt: liability Average asset holdings of source country i to ASEAN+3 CPIS, IMF
FDI FDI stock assets holdings of source country i in ASEAN+3 ASEAN Secretariat
Current account Current account as a percentage of GDP WDI
Financial development Ratio of M2 over GDP WDI
Trade openness Ratio of trade over GDP WDI
De jure measure of capital openness 1.Chinn-Ito index Chinn & Ito (2008)
2. Dummy variable takes value of 1 for no restrictions on capital movement AREAER
and zero otherwise.
Bilateral Trade Ratio of total exports from country i to country j over the GDP of country i UN Comtrade
Distance Distance between country i and j CIA’s World Fact Book
Border Dummy variable which takes value of 1 if i and j share a land border CIA’s World Fact Book
Language Dummy variable which takes value of 1 if i and j have a common language CIA’s World Fact Book
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APPENDIX B
B.1 Sources of Data and Data Descriptions
Scope of the study is from 1996q1 to 2008q2 using quarterly data. Sources of
data are as follows: 1
1. Core Inflation. Core inflation excludes raw food and energy from the con-
sumer price index basket.Core inflation indexes at 2002 price. Data were
obtained from the Bank of Thailand .Core CPI represents 79 percent of
Headline Consumer Price Index.
2. Headline Inflation. Headline inflation indexes at 2002 price. Data were ob-
tained from the Bank of Thailand.
3. Expected Inflation Rate. Estimates of expected inflation rate are obtained
from the probability distribution of forecasted value of inflation rate. The
data are provided by the Bank of Thailand.
4. Rate of Change in Producer Price Index. The rate of change in the Producer
Price Index is obtained by taking the percentage change from the previous
quarter of Producer Price Index from Thailand and the U.S. (PPI). Both are
obtained from quarterly data in the CEIC database in. PPI is calculated by
into account the total product being produced in that particular country.
5. GDP. Nominal Gross Domestic Product is in billion baht including statis-
tical discrepancies.Data were obtained from EIU and IFS.
6. Exchange Rate. Nominal exchange rate is quoted in terms of local currency:
baht per USD. Data were obtained from EIU and IFS.
1All the index variables were indexed at year 2002 , i.e., year 2002=100
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7. Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER). NEER is quoted against basket of
currencies. Rising of NEER means the relative appreciation of domestic
currency against basket, and vice versa. NEER is obtained from the Bank
of Thailand.
8. Short-Term Interest Rate. There are two types of interest rates being used in
the study according to the decision from the Monetary Policy Committee
to change the key interest rate under the inflation targeting regime.A 14-
day REPO rate was used prior to 2007q1 and a 1-day REPO rate since then.
Data were obtained from the Bank of Thailand.
9. Long-Term Interest Rate. Government bond yield was used as proxy for
long-term interest rate. Source of data is IFS.
10. Unemployment. Rate of unemployment was calculated by the National Sta-
tistical Office. Series of data are available from Bank of Thailand.
11. Money Supply. M2 , that is, M1 plus quasi money at the end of period was
used as proxy for money supply. M2 is quoted in billion baht. Data were
obtained from EIU and IFS.
12. Oil Price. Diesel oil price in baht/litre is used in the model. Source of data
is the Bank of Thailand.
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Table B.1: Thailand Policy Measures
Date Policy Measures
19-Dec-06 RR 30%
1. Foreign currencies bought or exchanged against baht for investments in debt securities,foreign currency borrowings from Dec 19th onwards, are subject to the 30 percent foreign currency
reserve requirement.
2. Balances in Non-resident Baht Accounts are allowed to exceed 300 million baht without limit until 8 January 2007. After that, the balances shall not exceed 300 million baht.
24-Jul-07 Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Regulations on Foreign Currency Deposits and Transfers
1. Allow companies registered in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, most of which are high-performance businesses and subject to supervision by government agencies, to purchase foreign
currencies to invest abroad in an amount up to 100 million USD per year.
2. Provide Thai residents, both juristic persons and individuals, with greater flexibility in depositing foreign currencies with financial institutions in Thailand.
3. Adjust the limit of fund remittances by Thai residents for various purposes.
4. Relax the repatriation requirement for Thai residents with foreign currency receipts by extending the period in which such receipts must be brought into Thailand from within 120 days
(if exceeding 120 days but not exceeding 360 days, a financial institution may provide approval on behalf of the Competent Officer) to within 360 days.
5. Abolish the surrender requirement for Thai residents with foreign exchange receipts from abroad to sell or deposit such receipts within period of 15 days.
6. Relax the regulation on foreign portfolio investment by the institutional investors by allowing institutional investors to invest in the form of deposits with financial institutions abroad
without seeking approval from the Competent Officer.
3-Aug-07 Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Fund
A 5,000-million baht fund was launched by BOT in an attempt to provide the liquidity support to SMEs which faces the liquidity shortage due to appreciation in baht
15-Aug-07 Savings Bonds Issuance
40,000 million baht semi-annual BOT savings bonds with 4- year and 7- year maturity were launched as saving alternatives for individual, foundation , non-profit organization. Rate was
offered at government bond rate with the same maturity date + ¡15% of return.
3-Mar-08 Capital Control Measure Removal
Source: Bank of Thailand
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APPENDIX C
C.1 Data and Source of Data
• ATL Atlanta
• BOS Boston
• ORD Chicago
• CLE Cleveland
• DFW Dallas
• DEN Denver
• DTW Detroit
• LAX Los Angeles
• MIAMiami
• MSPMinneapolis
• NYC New York
• PHX Phoenix
• PDX Portland
• SAN San Diego
• SFO San Francisco
• SEA Seattle
• TPA Tampa
• WASWashington
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Table C.1: Variables Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
City Data
House Price Index Case-Shiller Index by MSA http://www.macromarkets.com
Mortgage Rate Mortgage rate by MSA Federal Housing Finance Board(FHFB)
and author’s calculation
Real Personal Income Per capita real disposable income by MSA U.S.Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Inflation Rate Urban inflation rate ( year 2000 =100) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Expected Inflation Rate Median expected price change next 12 months Surveys of Consumers, University of Michigan
Housing Stock Building permits by MSA U.S. Census Bureau
Mortgage Credit Constraint Loan-to-value ratio for first time borrower by MSA Federal Housing Finance Board(FHFB)
Unemployment Rate Unemployment rate by MSA U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Income Tax Average tax rate Internal Revenue Services
Population Total population by MSA U.S.Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Country Data
House Price Index U.S. Monthly House Price Index Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO)
Number of Houses Sold Number of House Sold (units) U.S. Census Bureau
TED Spread Difference between LIBOR USD 3-month Federal Reserve Statistical Release
and 3-month T-Bill rate
Ratio of Housing Loans Ratio of mortgage loans by non-bank financial institutions Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve Statistical Release
to total mortgage loans
Credit Default Swap CDX Index Bloomberg
GDP per capita Interpolate series of real GDP per capita (2000 price) U.S.Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Household Consumption per capita Interpolate series of real household consumption U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
per capita (2000 price)
C.2 City Data: Panel Unit Root Test
The test is not performed on mortgage rate and expected inflation since there is
no variation across groups of MSA.
. local var lcase lry lu lpop lhs lm
. foreach x of local var {
2. levinlin `x´, lags(4)
3. }
Levin-Lin-Chu test for lcase Deterministics chosen: constant
Pooled ADF test, N,T = (18,186) Obs = 3258
Augmented by 4 lags (average) Truncation: 18 lags
coefficient t-value t-star P > t
-0.00191 -3.804 0.85944 0.8050
Levin-Lin-Chu test for lry Deterministics chosen: constant
Pooled ADF test, N,T = (18,192) Obs = 3366
Augmented by 4 lags (average) Truncation: 18 lags
coefficient t-value t-star P > t
-0.00704 -1.723 1.44658 0.9260
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Levin-Lin-Chu test for lu Deterministics chosen: constant
Pooled ADF test, N,T = (18,192) Obs = 3366
Augmented by 4 lags (average) Truncation: 18 lags
coefficient t-value t-star P > t
-0.03692 -7.269 -1.26346 0.1032
Levin-Lin-Chu test for lpop Deterministics chosen: constant
Pooled ADF test, N,T = (18,192) Obs = 3366
Augmented by 4 lags (average) Truncation: 18 lags
coefficient t-value t-star P > t
-0.01123 -11.269 -14.03667 0.0000
Levin-Lin-Chu test for lhs Deterministics chosen: constant
Pooled ADF test, N,T = (18,192) Obs = 3366
Augmented by 4 lags (average) Truncation: 18 lags
coefficient t-value t-star P > t
-0.23116 -12.742 -0.39991 0.3446
Levin-Lin-Chu test for lm Deterministics chosen: constant
Pooled ADF test, N,T = (18,190) Obs = 3330
Augmented by 4 lags (average) Truncation: 18 lags
coefficient t-value t-star P > t
-0.02246 -5.788 0.38533 0.6500
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C.3 National Data: Tests on Unit Root Test, Residual Stabil-
ity , Autocorrelation, and Estimation of Impulse Response
Function
C.3.1 Unit Root Test of Log Form
. local var lhp lmort_ratio lspread lcdx lry lrc lhsold
. foreach x of local var{
2. dfuller `x´ , lag(3) trend
3. }
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 59
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) 1.006 -4.130 -3.491 -3.175
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 1.0000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 58
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -1.877 -4.132 -3.492 -3.175
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.6664
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 59
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Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -3.336 -4.130 -3.491 -3.175
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0606
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 59
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -0.075 -4.130 -3.491 -3.175
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9934
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 59
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) 0.134 -4.130 -3.491 -3.175
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9954
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 59
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) 2.000 -4.130 -3.491 -3.175
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 1.0000
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 59
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -0.841 -4.130 -3.491 -3.175
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9621
.
.
. local var lhp lmort_ratio lspread lcdx lry lrc lhsold
. foreach x of local var{
2. dfuller d.`x´, lag(3) drift
3. }
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 58
Z(t) has t-distribution
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -1.362 -2.399 -1.674 -1.298
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0894
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 57
Z(t) has t-distribution
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -5.187 -2.400 -1.675 -1.298
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p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 58
Z(t) has t-distribution
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -5.102 -2.399 -1.674 -1.298
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 58
Z(t) has t-distribution
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -3.891 -2.399 -1.674 -1.298
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0001
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 58
Z(t) has t-distribution
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -3.357 -2.399 -1.674 -1.298
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0007
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 58
Z(t) has t-distribution
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
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Z(t) -3.412 -2.399 -1.674 -1.298
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0006
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root Number of obs = 58
Z(t) has t-distribution
Test 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical
Statistic Value Value Value
Z(t) -3.647 -2.399 -1.674 -1.298
p-value for Z(t) = 0.0003
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C.3.2 Test on Residual Stability
. vecstable, graph
Eigenvalue Modulus
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
.9630396 .96304
.5215825 + .2799811i .591978
.5215825 - .2799811i .591978
.1310107 + .5717102i .586529
.1310107 - .5717102i .586529
-.5056534 .505653
-.2586157 + .390979i .468771
-.2586157 - .390979i .468771
-.3197164 .319716
The VECM specification imposes 5 unit moduli.
C.3.3 Test of Autocorrelation of Residuals
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. veclmar
Lagrange-multiplier test
lag chi2 df Prob > chi2
1 76.3271 49 0.00748
2 61.5405 49 0.10776
H0: no autocorrelation at lag order
Figure C.1: Roots of Companion Matrix
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The VECM specification imposes 5 unit moduli
Roots of the companion matrix
Source: Author´s Calculation
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C.3.4 Impulse Response Function
. irf table coirf, irf(vec1) impulse(lhp) ;
response(lmort_ratio_i lspread lcdx lry_i lrc_i lhsold)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
step coirf coirf coirf coirf coirf coirf
0 .001581 -.03416 .000645 .000559 .000211 .011276
1 .003862 -.068617 .018337 .004487 .002979 .028407
2 .00539 -.081916 .023062 .00834 .004952 .046397
3 .006996 -.034601 .011934 .012213 .006593 .068494
4 .008322 .029599 -.008689 .016505 .008543 .094275
5 .009607 .086315 -.032539 .020714 .010454 .12292
6 .010775 .145687 -.057735 .025014 .012565 .153995
7 .011884 .206562 -.089067 .029502 .014995 .18744
8 .012975 .265101 -.128235 .034158 .017727 .22359
9 .014072 .320018 -.174394 .038996 .02076 .262399
10 .015167 .371736 -.226894 .044017 .02408 .303726
11 .016256 .421312 -.28564 .049212 .027669 .347456
12 .017337 .469257 -.350565 .054578 .031515 .39352
13 .018413 .515546 -.421427 .060105 .035605 .441839
14 .01948 .560213 -.497901 .065785 .039928 .492326
15 .02054 .603388 -.579734 .071614 .044475 .54489
16 .021591 .645162 -.666739 .077584 .049237 .599455
17 .022635 .685569 -.758737 .08369 .054207 .655947
18 .023671 .724636 -.855543 .089928 .059378 .714295
19 .0247 .762402 -.956974 .096293 .064742 .774431
20 .025723 .798916 -1.06286 .10278 .070293 .836288
21 .026739 .834227 -1.17304 .109384 .076022 .899803
22 .027748 .868377 -1.28736 .116101 .081924 .964915
23 .028752 .901409 -1.40566 .122928 .087992 1.03156
24 .02975 .933365 -1.52779 .129859 .09422 1.0997
(1) irfname = vec1, impulse = house price, and response = Mortgage ratio
(2) irfname = vec1, impulse = house price, and response = TED Spread
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(3) irfname = vec1, impulse = house price, and response = CDX index
(4) irfname = vec1, impulse = house price, and response = Real GDP per capita
(5) irfname = vec1, impulse = house price, and response = Real consumption per capita
(6) irfname = vec1, impulse = house price, and response = Number of house sold
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Table C.2: Subprime Crisis in Chronological Order, 2006–2007
Late 2006 The U.S. housing market slows after 2 years of increases in official interest rates. Delinquencies rise, a wave of bankruptcies.
Feb 7 Europe’s biggest bank HSBC holdings blamed soured U.S. subprime loans for its first-ever profit waning.
Feb 13 Country-wide shares drop as Fremont General Corp., one of the largest providers of subprime loans, says it has stopped offering some second mortgages.
Apr 2 Subprime lender New Century Financial Corp. files for bankruptcy.
Jun 20 Two Bear Stearns funds sell 4 billion USD of assets to cover redemptions and expected margin calls after making bad bets on securities backed by subprime mortgages.
Jul 10 Standard & Poors said it may cut ratings on some 12 billion USD of subprime debt.
Jul 17 Bear Stearns says two hedge funds with subprime exposure have very little value; credit spreads soar.
Jul 20 Home foreclosures rise 9 percent in July from June and soar 93 percent from the previous year.
Aug 9 French bank BNP Paribas bars investors from redeeming cash in 2.2 billion USD worth of funds, telling the markets it is unable to calculate the value of the asset-backed securities funds.
Aug 10 Central banks pump billions of dollars into banking systems in a concerted effort to beat back a credit crisis.
Aug 17 Fed surprises by cutting its discount rate by half a percentage point to 5.75 percent, cites tightening credit markets.
Sep 13 UK mortgage lender Northern Rock seeks emergency financial support from the Bank of England. The report sparked a run on the banks deposits by worried savers.
Oct 1 Swiss bank UBS says it would write down 3.4 billion USD in its fixed-income portfolio and elsewhere, first quarterly loss in 9 years.
Oct 15 Bank of America, Citigroup, and JP Morgan Chase plan fund to pool assets from stressed SIVs to prevent a fire sale of these assets.
Oct 30 Merrill Lynch ousts Chairman and Chief Executive Stan ONeal after reporting biggest quarterly loss in company’s history.
Nov 4 Citigroup announces a further 8–11 billion USD of subprime-related writedowns and losses. Charles Prince resigns as CEO.
Dec 6 Treasury, lenders set plan to bring reset relief to many of the 2 million homeowners facing higher rates.
Dec 12, 2007 Central banks coordinate the launch of a new temporary term auction facility to address pressures in short-term funding markets.
Mar 16, 2008 Bear Stearns is acquired for 2 USD a share by JP Morgan Chase in a fire sale avoiding bankruptcy. The deal is backed by the Federal Reserve,
providing up to 30 billion USD to cover possible Bear Stearn losses.
Jul 17 Major banks and financial institutions had borrowed and invested heavily in mortgage backed securities and report losses of approximately 435 billion USD.
Sep 14 Merrill Lynch is sold to Bank of America amidst fears of a liquidity crisis and Lehman Brothers collapse.
Sep 15 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protection.
Sep 17 The U.S. Federal Reserve lends 85 billion USD to American International Group (AIG) to avoid bankruptcy.
Oct 3 President George W. Bush signs the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, creating a 700 billion USD Troubled Assets Relief Program to purchase failing bank assets.
Oct 6 Fed announces that it will provide 900 billion USD in short-term cash loans to banks.
Oct 7 Fed makes emergency move to lend around 1.3 trillion USD directly to companies outside the financial sector.
Nov 24 The U.S. government agrees to rescue Citigroup after an attack by investors causes the stock price to plummet 60 percent over the previous week under a detailed plan that
including injecting another 20 billion USD of capital into Citigroup bringing the total infusion to 45 billion USD.
Nov 25 The U.S. Federal Reserve pledges 800 billion USD more to help revive the financial system. 600 billion USD will be used to buy mortgage bonds issued or guaranteed by
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Banks.
Source: Longstaff (n.d.)
and Author’s Compilation
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